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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Designing Certainty 
 The Rise of Algorithmic Computing in an Age of Anxiety 
1920-1970 
by 
Theodora Jewell Dryer 
Doctor of Philosophy in History (Science Studies) 
University of California San Diego, 2019 
Professor Cathy Gere, Chair 
This dissertation offers a political history of the cultural trope and technical apparatus: 
‘with 95% certainty,’ and of uncertainty more broadly, from the early 1920s mathematical statistics 
movement through the design of FORTRAN and ALGOL language digital algorithms of the 1960s 
and 1970s. The work features a prominent twentieth-century data architecture: confidence interval 
parameters (CIs). Confidence intervals are statistical hypothesis tests, and experimental design 
mechanisms, used to make estimations about statistical data, and inform subsequent decision-
making based on that information and analysis. CIs connect across digital and predigital computing 
and function as part of the underpinning logical and political infrastructures that make algorithmic 
decision-making possible. I situate digital algorithms and statistical hypothesis tests as common ‘data 
xvii 
architectures,’ that operate under uncertainty (probabilistic thinking), and that are designed to make 
certainty claims (political decisions) based on a set of information. By the 1960s, digital algorithms 
were designed to take over the (un)certainty work of human computers.  
At the scale of experimental data design, there are key computing concepts at work: 
confidence (measure of validity), control (randomization), and uncertainty (probability limits) that 
hold technical-mathematical meanings. I argue these computing concepts also hold affective 
meanings, driven by human desires and anxieties. I link historical instances and applications of CI 
logics, a practice that I term ‘confidence computing,’ with much larger historical forces in 
agriculture, militarism, and environmental policy. I follow iterations of CI logics across a hundred-
year period, and in global applications in Poland, India, England, the United States, and Navajo and 
Hopi land. I put forward two analytic categories to connect across these contexts: ‘(un)certainty 
work’ is the twofold process of translating data into probabilistic information and analysis and 
making certainty claims based on that information and analysis. And ‘computing landscapes’ are the 
geographical areas of land, and political and cultural contexts, that are altered and transformed 
through this computing work.  
I argue this: Between 1920 and 1970 an information transformation occurred that 
reconfigured economic, scientific, and environmental planning processes under a shared program to 
command uncertainty in data management. This information movement is driven by iterations of 
crisis that begin in the aftermath of WWI. Designations of crisis are generative of new technical 
(un)certainty designs and new information systems just as they reaffirm extant information and 
power structures. Waves of crisis and responsive computational design (and redesign) therefore give 
impetus to an expanding power of (un)certainty work and oversight, across the twentieth-century. 
Along this trajectory, confidence interval logics morph from handwritten statistical information on 
graphing paper, through punch-card ballistics analysis, to coded inputs in digital system processing.  
The chapters of this dissertation: crisis, confidence, control, (un)certainty, and climate, are 
defined by war and crisis. The story begins in the aftermath of WWI in the context of a growing 
agricultural industrialism, expanding western capitalism, and drought management. In the lead-up to 
WWII, the rising aerial bombing economy then severs computational logics from their agrarian 
roots and assumes a vantage point from 10,000 feet, “bombsight optics.” In the aftermath of WWII, 
the U.S. war in Korea and the subsequent proxy wars were vectors for the expansion of 
(un)certainty work, originating in the firestorm bombing of North African beaches. Throughout the 
Cold War period, weather control programs, built with confidence logics, generated a new aerial-
xviii 
agricultural economy to be taken over by the management of automated decision-making 
systems. Designing Certainty ends where the story begins, with farm management. But this is 
now an agricultural economy that has incorporated the colonial and aerial perspectives emergent 
from decades of war.  
Designing Certainty features the archives and work of Polish logician and statistician Jerzy 
Spława-Neyman, the confidence interval’s initial designer. I move away from a male figurehead 
genealogy and history and do not cast Neyman as the primary agent or “father” of CI logics. Rather, 
this is a history of the world he lived in, of the many actors, influences, and historical contingencies 
that contributed to the rise of (un)certainty computing as a dominant epistemological and political 
force. My research on CI logics spans over 20 archives and special collections and technical and 
cultural materials over a century. 
1 
Chapter 0: Introduction 
Mapping Uncertainty between Crisis and Confidence 
Designing Certainty 
This dissertation is a history of uncertainty and the rise of algorithmic computing. It is a 
story about numbers and mathematical logic, small and big data, digital and analog computing 
machines, and of the promises of rationality to make the modern world make sense. Above all, 
however, it is a history of crisis and anxiety. I argue that algorithmic computing is a modern mode of 
quantitative governance that grew out of efforts to manage war, colonialism, economic and 
technological expansion, drought, and climate change. In Designing Certainty, I aim to confront 
Figure 1: “Confidence Intervals,” Box 60, Egon Sharpe Pearson Papers, University 
College London Special Collections.  
  2 
mathematical logic and computational design through their concrete manifestations and real-world 
applications. Engaging the dreams and ambitions of those who designed the systems, I reflect on the 
often-devastating impact that these systems have had on the human and environmental worlds. 
My history of algorithmic computing is foremost a history of information and data. I define 
algorithmic computing as a multinational and multidisciplinary reordering of the informational world, according to 
axiomatic-mathematical designs and bounded by computing technologies.  Between 1920 and 1970, an 
information transformation occurred that reconfigured economic, scientific, and environmental 
planning processes under a shared program to command uncertainty in data management.1 I argue 
that the catalyst for this transformation was not the famed electronic memory-stored digital 
computer. Rather, much earlier in the twentieth century, this information movement, catalyzed by 
                                               
1 Designing Certainty contributes to a robust and growing scholarship in histories of data, information, and 
quantification. My work is inspired by the newer field of critical data studies defined as the systematic study of 
data and its criticisms, usually pertaining to Big Data, see: Kate Crawford, “The Anxieties of Big Data,” The 
New Inquiry (2014), http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-anxieties-of-big-data/; Andrew Iliadis and Fredrica 
Russo, “Critical Data Studies: An Introduction,” Big Data & Society (2016): 1-7. For histories that seek to 
define data, see: Rob Kitchin, The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures & Their Consequences 
(Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014); Daniel Rosenberg, “Data Before the Fact,” in “Raw Data” Is an Oxymoron ed. Lisa 
Gitelman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013). On early modern histories of data, see: Daniel Rosenberg, “Early 
Modern Information Overload,” Journal of the History of Ideas 64, no. 1(2003): 1-9; Staffan Müller-Wille and 
Isabelle Charmantier, “Natural history and information overload: The case of Linneaus,” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43, no. 1 (2012): 4-15.  
For histories of data and surveillance, and mass data, see: Ruha Benjamin, Race After Technology: Abolitionist 
Tools for the New Jim Code (Cambridge and Medford: Polity Press, 2019); Caitlin Rosenthal, Accounting for Slavery: 
Masters and Management (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018); Matthew Jones, “Querying the Archive: 
Data Mining from Apriori to Page Rank,” in L. Daston, ed. Archives of the Sciences (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2016); Sarah E. Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008); Sarah E. Igo, The Known Citizen: A History of Privacy in Modern America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018); Dan Bouk, “The History and Political Economy of Personal 
Data over the Last Two Centuries in Three Acts,” Osiris 32, no. 1 (2017): 85-106.  
For histories of life and death data, see: Ian Hacking, “Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed 
Numbers,” Culture and History (1983); Kim TallBear, “Beyond the Life/Not Life Binary: A Feminist-
Indigenous Reading of Cryopreservation, Interspecies Thinking and the New Materialisms,” in Cryopolitics: 
Frozen Life in a Melting World, eds. Joanna Radin and Emma Kowal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017); Kim 
TallBear, “The Emergence, Politics, and Marketplace of Native American DNA,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Science, Technology, and Society, eds. Daniel Lee Kleinman and Kelly Moore (London: 
Routledge, 2014): 21-37. Jacqueline Wernimont, Life and Death in Quantum Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2018); Rebecca M. Lemov, Database of Dreams: The Lost Quest to Catalog Humanity (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2015). 
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assertions of informational crisis, gave impetus to drive probabilistic reasoning over state, society, 
and technology, mobilizing powerful data economies and computing infrastructures to sustain the 
ascendant epistemology. This movement set out to wrangle a whole world of missing, incomplete, 
and porous information, hold it still, and transfigure it into predictive frameworks.  
These transformations in knowledge production did not occur solely in the realm of 
abstraction but through computational labor, technological design, and political and economic 
intervention. The movement constitutes one of the most metamorphic events of the twentieth 
century, but it has been hidden in plain sight. Like its subject, histories of quantification are hard to 
hold still, as the power of numbers resides precisely in the ways they are designed to disappear.2  
The Object: Confidence Intervals  
My site of study, or the vessel that has carried me through this vast terrain, is a statistical inference 
tool—the confidence interval parameter (CI)—that was first computed in 1920s Warsaw, Poland 
(chapter 2). In practice, CIs are known as interval estimates, created from observed data that can 
predict an unobserved general population value of interest. They are typically visualized and taught 
as bounded areas in a normal density curve; a 95% confidence interval is said to cover 95% of the 
area under the curve. The unobserved population value is thereby estimated to fall in this range.  
They are quantified measures of the limits of knowability within a designed statistical experiment.  
2 For cornerstone literature on giving history to these slippery numerical methods, see: Theodore Porter, 
“Funny Numbers,” Culture Unbound (online journal), 4 (2012): 585-598; Martha Lampland, “False numbers as 
formalizing practices,” Social Studies of Science 40, no. 3 (2010): 377-404.  
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The confidence interval parameter was designed before the 1950s wave of algorithmic theory 
and applied optimal-decision algorithms, and before the 1970s and 1980s wave of FORTRAN-
language algorithms in digital computing. CI logics travel through these later information shifts, and 
morph into corresponding iterations along the way, but they first proliferated in the interwar 
world—they are mathematical logics built into the DNA of digital computing.  
 
 
The core mathematical problem confidence intervals are designed to solve is the problem of 
estimating the parameters of an unknown population value in statistics from a sample. Since the turn 
of the nineteenth century, it had become common practice to take statistical samples. It was 
impossible in both government and scientific statistics to enumerate entire populations (e.g. an 
entire country of people or a microscale universe of virulent particles. Statistical work depended on 
statistical estimation. Confidence intervals are a way of bounding the estimation processes. For 
example, in estimating the time of day, one person may say it is 3 o’ clock, which is a point estimate. 
Another person may say that is somewhere between 3 and 4, which is an interval estimate. A 
Figure 2: UCL, “Confidence Intervals,” https://tinyurl.com/y3utonfd 
(accessed May 20, 2015). 
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confidence interval is an interval that is ascribed a certain probability of being correct. The wider the 
interval, the higher the probability that the interval contains the true value, for example: 
To be 100% sure that the interval contains the true time we would have to make the 
interval twenty-four hours long. This interval is of no use so we reduce the level of 
confidence. To be fairly confident, but not 100% sure of containing the true value, we 
may go from 5 minutes before 3 to 5 minutes after 3. 3  
 
This example taken from a 1970s classroom demonstration of a confidence interval, explains the 
logic behind CIs. The more precise one is in their estimation (exactly 3:00 pm), the less likely they 
are correct; the wider their estimation interval (between 3:00 a.m. and 3:00 pm), the more likely they 
are correct. In using interval estimation, certainty is relinquished for accuracy, and vice versa.  
 Confidence intervals are chosen before the experiment is conducted—the experimental 
designer determines their interval or what percentage of certainty they would like to hold in the 
experiment, for example 90%, 95%, or 99%, before conducting the calculations. In this 1970s 
classroom experiment, 12 students selected 9 random samples from a larger unknown population set 
with the mean value, 𝜇. Their job was to estimate this value, 𝜇. First the students calculated the 
sample mean and standard deviation for their individual sets and drew intervals of estimation that 
the real value of the population set falls within their range of values, using this equation:  
 
𝐿! 	= 𝑋$ − 𝑡 ∙ 𝑠√9  
 
and  
 
𝐿) 	= 𝑋$ + 𝑡 ∙ 𝑠√9  
                                               
3 For this pedagogical example from a 1970s U.S. classroom, see: Wayne Andrepont and Peter Dickenson, 
“Classroom Demonstration of a Confidence Interval,” The Two-Year College Mathematics Journal 9, no. 1 (1978): 
24-36.  
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The upper limit, 𝐿 !	 is equal to sample mean, $𝑋 minus the t-value multiplied by the standard 
deviation, 𝑠 .4 This is then divided by the root of the total number of samples, √9. This equation 
draws lower and upper limits to their interval estimations, after inputting their preselected p-value: 
95% while computing the t-value.  
The predetermined 95% is at work at multiple scales of the experiment. First as each student 
calculates t-values for their 9 samples, they input their preselected probability-value, 95%. Then, as 
pictured below, all of the students plotted their intervals. The teacher explained, “To give the 
students a visual demonstration of the meaning of a 95% confidence interval, the intervals calculated 
by all of the students can be plotted. Approximately 95% of the intervals should cross the line, 𝜇.” 
Figure 3: Interval Estimations 
4 t-values are found in t-tables, a statistical tool that was designed in 1925, during the confidence computing 
movement, by a Scottish beer brewer and statistician named William Gosset or ‘student.’ They were designed 
to make estimations at small scales with small sets of data that circulated in the form of reference chart of 
values. Student’s equation and corresponding t-table values are estimations of sample means when the 
standard deviation is unknown. They operate in small and incomplete sets of data and are used to construct 
confidence intervals. They are, in many ways, micro estimation tools.  
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This diagram shows that out of all the interval estimations made for the mean value of the 
population set, by all of the students, 95% of them will have made estimates that contain the true 
value of this estimation. This aggregate plotting can also be visualized as a bell curve, as pictured in 
the first image. The bell curve is the common representation for confidence intervals, even though it 
doesn’t represent the many layers of calculation.  
Over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries we have disengaged with the 
epistemic and political complexity of this enormously impactful statistical architecture. In this 
classroom experiment, the method is taught as intuitive and procedural. However, uncertainty lurks. 
Even within a single experiment, there are many different meanings and measures for uncertainty and 
confidence. Even experimental control, or randomization, can occur in different ways and introduce 
bias. For example, each student can sample from the population set and then return their sample to 
the set before the next student samples, or they might keep their sample before the next student 
conducts a sample, changing the mathematical parameters of the experiment.  
More confusion lurks at the level of practice, calculation, and description. Philosopher of 
science Ian Hacking has warned that inductive statements made about confidence intervals are 
frequently confused. For example, compare the following two statements: 
a. The probability that the quantity q lies in the interval I is 95%.  
b. On the basis of our data, we estimate that an unknown quantity q lies in an 
interval I; this estimate is made according to a method that is right with 
probability at least 95%.5  
 
The first statement claims that the statistical thinker is 95% confident the interval area contains their 
real value of interest. The second statement claims that the statistical thinker has made a statistical 
                                               
5 Ian Hacking, An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
235. 
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estimate with some method such as regression analysis and is 95% confident that the estimate 
generated by their method is correct.  
My core historical intervention is to confront information governance in the interwar period 
(1920-1940) through engaging real-world applications of CI logics. In so doing, I uncover the 
historical processes that gave rise to our late twentieth-century algorithmic society. Through this 
analysis, I have isolated three dimensions or expressions of CI logics, which I argue constitute three 
of the most important computing concepts across the twentieth-century: Confidence (chapter 2), 
Control (chapter 3), and Uncertainty (chapter 4) and in Climate (chapter 5), these computing 
concepts converge into Cold War weather modification programs and digital machinery.6  
In 1929, when numerical calculations for this data architecture were first computed, 
confidence was both a mathematical and economic concept, which held technical and affective-
cultural meanings. What I call, confidence computing, emblematized by confidence interval logics, began 
as an interwar information movement to command uncertainty and assert control over preexisting 
and burgeoning domains of data production. At the level of data and analysis, confidence computing 
is a practice of identifying and minimizing error in statistical work and translating it into probabilities 
in order to garner public confidence in the information. By the end of the twentieth century, 
confidence would rarify into a digital computing mechanism and concept—achieving status quo in 
university mathematics and computer science education, and become embedded in software, 
hardware, and big data analysis. The ubiquitous cultural trope— ‘with 95% certainty’—owes its 
existence to CI logics; they are also known in practice as confidence measures, confidence levels, 
                                               
6 An obviously important fourth twentieth-century computing concept is ‘efficiency’ that is bound into these 
concepts, as they were fueled by industrial capitalism. There is a wide body of literature on histories of 
efficiency and its offspring, ‘optimality’ that is addressed in subsequent chapters. 
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certainty parameters, and interval measures, and are part of a larger family of p-value tests, statistical 
significance, statistical correlations, and so on.  
Confidence logics are data architectures used to dictate processes of data collection, test the 
validity of data, and provide visual-mathematical evidence of the outcomes. They are axiomatic 
mathematical frameworks used to quantify mathematical confidence and build affective confidence in data 
analysis. Affective confidence then contributes to the valuation of the system, as it gains social and 
economic power. There is a shift in confidence-computing labor between the early and late 
twentieth-century. In the early-twentieth century, a confidence computer was part statistician, part 
philosopher and logician, and part farmer or industrialist. By the late-twentieth century, confidence 
computing is largely delegated to confidence algorithms and digital computing software. In the 
course of this transformation, human computational labor has not disappeared, but is gradually 
veiled behind larger algorithmic systems. This shift from logician to logic algorithm is the backbone 
of Designing Certainty. However, this history cannot be reduced to technological or mathematical 
determinism: these designs of certainty came to power through much larger human forces.  
The chapters of this dissertation are shaped by war and crisis rather that corresponds with 
technological change. The first half of Designing Certainty contends with the aftermath of WWI in the 
context of a growing agricultural industrialism, expanding western capitalism, and drought 
management. In the lead-up to WWII, the rising aerial bombing economy then severs computational 
logics from their agrarian roots and assumes a vantage point from 10,000 feet— “bombsight 
optics.” In the aftermath of WWII, the U.S. war in Korea and the subsequent proxy wars were 
vectors for the expansion of (un)certainty work originating in the firebombing of North African 
beaches. In the Cold War period, weather control programs, built with confidence logics, generated 
a new aerial-agricultural economy to be taken over by the management of automated decision-
making systems. Designing Certainty ends where the story begins—with farm management. But this is 
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now an agricultural economy that has incorporated the colonial and aerial perspectives born of 
decades of war. 
My archives have likewise been shaped by war and crisis. Many are material products of 
military and state confidence computing programs that resulted in devastating human and 
environmental destruction. My central human protagonist and initial confidence interval designer is 
Polish logician Jerzy Spława-Neyman—his archives exist by happenstance. He moved a number of 
times throughout the twentieth-century: first, after spending a year in a soviet prison during WWI as 
his home country disappeared, then after his new home of Warsaw was occupied by the Nazis. The 
Gestapo murdered most of the logicians and statisticians in the initial confidence computing 
collective and burned their libraries. Some of the statistics materials that moved with Neyman to his 
subsequent position at the University College London were destroyed in the London Blitz. I found 
surviving copies of Warsaw’s journal Statistica (1929-1939), but many of the sources pertaining to 
confidence interval logics were generated retrospectively in the 1970s and 1980s, an overdetermined 
resource that made it difficult to read the story forward, a source of my anxiety.  
 
The Age of Anxiety  
I define anxiety as a captivation with/by the past that manifests as a conditioned worry about the future.7 Anxiety, 
like confidence computing, flourished in the aftermath of WWI. It was widely understood to be an 
outcome of military trauma.8 Medical and public health professionals worked to make sense of the 
mental anguish that had followed soldiers home. This overwhelming state of worry and anxiety 
                                               
7 I am thinking about captivation in two ways: to hold the attention or interest of, as by beauty or excellence; 
to capture and subjugate.   
8 “In Moments of Anxiety,” The Biblical World 51, no. 4 (1918): 193-194.  
  11 
experienced by soldiers, only produced more worry and anxiety about how to live normally under 
such a condition. In the legal and medical domains, material manifestations of anxiety were sought 
after, such as the loss of work wage labor, in order to establish social legitimacy for the otherwise 
elusive ailment.9  
Anxiety first emerged as a symptom of shell shock and a manifestation of hysteria in 
psychoanalysis.10 After WWI, anxiety evolved into its own medical condition with its own sciences 
and typologies of interpretation. Psychologists defined “anxiety neurosis” as a condition of always 
waiting for the future, a chronic anticipation. And this was largely studied in homecoming soldiers:  
…the man in the navy was not subjected so frequently as his comrade in the army to 
the actual strain of battle, and consequently did not experience the vivid emotional 
disturbances accompanying imminent unavoidable danger. The sailor had to bear the 
stress of chronic anticipation […] and developed the anxiety neurosis rather than the 
hysterical dissociation. 11   
 
In this rendering, anxiety describes the experience by which the Navy solider is spared the horrors of 
the battlefield, only to become subject to their anticipation.  
After 1926, practical field studies of anxiety corresponding to military shock collided with 
Sigmund Freud’s new theoretical framework of the ego, producing anxiety-neurosis.12 In Freud’s 
framing, anxiety was one of the ways in which the ego relieves itself of repressed wishes which have 
become too strong. Freud’s theories of neurotic anxiety proliferated as psychologists sought to 
define the personality of the anxious individual, with behavioral descriptions such as, “an anxious 
                                               
9 M.H.V.G., “Mental Suffering: Evidence of Plantiff’s Poverty,” California Law Review 7, no. 4 (1919).  
10 For example, George M. Parker, “The New Meaning of Symptoms in Hysteria,” The Cleveland Medical Journal 
XI, no. 4 (1912): 248-49; Sigmund Freud, “The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis,” The American 
Journal of Psychology xxxi, no. 2 (1910); R.T. Williamson, “Remarks on the Treatment of Neurasthenia and 
Psychasthenia Following Shell Shock,” The British Medical Journal 2, no. 2970 (1917): 713. 
11 “The Psycho-Neuroses,” The British Medical Journal 1, no. 3090 (1920): 408.  
12 Sigmund Freud, “The Justification for Detaching from Neurasthenia a Particular Syndrome: The Anxiety-
Neurosis,” in Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (London: Hogarth Press, 1953); Robert R. Morris, “Anxiety: Freud and 
Theology,” Journal of Religion and Health 12, no. 2 (1973). 
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person needs to control their environment.” Anxiety was studied in terms of an individual’s fears—
the objects of anxiety. For Freud, the greatest fear was the fear of castration, but all fears belonged 
to the future. The chronic anticipation of an uncertain future is referenced throughout the 
twentieth-century as a void, an abyss, a chasm. In 1944, W.H. Auden, began his book-length poem 
The Age of Anxiety with reference to this void, and the failure of historical processes to make sense of 
it: “When the historical process breaks down and armies organize with their embossed debates the 
ensuing void which they can never consecrate […].”13  
 “The Age of Anxiety” is a historical epoch, characterized in reference to Auden’s Baroque 
Eclogue, a poem responsive to the atrocities of WWII. Historians have used Auden’s poem as the 
core analytic description of the period. Some have used the phrase to express the chronic 
anticipation of nuclear holocaust that shaped Cold War politics.14 There are also a number of studies 
that play with the idea of an age of anxiety in the twentieth-century, by linking to histories of 
tranquilizing drugs in this same epoch, conflating anxiety as a mental anguish produced by war, with 
anxiety as a pharmaceutical product.15 I demarcate ‘the age of anxiety’ beginning after WWI, in order 
to draw explicit attention to the irrational, emotional, and affective forces driving numerical 
governance under the guise of bounded rationality, and to situate confidence computing within 
contexts of war, colonialism, technological expansionism, and climate change.   
                                               
13 W.H. Auden: “The Age of Anxiety: A Baroque Eclogue,” in W.H. Auden Collected Poems, ed. Edward 
Mendelson (New York: Vintage International, 1991: 447. Thank you to Janine Utell and J.P. Spiro for 
discussing anxiety and the interwar literary world with me and for giving me this book.  
14 Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War (Chapel 
Hill/London: University of North Carolina Press, 1999): K.A. Cuordileone, “Politics in an Age of Anxiety”: 
Cold War Political Culture and the Crisis in American Masculinity, 1949-1960,” The Journal of American History 
87, no. 2 (2000): 515-545.   
15 Andrea Tone, The Age of Anxiety: A History of America’s Turbulent Affair with Tranquilizers (New York: Basic 
Books, 2009); Mickey C. Smith, A Social History of the Minor Tranquilizers: The Quest for Small Comfort in the Age of 
Anxiety (New York/London: Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1991).  
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Beyond Auden, there was a much wider constellation of twentieth-century public 
intellectuals, psychoanalysts, and authors who read the twentieth-century through frameworks of 
anxiety.16 These works reveal the age of anxiety to be a symptom of eurocentrism. Immediately after 
WWI, French scholar Paul Valéry wrote The Crisis of the Mind that was foremost a manifesto on 
European superiority and secondly an explanation of the “crisis of the mind” in art, literature, and 
philosophy that would inevitably follow the economic and military crises of WWI. His response 
makes explicit the ways in which the age of anxiety is really a crisis of the old guard. Anxiety was 
caused by the revelation of doubt in the superiority of European civilization, as captured in his 
statement, “everything has not been lost, but everything has sensed that it might perish.” Valéry’s 
anxiety denotes a consciousness that Europe has lost its sense of superiority after the bloodbath of 
WWI. Drawing attention to the complicity of European liberalism in producing wartime atrocities, 
Hannah Arendt notes that Valéry had donated money to the Third Reich’s early presence in Paris. 
For Arendt, the incomprehensible void of understanding following WWII is not really a void but 
can be explained in terms of two power structures: race and bureaucracy.17  
Throughout the 1960s, the period when this dissertation ends, French psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan held his infamous anxiety seminars, that he titled l’angoisse (anguish) rather than anxiété.18 
Lacan’s 1960s corpus on anxiety is itself a semi-psychotic display of inconsistencies, experimental 
semiotics, and obscure diagrams, but his main contribution was to break from fear as the object of 
                                               
16 Alan Watts, The Wisdom of Insecurity: A Message for an Age of Anxiety (New York: Pantheon Books, 1951).  
17 See: Susannah Young-ah Gottlieb, Regions of Sorrow: Anxiety and Messianism in Hannah Arendt and W.H. Auden. 
Gottlieb links Auden to Arendt as literary figures that believe speech could be the redemption after world war 
II—it is the uncertainty of this hope that produces anxiety.  
18 Robert Harari, Lacan’s Seminar on Anxiety: An Introduction, trans. Jane. C. Ruiz (New York: The Other Press, 
2001); Jacques Lacan, Séminaire X: L’angoisse (Paris: Seuil, 2004); Erica Harris, “Sidestepping the Problem of 
the Unconscious: Why We Ought to Reframe the Lacan/Merleau-Ponty Debate in Bodily Terms,” The Journal 
of Speculative Philosophy, 30, no. 3 (2016): 267-277.  
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anxiety.19 For Lacan, anxiety has no object, only the absence and possibility of the object. He situates 
anxiety as a median between desire and jouissance — “Desire is always linked to dissatisfaction (to the 
lack of the object), while jouissance brings the subject close to the object, often in most painful ways.” 
Anxiety, therefore is bounded between the object of desire and the painful pleasure of its unending 
pursuit: it is at 95%. Anxiety is insatiable, and it is driven by guilt.  
Freud, Lacan, and postcolonial psychoanalyst Frantz Fanon link anxiety to guilt. For Fanon 
anxiety is a condition caused under the dominance of colonial rule. Anxiety manifests in the 
personality of the colonial subject as well as in the colonizer, as a direct outcome of guilt. For the 
subject, this is an embodied condition whereas the settler’s anxiety is in losing control of the future, 
as with the crisis of eurocentrism described by Valéry. Fanon describes the embodied condition of 
anxiety in the context of colonial domination:  
As soon as the native begins to pull on his moorings, and to cause anxiety to the settler, 
he is handed over to well-meaning souls who in cultural congresses point out to him 
the specificity and wealth of Western values. But every time Western values are 
mentioned they produce in the native a sort of stiffening or muscular lockjaw.20  
 
Defining anxiety as a captivation by the past that produces a conditioned worry about the future, 
speaks to the traumas of twentieth-century war and colonialism. It also speaks to the anxiety and 
indeterminacy of mathematical modeling, which is itself an undertaking to command what has been 
in order to project what will be. Tying these two threads together: early twentieth-century computing 
methods were designed to interpret historical data to establish frameworks for making decisions. 
                                               
19 See: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (Vol. Book XI) 
trans., Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998) originally published in 1973; and J. Peter 
Burgess’s analysis in Politics of Anxiety, eds. Emmy Eklundh, Andreja Zevnik, and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).  
20 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963): 
42.  
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They constitute a mathematical manipulation of historical and future time, that is rooted in 
regression techniques, a colonial mathematics.  
In mathematical prognostication, the promise of certainty is always on the horizon of 
possibility, but never achieved. Situating my history of computing within the age of anxiety reveals 
the larger cultural and market forces at work and makes the point that computing models are rooted 
in military production and military trauma. Furthermore, I show how new modes of information 
processing came to power through harnessing public anxieties in their applications. While 
uncertainty is a technical numerical concept, certainty is always a political project. It is the process by 
which uncertainty calculations are translated into evidence and concretized into decisions. Designing 
Certainty further details the slippages between the technical and political in (un)certainty work.  
The story begins in the post WWI moment when confidence computing arose as the 
technocratic elite worked to establish a statistical control state over a crumpling European empire, 
the primary source of their anxiety. This movement began after the designation of a “confidence 
crisis” as informational crisis drove rehabilitation efforts in the wreckage of the postwar world.  
 
Crisis!  
Throughout this dissertation I will speak to designs of crisis, which are the identifications and 
explanations of informational crisis, which overlay real conditions of instability, collapse, and 
destruction. These are not designs in the sense that the underlying calamity is not real. They are 
designs because they are technocratic, and predominantly mathematical, explanations of the 
underlying crisis. It is the designer who decides what is and is not a crisis; by identifying the design, 
we identify the designer. Designs of crisis are very powerful mechanisms in the production of 
history; we use them to define periods of time and to explain events. It has largely been through 
adopting the designer’s explanations of crisis that we have interpreted the past.  
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There is a huge body of scholarship on the history of crisis, on crisis as an analytic category, 
and crisis theory.21 In its Greek etymology, crisis means to separate, decide, choose, judge. In human 
experience, crisis denotes a sudden rupture in everyday life, a calamity that generates confusion 
defying language and logical description. The inexplicable experience of human crisis coexists with 
its political over-description at the scale of populations and society. I adhere to the common notion 
that crisis is a function of western capitalism and a designation of technocratic society. Political 
economists have been using crisis to reaffirm market society, through rationalizing economic ebbs 
and flows, bubbles and bursts, depressions and growth. As expressed in political-economic 
frameworks, crisis is a period of market instability or failure, explained within larger rational 
frameworks. In contrast, Marxist crisis theory characterizes crisis as an entirely irrational process, 
reflecting the inherent instability of western capitalism, which is designed to yield cycles of its own 
disarray.22 Under capitalism, crisis is an extremely productive designation. Relating this to the 
information sciences, I make use of anthropologist Janet Roitman’s notion that, “crisis is a 
distinction that produces information and reaffirms extant hierarchies.”23  
Information bodies and infrastructures follow from crisis and, in turn, anticipate future 
crises, which they were designed to manage. For the designer of crisis, crisis is profitable. The late 
twentieth-century has been described as “an age of crisis” after the United States destroyed the cities 
                                               
21 In histories of finance, see: Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias Panics, and Crashes: A History 
of Financial Crises (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005), previous editions in 1978, 1989, 1996, 2000, 
following financial crises. On page 21, they write: “For historians each event is unique. In contrast economists 
maintain that there are patterns in the data and particular events are likely to induce similar responses.” The 
1907 confidence crisis and panic were a huge driver of crisis analysis, setting a precedent for the twentieth-
century, see: O.M.W. Spargue, History of Crises under the National Banking System (1910; reprint edition, New 
York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1968).  
22 Seize the Crisis! https://monthlyreview.org/2009/12/01/seize-the-crisis/ 
23 Janet Roitman, Anti-Crisis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014): 53. She writes on page 7: “Crisis serves 
as the noun-formation of contemporary historical narrative; it is a non-locus from which to claim access to 
both history and the knowledge of history.”  
  17 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.24 Following from this precedent, Cold War anxieties are 
described as a series of political crises pertaining to the potential of mass destruction. The 1948 
Berlin crisis constituted a grasp for occupation and power between western and USSR oversight and 
monetary control within the parameters of the city, and this would manifest in the late 1950s with 
the second Berlin crisis, culminating in the building of the wall in 1961. Other Cold War crises 
constitute failed grasps for colonial power under decolonization. This is seen with the U.S. entry in 
Korea, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Cuban missile crisis, the Euromissiles crisis and so on.  
Michelle Murphy defines this period of the Cold War and decolonization as the economization 
of life— “a historically specific regime of valuation hinged to the macrological figure of national 
“economy.”25  Heightened by the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, economic crisis became 
formally linked to ecological crisis through quantitative studies of risk that flourished in the 1970s 
and 1980s.26 Risk management, risk assessment, and risk metrics became the science of crisis at the 
nexus of climate change, ecological crisis, and the threat of financial collapse. Crisis managers 
became risk calculators. As with anxiety, crisis is an outcome of a European colonialism. During the 
recent crisis of the European Union and nation-state democracy, Ulrich Beck and Ciaran Cronin 
wrote that the European crisis can only be truly understood by “deprovincializing” ourselves— 
“that is, only by learning to see the world and ourselves with the eyes of others at the level of 
methodology.”27  
                                               
24 See: Joseph Masco, “The Crisis in Crisis,” Current Anthropology 58, no. 15 (2017): S65-S76. 
25 Michelle Murphy, The Economization of Life (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017): 006.  
26 The literature on risk society is huge, for some cornerstone texts see: Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a 
New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992); Ulrich Beck World at Risk (London: Polity, 2008); Francis 
Ewald, “Two Infinities of Risk,” in The Politics of Everyday Fear ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991): 221-28; Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (New York: Routledge, 2000); Richard A. 
Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Gina Neff, Venture Labor: 
Work and the Burden of Risk in Innovative Industries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012).  
27 Ulrich Beck and Ciaran Cronin, “The European Crisis in the Context of Cosmopolitization,” New Literary 
History 43, no. 4 (2012): 641.  
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A growing literature in STS has sought to map out crisis through its human actors. In the 
early 2000s, economic sociology extricated the study of economics from society to show how 
finance economics functions as a reference to itself.28 The idea is that, “Economics does not 
describe an existing external “economy,” but brings that economy into being: economics performs the 
economy, creating the phenomena it describes.”29 In this framework, the system is self-contained—
or bounded—except in times of “extreme crisis,” as with the 1987 market crash, when options 
theory was proven to not work under extreme volatility. Crisis is explained within or in relation to 
market performativity—it is a failure of the market to do what it says it’s going to do. Sociologist of 
economics Donald Mackenzie determined that ‘crisis’ can be explained through the study of human 
actions. He relegated the 2008 credit crisis, for example, to be an outcome of, “market processes in 
abstraction from the cognitive and organizational reality of evaluation practices.”30 Michel Callon 
and Mackenzie assert counter-performativity as an explanation of crisis—for when the formula 
driving the economy produces effects that undermine its own performance.   
STS scholar Jens Schroter argues that Callon’s performativity theory lacks a true notion of 
“crisis’ and therefore precludes alternative modes of explanation and organization.31 At its root, 
counter-performativity should be read as a falsification of the formula driving the system rather than 
as an explanation of the system. As seen with financial performativity theory, crisis plays a role in the 
                                               
28 Michael Callon, “Introduction: the embeddedness of economic markets in economics,” The Sociological 
Review 46, no. 1 (1998); on page 30, Callon writes, the economy “is embedded not in society but in 
economics.”  
29 Donald MacKenzie and Yuval Millo, “Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: The Historical Sociology 
of a Financial Derivatives Exchange,” American Journal of Sociology, 109, no. 1(2003): 108; Fabian Muniesa, The 
Provoked Economy: Economic Reality and the Performative Turn (London: Routledge, 2014). 
30 See: Julia Elyachar, “Regulating Crisis: A Retrospective Ethnography of the 1982 Latin American Debt 
Crisis at the New York Federal Reserve Bank,” Valuation Studies  
31 Jens Schröter, “Performing the economy, digital media and crisis. A critique of Michel Callon,” in eds. 
Martina Leeker, Imanuel Shipper, Timon Bayes, Performing the Digital: Performance Studies and Performances in 
Digital Cultures (Transcript Verlag, 2017). 
  19 
determination of whether or not theories, models, and explanations of economic and social 
phenomena work. It is used to confirm or falsify larger theories of explanation. Economist Milton 
Friedman’s theory of economics hinges on the value of predictive accuracy—he argues that only 
theories predicting crisis are correct.32 Crisis is intrinsic to neoliberal frameworks of economics, as it 
is the metric by which this politics is rationalized. For Thomas Kuhn, crisis is the catalyst for theory 
change and constitutes the structure of scientific revolutions— “the failure of rules that precludes 
the search for new ones.”33 Crisis sustains the epistemological frameworks of our scientific society.   
Recent literature in economic anthropology has moved beyond crisis frameworks. These 
works reveal alternative modes of market-making and the hidden economies that shape our world. 
Dominant frameworks of market capitalism, such as the notion of an ‘invisible hand’ and homo 
economicus are relegated to the status of folk stories, and alternative ethnographic and semiotic 
frameworks are deployed to describe economic processes.34 Their work has helped undo the reliance 
on the designer’s explanation of crisis, as they have unearthed the many different experiences of 
economy in subaltern contexts, revealing the stratification of human experience under crisis. They 
show how commodities, value, and dollarization are deeply embedded in social and politic contexts 
revealing otherwise hidden political and social conditions.35  
Crisis is an intrinsic part of the rise of statistical inference, algorithmic computing, and 
artificial intelligence in the twentieth-century. These modes of governance are outcomes of 
                                               
32 See: Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966).  
33 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012, originally 
published 1962).  
34 Cathy Gere’s work current work, looking beyond neoliberalism, has opened my eyes to how the 
psychological attachment to the Cold War economic relics such as homo economicus limits possibilities for 
alternative frameworks.  
35 Heonik Kwon, “The Dollarization of Vietnamese Ghost Money,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 13, no. 1 (2007): 73-90; Julia Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development and the State 
in Cairo (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005); Martha Lampland, The Value of Labor: The Science 
of Commodification in Hungary, 1920-1956 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016).   
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reconfiguring information and information systems in response to crisis. Throughout Designing 
Certainty, crisis is a reoccurring and prominent actors’ category. It is a term used by statisticians, 
political economists, market makers, technologists, computing programmers, and so forth. Crisis is 
used to explain transformations and failures in their systems, and at the root—crisis does work in 
bringing number to power. New techniques and methods of analysis are designed in response to 
crisis.  
I engage three main types of crisis: economic, epistemic, and environmental. I will flesh out 
designations of crisis in agriculture, in logic and mathematics, and in drought and climate control, 
showing how they served as catalysts for generating information (and misinformation), and as 
pretexts for new methods of making sense of that information. All of my cases are rooted in the 
initial confidence crisis, a designed crisis of quantification that was asserted over these three 
domains. Various economic, epistemic, and environmental crises were thereby linked together as a 
problem of data and method, setting the stage for new anxiety-driven methods of analysis and 
computation to arrive as the reigning solution. Crisis is prologue for the twentieth-century project of 
designing certainty.  
 
The Landscape: Argument and Method    
At the nexus of crisis and confidence computing, Designing Certainty offers a genealogy of 
shifting regimes of ‘(un)certainty work’ over the course of the twentieth-century.36 I present 
                                               
36 My term “(un)certainty work” is informed by a wide body of scholarship in history, STS, critical algorithm 
and data studies, as well as from its technical usages in analog and digital data processing. I present 
uncertainty as an interdisciplinary meeting point, see: Theodora Dryer, “Algorithms under the Reign of 
Probability,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 40, no. 1 (2018): 93. For cornerstone work on histories of 
uncertainty as probability, see: The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life by Gerd 
Gigerenzer et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the 
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(un)certainty work as an analytic category that links computational labor with epistemological 
frameworks.37 (Un)certainty work constitutes the process of translating data into “probability data” 
or information that is expressed in terms of probabilities, e.g. 95%. As a base definition, probability 
describes likelihoods of propositions and events, usually expressed as a percentage, where perfect 
certainty is 1 and uncertainty is <1. Beyond this, probabilistic knowing is a commitment to greater 
analytic (laws, axioms, and definitions) and technological (computers and data systems) architectures 
needed to express limited information in terms of likelihoods.38 This process involves everything 
from collecting and organizing the data, designing mathematical architectures for analysis and 
computation, and the subsequent uses of the data as uncertainty calculations become evidence or 
material for decision-making processes.39 (Un)certainty work spans across different temporal 
                                               
Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Lorraine Daston, Lorezn Krüger, and Michael 
Heidelberger, The Probabilistic Revolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); Lorraine Daston, “The Doctrine of 
Chances without Chance: Determinism, Mathematical Probability, and Quantification in the Seventeenth 
Century,” in: Mary Jo Nye, Joan Richards, and Roger Stuewer, eds., The Invention of Physical Science. Essay in 
Honor of Erwin Hiebert (Boston/The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992); Matthew Jones, 
Reckoning with Matter: Calculating Machines, Improvement, and Thinking about Thinking from Pascal to Babbage 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2016). For literature on uncertainty in critical algorithm and data studies, 
see: Mei-Po Kwan, “Algorithmic Geographies: Big Data, Algorithmic Uncertainty, and the Production of 
Geographic Knowledge,” Annals of the American Association of Geographers 106, no. 2 (2016): 274-282. There is 
an anonymous collective of scholars from different disciplines, institutions and countries called “An uncertain 
commons,” see: Uncertain Commons, Speculate This! (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013): 
thank you to Lilly Irani for sending this to me.  
37 My general thinking about the analytic and physical labor behind computing, data processing, and 
quantitative formalization is deeply informed and inspired by: Lilly Irani, “Difference and Dependence 
among Digital Workers: The Case of Mechanical Turk,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 114, no. 1 (2015): 225-
234; Martha Lampland, “False numbers as formalizing practices,” Social Studies of Science 40, no. 3 (2010): 377-
404; Mary S. Morgan, The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Stephanie Dick, “Aftermath: the Work of Proof in the Age of 
Human-Machine Collaboration” in Isis 102.3 (September 2011): 494-505.   
38 Dryer, “Algorithms under the Reign of Probability,” 93.  
39 For work in STS and philosophy on the intrinsically political process of translating uncertainty into 
certainty, see: Susan Star, “Scientific Work and Uncertainty,” Social Studies of Science 15, no. 3 (1985): 391-427; 
Geoffrey Supran and Naomi Oreskes, “Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate Change Communications (1977-
2014),” Environmental Research Letters 12 (2017): 1-17; W.R. Freudenburg, R. Gramling, and D.J. Davidson, 
“Scientific Certainty Argumentation Methods (SCAMs): Science and the Politics of Doubt,” Sociological Inquiry 
78, no. 1 (2008): 2-38; Wendy Parker, “Whose Probabilities? Predicting Climate Change with Ensembles of 
Models,” Philosophy of Science 77 (2010): 985-997.  
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geographical contexts and different scales of doing and knowing, permeating data generated at the 
scale of a microorganic universe in a petri dish to data collected from a B-52 bomber flying 10,000 
feet in the air.  
 
 
 
Each one of the subsequent chapters constitutes a specific case study of confidence intervals 
at work: small-farm analysis in interwar Poland (confidence), sugar beet analysis in the New Deal 
United States (control), bombing campaigns during WWII (uncertainty), and cloud-seeding 
programs in the larger context of the cold war proxy wars (climate). There are two significant 
dimensions to these programs. First, they are economic in nature—they are used to stabilize larger 
programs such as western pricing logics, agricultural development, military expansionism, and 
technological design as with the electronic memory-stored digital computer.40 Second, the 
                                               
40 The interfaces between confidence intervals and digital technology are addressed at length in Chapter 4, on 
military methods and in Chapter 6, on digital methods.   
Figure 4: Jerzy Neyman and Herbert Osborn, “Evidence of widespread 
effect of cloud seeding at two Arizona experiments,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 68 (1971): 649. 
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(un)certainty work conducted towards these larger programs is generative of and responsive to 
bodies of data that have contextually specific epistemic and political complexities. I focus on the 
contexts in which the data is produced, beyond the statistical laboratories and computing centers 
where it is ultimately processed, thereby decentering institutional centers of calculation. Instead, I 
map out larger computing landscapes.  
What I refer to a “computing landscapes” are the physical-geographical areas from which 
data is generated and collected. These landscapes include farm areas, military proving grounds, 
colonial land, and target areas in weather control experimentation. Processes of (un)certainty work 
produce visual-metathetical maps that are overlaid on the landscapes. In the semi-arid southwestern 
landscape, for example, data is generated from rain gauge measurements. These nodes of calculation 
are depicted as coordinates drawn from an aerial perspective and used as coordinates in 
mathematical analysis of the entire region. Computing landscapes constitute an abstracted 
mathematical remapping of ground areas that is rooted in the physical alteration of those areas. In 
the case of firestorm bombing during WWII, I define ‘destruction data’ as generated by the mass 
destruction of the human and environment worlds. In all of my cases, (un)certainty work transforms 
the human and environmental worlds, first through processes of data collection, and then through 
continued intervention as dictated by the analysis and decision-making.  
My genealogy of (un)certainty work follows a trajectory from the early twentieth-century 
mathematical statistics movement through to the beginnings of our Big Data society. Over the 
course of this period, and through my confidence interval applications, I touch on many different 
mathematical and computing disciplines. These include logical positivism, mathematical statistics, set 
theory, axiomatic probability theory, stochastic calculus, linear programming, operations research, 
decision-science, and algorithmic theory. Designing Certainty does not offer a formal history of these 
disciplines nor corresponding institutional histories. My analysis of (un)certainty work, and its 
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applications, serves to demonstrate larger shifts in numerical governance across different geopolitical 
contexts, or computing landscapes, that span across these disciplines. 
Chapter 1, ‘Crisis,’ the prologue chapter to this dissertation, sets the stage for subsequent 
waves of crisis designation and computing design that begins after WWI. Crisis is a designation that 
produces new information and reaffirms extant hierarchies of information and their corresponding 
power structures. The initial ‘crisis of confidence’ occurred in two waves. The first wave occurred at 
the turn of the twentieth-century when statistical thinkers increasingly interpreted poor economic 
conditions in visual and quantitative terms of flagging public confidence. This set precedent for 
designing increasingly technical quantitative explanations for ‘confidence.’ After WWI, a ‘crisis of 
confidence’ ballooned in statistical information and corresponding statistical establishments 
including global trade systems, paper currency, census administration. I engage this designated 
computational crisis along three axes: economic, environmental, and epistemic and introduce 
agricultural experimentation and the agricultural experimental station as the primary facilitator of a 
new mechanized data management regime responsive to the confidence crisis. Throughout this 
dissertation I contextualize four agricultural stations in Warsaw, Poland, London, England, Kolkata, 
India, and Beltsville, Maryland.  
Chapter 2, ‘Confidence,’ is the first computing concept explored in this dissertation and is 
followed by two more: control and uncertainty. The computing concept ‘confidence’ is an 
expression of trust that a logician or statistical thinker holds in their experimental design and 
analysis. It is also an expression of trust that the public holds in numerical-economic informational 
systems and technologies. In the 1920s, statistical thinkers designed new data architectures to 
quantify and mechanize confidence logics in data management. This chapter details the first 
numerical calculations for the confidence interval parameter in 1929 Warsaw, Poland. After WWI, 
Poland became a sovereign nation state for the first time in 150 years and the dreams of a great 
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agrarian nation state were complicated by the realities of extreme poverty, ongoing border disputes 
and turmoil, Jewish emigration and forced removal policy, inhumane labor conditions, the 
circulation of foreign capital, and efforts to stabilize paper currency. In order to establish public 
‘confidence’ in growing western pricing logics, paper currency, and quantitative oversight more 
generally, fledgling agricultural administrative bodies turned their attention to “improving statistics.”  
This turn towards emboldening quantitative oversight in agriculture fueled the global 
circulation of new mechanized logics and data. In Poland, the newly formed Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics employed a fringe-computing laboratory at the Nencki Institute for Experimental 
Biology, a biometrics center, to compute tables for a “small farm problem,” deemed to be the 
central issue in managing Polish agriculture. There the first numerical calculations for the ufności 
przedzial  or confidence interval parameter were conducted. They were handwritten on graphed 
paper and calculated using an Odhner arithmometer machine. These calculations served as 
numerical limits for ‘uncertainty’ within a statistical experiment and were quantitative expressions of 
‘confusion’ that the statistical thinker—here Wacław Pytkowski—held in his method of 
interpretation.  
 In 1929, agricultural workers in Warsaw reconfigured the economic and statistical concept of 
‘confidence’ into a method of analysis that established limits for uncertainty in experimental design. 
In this context ‘confidence’ became a mechanized computing concept; what I call ‘confidence 
computing’ is a bounded philosophy of data production and analysis that galvanized agricultural 
management as (un)certainty work. In this historical and geographical context, (un)certainty work 
served the conflicting political aspirations of preserving peasant farming as the underpinning notion 
of Polish sovereignty, while also aspiring to make the Polish economy legible on the world stage as 
part of a growing western pricing geopolitics. In the period between 1929 and 1939, a confidence 
computing collective emerged around Warsaw and nearby Lwów that integrating new methods of 
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interpretation, inspired by rising trends in axiomatic probability theory, with tacit agricultural work. 
Applications included: Polish labor health analysis, virulent studies, sugar beet planning, and beyond.  
Chapter 3, ‘Control’: Control is a computing concept that informs experimental design 
through the procedures of conducting ‘control tests’ and establishing the terms of randomized 
testing. Control is also a political-economic term indicating the acquisition and consolidation of data 
and resources and the assertion of hierarchies of decision-making power. In the early twentieth-
century, statistical thinkers established new mechanized meanings and technologies for control 
logics under probability. My case study for ‘control’ occurs in the 1933-1937 New Deal United 
States, when statistical quality control logics converged with new farming programs under a rising 
agricultural-industrialism. Like confidence, ‘quality control’ frameworks and ‘statistical control’ logics 
were first mechanized in the 1930s. Prior to that, in the 1920s, quality control logics first emerged as 
part of a new industrial manufacturing regime at Bell Laboratories that sought to control 
manufacturing processes through new managerial oversight. In the New Deal moment, Quality 
Control became Statistical Quality Control, or the transfiguration of manufacturing errors into 
probabilistic data. This (un)certainty work part of control logics moved into agriculture and planted 
seeds of computational control over agricultural resources, as part of the new U.S. control state.  
Chapter 4, ‘(Un)certainty,’ begins at the end of WWII, when machine brains and the impulse 
of “yes or no” processes of decision-making certainty began to dominate technocratic imagination. 
Bounded rationality would soon come to flatten the complexities of the logical empiricist movement 
in practice, computation, and discourse. I trace the shift from uncertainty computation to certainty 
calculations back to U.S. and Allied firestorm bombing campaigns during the war. Data managers 
created destruction data sites in North Africa, Japan, and U.S. National Parkland and translated 
statistical destruction into ‘probability tables’ and other knowledge making apparatus for binary 
decision making in military strategy. ‘Time’ measurements and ‘space’ measurements were cleaved 
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apart as calculating machines—including intervalometers, clocks, slide rulers, nomograms, and 
bombsight calculators—were used to stabilize this data collection and organization process. I define 
bombsight optics as the visualization of bombing waste and destruction as predictable, controllable, 
and calculable sites of statistical study. This culture of visual-mathematical study led in 1945 to the 
patent for the Optical Method calculating machine, the precursor to today’s drone technology.  
In Chapter 5, ‘Climate,’ I confront the blurry boundaries of mathematical ‘experiment 
making’ in the context of 1950s and 60s cloud seed experimentation over indigenous land in the 
southwest. These experiments stitched together mathematical computing analysis and physical and 
environmental alterations. I take apart conclusive mathematical experiments designed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s to uncover their technological, philosophical, and environmental 
underpinnings and impacts. Weather control is a critical site for understanding the interfaces 
between and the environment and questions of human and environmental justice.  
In Chapter 6, ‘Conclusion,’ I map out iterations of confidence intervals through two digital 
computing movements: algorithmic programming languages and automata studies that contributed 
to a new wave of (un)certainty work. Confidence logics were reconfigured as a new mode of 
reasoning, pertaining to digital philosophies and coding practices. This is exhibited in the re-
evaluation of cloud-seeding, which incorporated digital machinery and centered algorithms in the 
assessments. Significantly, confidence logics were not replaced by the new modes of computing and 
machine development, but rather, they were built into the material and logical designs of digital 
models, machines, and methods. I argue that CI logics are part of the material fabric of artificial 
intelligence, they are a tuning apparatus in assessing the power and validity of other optimal 
algorithms such as linear programming (the simplex algorithm) and Monte Carlo methods, and they 
are algorithmic in their own right as they were reprogrammed and circulated as certified algorithms. 
Digital computing is then a new iteration of (un)certainty work that has black-boxed the 
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philosophies of logic at work, and the material production of data, under its protocols, procedures, 
and programs.  
 
An Ode to Jerzy Spława-Neyman (1894-1981)  
In 2014, when I began research for my dissertation project, I had difficulty finding an entry 
point into the massive subject matter of algorithmic society. Inspired by recent scholarship in STS 
on mobile artifacts and traveling rationality, I decided to center an algorithm or mathematical model 
as the core site for my history. I would follow this potentially immutable—but probably mutable—
mobile around to see it at work, and through its applications. After researching a number of 
candidates, including the simplex algorithm, the input-output model, Monte Carlo methods, and 
minimum-maximum models, I landed on confidence intervals as my core site of study. CIs were a 
bit more slippery and prolific, as they had been present in all of my former research. Innocuous in 
their presentation, these statistical architectures were engrained in much of the data processing and 
computational work I encountered: they appeared in my research as a tuning apparatus for data 
analysis and algorithmic thought. A colleague encouraged me to look into their designer, Jerzy 
Spława-Neyman.41 I found with Neyman a robust archive for the history of confidence intervals and 
so much more.  
Designing Certainty does not offer a traditional biography of Jerzy Spława-Neyman. Rather, 
this is a history of the world he lived in. This is a history of the many human and technological 
expressions, meanings, and impacts of his confidence intervals. My decision to engage Neyman’s 
archives was part opportunity. The archives documenting his life and work probably would not exist 
                                               
41 Thank you to Will Thomas for encouragement in the early stages of this project.  
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if he had been a woman logician or if things happened to roll out differently along his precarious 
path from interwar Ukraine and Poland to England and finally resting in Berkeley, California. But 
Neyman was also an exceptional person with an exceptional story. In his records in California, 
London, and Poland, I discovered profound moments of dissent, raw emotion, and advocacy for a 
different world. His archives serve as a unique view into the twentieth-century anxieties that I aim to 
confront in this work. I have come to empathize with Neyman, not for his mathematical acuity, but 
for his humanism and his very human life full of conflict, contradiction, and persistent optimism. 
Neyman’s quintessentially modern life was shaped by circumstance and opportunity in equal 
measure to the tragedies and uncertainties that inspired his work.  
There is a large body of biographical material on Neyman that has been predominantly 
generated by the mathematics community. While there has not been a comprehensive history on his 
work, there is a well-documented timeline of his life through memoirs, biographies, and oral 
interviews. As with most history of mathematics and computing topics, Neyman and his colleagues 
have published a huge corpus of technical literature. Neyman began collecting his own personal 
papers in 1937, after beginning his professorship at the University of California, Berkeley. In 1978, 
mathematics biographer, Constance Reid began work with Jerzy Neyman recounting his life and 
work. Over the course of the next six years, Reid interviewed Neyman and surrounding personal 
contracts and professional colleagues and supplemented their oral testimony with visits to a select 
number of archives, to fill out Neyman’s work. Her biography of Neyman constitutes the core 
biographical material on his life.  
Through her extensive and detailed oral interviews, Constance Reid produced Neyman’s 
biography as a retrospective—looking backward—and I have worked to read the story of 
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confidence intervals forward, through their applications.42 Reid wrote that Neyman’s life can be 
organized into three periods.43 The first period (1894-1921) constitutes his birth through his 
departure to Poland Born in Kiev, Russia, Neyman arrived in Poland in 1921, after being released 
from a Soviet jail that held him “as an enemy alien in Russia” due to the changing shape of the 
Ukrainian border.44 He immediately took a position as the only statistician at the Agricultural 
Institute in Bydgoszcz, where he worked on the applications of probability theory in agricultural 
experimentation.45 Between 1923 and 1935 Neyman lectured at the University of Warsaw’s Nencki 
Institute for Experimental Biology, where he established a mathematical statistics laboratory that 
became the epicenter of a larger Polish planning collective, that I refer to as confidence computing. 
An important characteristic of Neyman, that speaks to my larger history of uncertainty was his 
inclination to put things to question. 
 If I did write a biography of Neyman, I would title it “The Objective Observer,” as this 
failed desire of his, to be an objective observer, is evidenced throughout his life. In the 1920s when 
Neyman began his career as a practical statistician, his preoccupation with challenging the logical 
foundations of axiomatic probability theory was manifest in the questions he asked of his work. He 
seems to me to have always held a drive towards a deeper truth and often discontent with the 
injustices he witnessed in the world. I read in the archives his desperate letters he wrote after the 
German invasion to try and secure university positions in the United States for his Polish colleagues.  
                                               
42 While my analysis of information society concerns much broader contours, they map onto Neyman’s life 
and work. The materials collected at UC Berkeley constitute Neyman’s main personal archives.42 I have also 
visited his archives at the University College London. Using Neyman’s personal papers and technical work as 
a starting point, I extended my study of confidence intervals, and their select applications, to over twenty 
archives and a broad survey of technical material spanning the 1900-1980 period.  
43 Constance Reid, Neyman—from life (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982): 4.  
44 Erich Lehmann, “Jerzy Neyman, 1894-1981,” Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley, 
Technical Report No. 155, May, 1998, accessed December 10, 2016, 
http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/sdtr/ucb/text/155.pdf, 1. 
45 Ibid, 2.  
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I borrow the term “objective observer” itself from a French newspaper article that was 
written about Neyman in 1947. Neyman had been sent to oversee the Greek Elections as part of the 
U.S. occupation. He dissented from the U.S. intervention, after experiencing the violence they 
generated in Salonika. A Parisian newspaper reported on Neyman’s dissent and they myth of 
objectivity in overseeing the election during the occupation. In 1967, I read a number of letters that 
Neyman wrote to acquaintances in Sweden petitioning them to grant Dr. Martin Luther King the 
Nobel Peace Prize. He argued that international diplomacy would only be possible after confronting 
race relations in the United States. Throughout his life, Neyman was part of many programs that 
described him as an “objective observer,” as with the Cold War cloud seeding projects (chapter 5). 
The pursuit of objectivity was important to Neyman, even though he remained subject to historical 
contingency.  
In the late 1970s, Constance Reid’s interview project catalyzed increased correspondence 
between Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson, who worked to recount their own history and the 
development of Confidence Intervals. The archive file on this subject contains 96 written letters. It 
was during this time that Neyman became preoccupied with the process of writing history. In a 
letter drafted to Egon, he wrote, “I am in full agreement with you about complexities of writing a 
history, be it history of ideas or of developments in a country.”46 Their correspondence reflects an 
anxious effort to wrangle memories and pinpoint significant moments in the timeline of their CI 
research. At this point in time, Egon Pearson and Neyman had been writing letters for over 50 years, 
and their very close friendship had survived all of the uncertainties presented in this dissertation. 
Neyman died on August 5th, 1981, one year after Egon. He is revered in the mathematics community 
as the architect of statistical inference.  
                                               
46 Letter from Jerzy Neyman to E.S. Pearson, March 17, 1978, E.S. Pearson, Correspondence. Jerzy Neyman 
Papers, BANC MSS 84/30 c., Carton 1, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 
  32 
As evidenced in the quote below, Neyman may not have been happy that a mildly sardonic, 
millennial woman and so-called historian of science wrote a history of confidence intervals. But I do 
believe, given his predilections, that he would respect my critical inquiry into the world he lived in 
and the world we share. I, too, believe that we must put things to question.  
I do not expect these letters and my comments will ever be published but knowing 
what so-called historians of science do in introducing their own guesses of what 
contacts and thoughts passed through the minds of their ‘subjects’, it seemed that I 
had almost a duty to put my memories and explanations on record in as objective a 
way as I could. 47                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 0, contains material as it appears in “Algorithms under the Reign of Probability” 
Think Piece in IEEE Annals of the History of Computing Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2018): 93-96. 
Dryer, Theodora. The dissertation author was the sole author of this material. 
 
                                                               
                                               
47 Ibid, Neyman Papers, Carton 1, Berkeley. 
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Chapter 1: Crisis 
 
Crisis as Prologue: The New Agrarian Calculus and Anxious Quanta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRISIS is a designation that produces new information and reaffirms extant information 
systems and their corresponding power relations.1 In the early twentieth-century, the mathematical-
statistics movement came on the world stage to affirm a new science of calculation over statistical 
material, but also to confront a crisis of information, generated by their own efforts to create a new 
world of data and probabilistic oversight. New regimes of quantitative oversight involve much more 
than internal procedural change. They transform entire informational systems, technological 
                                               
1 I am inspired by Janet Roitman’s work, Anti-Crisis and am integrating her observations into my history of 
information and computing. Histories of crisis and crisis theory are intrinsically about information and the 
control of information and resources.  
Figure 5: Duane Michals, “Madame Schrödinger’s Cat,” 1998, From the series Quantum. 
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infrastructures, and political decision-making apparatus. By the late nineteenth-century, the new 
statistical calculus of mathematical statistics, in Karl Pearson’s terminology, required new methods 
of statistical counts and new formulations and analysis of statistical material. Record keeping shifted 
to aggregated statistical analysis, and this involved new ways of counting, organizing, and computing 
information. Hypothesis tests, statistical estimations, and frequency analysis came to prominence in 
the domains of quantitative governance. These new modes of thinking about information generated 
new modes of data production, valued in terms of its usefulness for analysis, under the new 
statistical calculus.  
By the late nineteenth-century, the mathematical architectures for thinking about 
information, rather than the things being counted, became the new objects and subjects of study. 
These were predominantly probabilistic frameworks: error laws, standard deviations, hypothesis tests 
and estimation mechanisms—all of which were inherently unstable subjects of analysis. Many of 
these new architectures were designed to make sense of small data: information deemed too thin, 
porous, and incomplete to make useful without an estimation tool. Experimental designs under the 
new calculus were thereby conceived with inherent errors, limitations, uncertainty, and doubts. This 
is from where the computational crisis emerged.  
Probabilities are numerical expressions that attempt to quantify the limits of knowability 
within a set of information and are expressed in terms of numerical uncertainty: < 100%. The 
process of transfiguring information and decision-making systems into probabilistic frameworks is 
what I call (un)certainty work. In this preliminary chapter, I will briefly sketch out how, in the early 
twentieth-century, anxieties about incomplete, tattered, and porous information fueled an 
international movement towards new probabilistic methods of computation and control, “an 
improved statistics.” The drive to develop and implement this “improved statistics” emerged from a 
designated computational crisis. And this was entirely a political project. What the technical elite 
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commonly identified as ‘crisis’ was an identified lack of public trust, or public confidence, in 
statistical information and data. Through this lens, they explained away flagging market depressions, 
failing administrative institutions, and the failure of paper currencies and standards to take hold as 
an outcome of public doubt. They described this as a “crisis of confidence,” a distinct articulation of 
economic instability that reconfigures crisis as a lack of control over data, rather than in terms of the 
underlying real-world calamity (e.g. drought crisis becomes a crisis of water scarcity information). 
The initial “crisis of confidence” occurred in two waves. The first wave occurred at the turn 
of the twentieth-century, when statistical thinkers increasingly interpreted poor economic conditions 
as quantitative and visual representations of flagging public confidence, setting a precedent in 
designing increasingly technical explanations for “confidence.” Prior to this, nineteenth-century 
affective-economic meanings of ‘confidence’ had been a primary, and rather vague, explanation of 
economic processes. This affective-economic meaning of confidence emerged in the context of 
shifting global gold and silver standards, and economic depression, especially the United States 
recessions of 1890 and 1907, when political economists began to explain economic fluctuations in 
terms of public confidence cycles. After WWI, identifications of a “crisis of confidence” ballooned 
in statistical work and in the management of statistical institutions, including global trade systems, 
paper currency, and census administration. Across these contexts, problems with the larger 
economic and financial systems were attributed to flagging public confidence in those systems, 
tractable in statistical data.   
In this chapter, I introduce notions of computational crisis along three axes: epistemic, 
environmental, and economic. I then introduce early twentieth-century agricultural experimentation, 
and the agricultural experimental station, as the primary facilitator of a new mechanized data 
management regime responsive to the confidence crisis. This involved the confluence and spread of 
the mathematical statistics and transnational philosophy of science movements: the two major forces 
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shaping (un)certainty work in the early twentieth-century. These three threads converge over time 
becoming less and less distinct in the new computational designs. The ‘economic’ domain pertains 
to the realms of state statistics and trade mechanization. This primarily accounts for population data: 
census information, labor statistics, immigration and emigration statistics, and anthropogenic and 
eugenic heredity information. This also includes market information and data, that ranges from 
consumption and production data to price indices and other quantitative trade mechanisms. In the 
‘environmental’ realm, administrators identified a lack of confidence and control in agricultural data, 
weather and climate data and maps, and water scarcity information. The ‘epistemic’ dimension 
pertains to the complex ‘crises of foundations’ in physics and mathematics at turn of century. 
During this time, physicists, mathematicians, and logicians put to question what data indicated about 
the real, material world. In 1929, these three domains of inquiry and corresponding informational 
architectures converged in the initial confidence interval designs and calculations.  
While these changes in information society move along with the growing Anglophone 
school of mathematical statistics, this crisis of data management does not belong to a single field, 
institution, or nation state. It occurred in transnational as well as national contexts. It permeated the 
exact sciences, the sciences of administration, and international trade and agriculture. Common 
across these contexts is a notable grasp for control over the authority of information and resources. 
Statisticians, eugenicists, biometricians, trade commissioners, bureaucrats, traders, census 
administrators and others who oversaw the collection, organization and management of data, 
statistics, and information, identified this crisis as a loss of public trust in the preexisting powers of 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century quantitative oversight. The shared and growing anxiety and doubt 
amongst the technocratic elite about the efficacy and validity of quantitative information, is 
evidenced throughout this early twentieth-century period in the circulation of technical publications, 
formal methods and data, letters, and front matter. Statistical and information work designed during 
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this time moved to stabilize hierarchies of control over purportedly unstable quantitative systems 
and their corresponding economic and political bodies.  
This initial informational crisis is demarcated by statistical thinkers and the technocratic elite. 
Although, as I will show throughout this dissertation, formulations of crisis, and their responses, 
involved many more actors and impacted many more people and environments. I decenter the 
Anglophone school for two reasons. First, the initial mathematical statistics movement, or the turn 
to transfigure statistical work into probability analysis, occurred on the world stage, and was made 
sense of, in radically different ways, across different geopolitical contexts. Throughout Designing 
Certainty, I travel to Warsaw, Poland, Kolkata, India, Beltsville, Maryland, and the sugar beet belt of 
Detroit, Michigan. The data economies I identify are likewise transnational: they stretch into North 
Africa, Korea, Japan, Mexico, Canada, Navajoland, and beyond.  
I further decenter the Anglophone school in terms of historical explanation. I aim to give 
visibility to the existence and impacts of Anglophone and Anglo-American designs of information 
and decision-making, without carrying forward their historical explanations of those systems and 
corresponding values. The intellectual history one can build from mathematical textbooks and 
technical publications alone does not yield a sufficient explanation of the historical significance of 
these shifting regimes of (un)certainty work and their impacts. As already stated, informational crises 
were defined as a crisis of public confidence in that information and analysis. Therefore, the public 
is an important and oft neglected participant in this history. Another important dimension to my 
argument is that I understand data production as economy. Throughout this dissertation I engage a 
number of data economies including the aerial-bombing economy, environmental policy planning, 
and the rise of digital computing. But the story begins in interwar agriculture.  
The initial confidence crisis and early twentieth-century computational anxiety is difficult to 
pinpoint and map out, as it expands across different domains of inquiry and impact, and across 
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different temporal and geographical contexts. However, there are shared descriptions of crisis across 
these domains that directly pertain to flagging public confidence in preexisting systems of numerical 
governance. They are linked by technical expressions of confidence. I designate a general historical 
period of confidence crisis between 1900-1940. While this historical periodization is quite large, 
especially for a purportedly singular instance of ‘crisis’—it contains the family of identified crises 
that directly contributed to the formulation of new numerical-statistical designs of certainty, 
particularly confidence interval logics. As noted, a better formulation of this historical period, is to 
understand it as two waves of transformation in numerical governance: the first at fin de siècle, and the 
next following WWI.  
At the turn of the twentieth-century, the technical elite defined the “confidence crisis” as a 
problem of securing public certainty in numerical analysis and management that can only be 
resolved through designing new quantitative experiments and techniques. This catalyzed a long-
durée cycle of crisis management through computational design and redesign: a cycle of 
transfiguring social and economic problems into problems of information, then designing 
techniques to manage that information. With this precedent: after the underlying calamity is not 
resolved, or a new crisis is in the fold, resources are then mobilized towards development of a new 
informational technique, rather than addressing the underlying calamity some other way. Social, 
economic, and environmental problems are thus sustained as problems of information and technical 
design. By the late 1920s, this larger context of confidence crisis gave rise to designs of confidence 
interval parameters, the subject of this dissertation. As a bounded site of inquiry within much larger 
information movements throughout the twentieth century, the various iterations and applications of 
confidence intervals demonstrates the ongoing dialectic between ‘crisis’ and ‘confidence computing’ 
from mathematical statistics to the rise to digital algorithmic oversight.  
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Economic Confidence 
In the U.S. context, ‘confidence’ first emerged as a nineteenth-century economic concept 
and cultural creed at work in the development of white middle-class society and corporate 
capitalism. Hermann Melville’s civil-war era novel The Confidence Man: His Masquerade (1857) captures 
the popular anxiety and awe surrounding the folkloric mid-nineteenth century ‘confidence man.’2 
Aboard a Mississippi steamboat, Melville’s confidence man used his wiles and cunning to convince 
unsuspecting puritans to give him their money, their most cherished worldly possessions, and even 
their souls. But the American confidence man was not just a literary character. Following the Civil 
War, the rapid secularization and urbanization of U.S. society produced a cultural vacuum that 
fueled progressive ideologies and a search for new social-organizational principles.3 By the late 
nineteenth century ‘confidence’ held Janus-faced meaning in U.S. banking and trade systems. The 
‘confidence’ of conservative white men was an attitude needed to sustain trust in banking before 
federally mandated banking insurance, and to uphold ‘confidence’ in business cycles, market 
ideology, and national identity. ‘Confidence’ therefore described the newly positioned white middle-
class middle-management man who worked tirelessly to secure public trust in the unprecedented 
authority of banking logics.  
At the same time, ‘confidence’ held the meaning explored by Melville in his satire: that the 
American dream was a chimera of confidence tricks. Doubt about the reliability of the national 
banking system was frequently described in these terms. For example, an 1885 review of the 
National Banking System asserted: “…it is not possible for the legislatures of thirty-eight States to 
adopt individually, and in such a way to inspire general confidence, a system that will make the bill-
                                               
2 See: Herman Melville, The Confidence-Man, ed. John Bryant (USA: The Modern Library, 2003); Karen 
Halttunen, Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-class Culture in America, 1830-1870 (Yale 
University Press, 1982). 
3 See: Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967).  
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holders secure in case of the failure of a bank.”4 This ambition to achieve ‘ general confidence’ in the 
banking system was specifically intended to ward off Anglophone ‘confidence tricks,’ stating that, 
“Our national banking system to-day is as good a thing, perhaps, as could possibly be derived from 
such a source—the great British confidence game of specie basis, inflation, and suspension.”5 
Confidence lived a double life of being both the threat and promise behind public participation in 
the new banking institution. Confidence tricks were a threat to the growing finance society that also 
needed public confidence to make the system work—confidence promised that which it was 
predicated on.  
Under the confidence crisis, doubt in numerical-statistical frameworks is doubt in the 
economic systems to which they correspond. The term ‘confidence crisis’ is a prominent actor’s 
category in the history of political economic thought and practice, and its influence pertaining to this 
numerical and institutional doubt. In the U.S. context, studies of confidence economics galvanized 
after the 1890 and 1907 market depressions, which were both predominantly described as “a crisis in 
confidence.”6 These two periods of extreme crisis set a precedent in the use and inquiry of 
confidence studies. Political economists identify crises of confidence to frame economic history, 
denoting periods of flagging trust in market trade. Reference to confidence crises can be traced in 
trade and planning journals from the seventeenth century. A crisis of confidence is a moment of 
depletion, “a sudden disturbance” ascribed to a lack of public enthusiasm in the overarching finance 
and banking systems. This terminology holds power in solidifying a market society defined by 
periods of growth and depression. 
                                               
4 F. J. Scott, George S. Boutwell, Edward H. G. Clark, and S. Dana Horton. "Our National Banking 
System." The North American Review 141, no. 346 (1885): 201 
5 Scott et al., "Our National Banking System,” 206.  
6 O.M.W. Sprague, “The American Crisis of 1907,” The Economic Journal 18, no. 71 (1908): 353; Myron T. 
Herrick, “The Panic of 1907 and Some of its Lesson,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 31 (1908).  
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While political economists described the confidence crisis as a period of flagging public trust 
in market trade, statistical administrators of the same time period interpreted it more distinctly as a 
problem of distrust in the validity of material information. Without the willing participation of 
people to be counted, or the ability of governing bodies to adequately collect and house information, 
it was difficult to accurately enumerate and organize populations and resources. The confidence 
crisis was therefore identified as a twofold problem—it was a public problem due to a lack of 
participation in numerical systems and institutions, and it was a problem of expert oversight unable 
to command a growing influx of statistical information.   
In the progressive era, statistical thought and economic management blurred in the search 
for new organizational mechanisms: price indices, wage measures, and labor statistics.7 The statistical 
sciences, including census management, and spanning from industrial bookkeeping to agricultural 
and economic statistics, were said to-be saturated with error. It was statistical error that undermined 
public trust in statistical information, and worry spread about the future of statistical institutions 
under their growing inability to manage and account for statistical error. For example, in 1908, an 
address given at to the American Statistical Association reported on the confidence crisis in the U.S. 
Census: 
 
It would work an incalculable inquiry to the cause of statistical science if anything 
should happen to impair public confidence in the integrity and reliability of the census; 
and it is one of the best traditions of this office that its reports should point out and 
emphasize the limitations and sources of error in the statistics which it compiles and thus 
guard against their misinterpretation.8 
 
                                               
7 For a detailed history of labor mechanisms in the era of “new capitalism,” see: Mark Hendrickson, American 
Labor and Economic Citizenship: New Capitalism from World War I to the Great Depression (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); for a comprehensive history of price statistics see: Thomas Stapleford, The Cost of 
Living in America: A Political History of Economic Statistics, 1880-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
8 S. N. D. North, "The Outlook for Statistical Science in the United States." Publications of the American 
Statistical Association 11, no. 81 (1908): 22, my emphasis.  
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Political economists and statisticians viewed error, generated in the production of statistical 
information, as infecting people’s trust in larger numerical systems that depended on the data. Yet 
error was unavoidable. Error occurred in statistical sampling, in data collection, in data organization, 
and especially in the computation and interpretation of that information. Statistical administrators 
interpreted error as both a computational and institutional problem.  
While “sources of error” were vaguely defined, statistical administrators thus stressed the 
importance of gathering observations on statistical error, “to build confidence in numerical data […] and 
draw valid conclusions in spite of the defects of the materials.”9 Population data housed in various 
collection centers ranging from census bureaus to clearing houses suffered from both 
incompleteness and sheer quantity, described by U.S. statisticians as “an embarrass de richesses: […]the 
difficulty was not so much in gathering material as in mastering it, in digesting [the] masses of 
reports which have been stored in the archives and on the bookshelves of statistical offices.”10 
Mastering statistical material meant ensuring public confidence in its validity. The confidence crisis 
was both an embarrass de richesses, and a problem of producing knowledge under limited information. 
There was at once too much and too little information. 
Anxious and worried statistical practitioners sought, from the public, a “general confidence 
and […] willingness to cooperate with the authorities.”11 The crisis of confidence in statistical 
information ranged across business statistics, economic statistics, vitality and mortality statistics, 
census statistics, labor statistics, medical statistics, and so on. This was seen especially in cases where 
the population data was not in a ‘controlled’ state.12 A lack of controllability was another description 
                                               
9 Westergaard, Harald. "Scope and Method of Statistics." Publications of the American Statistical Association 15, no. 
115 (1916): 240.  
10 Westergaard, "Scope and Method of Statistics," 237. 
11 Westergaard, "Scope and Method of Statistics." Ibid.   
12 Chapter two focuses on statistical and economic control and the controllability of data, both of which are 
historical computing categories. 
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of incomplete information. From this view, emigration ad immigration statistics became a popular 
site of study in the search for statistical improvement, as fluctuating populations were difficult to 
quantify. “Jewish statistics” was a common point of focus for statisticians experimenting with new 
estimation methods. Population data about the Jewish people was difficult to generate due to their 
conditions of migration and social exclusion. For example, in 1908, the American Jewish Year Book 
described the need for estimation in counting Jewish populations “as confidence can be placed in 
[these] figures not the result of an actual count.”13  
 
Mathematical Statistics  
The confidence crisis pertains to a widespread designation of flagging public trust in 
numerical systems of governance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This 
designation is seen in political economic and administrative work in census, trade, and so forth. It is 
also seen in academic institutions, predominantly in the growing fields of mathematical statistics, 
part of the eugenics and anthropometric movements in England and the larger Anglophone colonial 
landscape. Mathematical statistics is a field that applies mathematical laws, axioms, and models to 
statistical information. The scientific field of mathematical statistics is attributed to English scientist 
Karl Pearson, who in the late nineteenth century turned his scientific work to a study of statistics. 
His goal was to establish “a new tool in science which would give certainty where all was obscurity 
and hypothesis before.”14 His new statistics shaped and molded statistical information into bell 
curves and derived new laws of assessing error, testing hypotheses, and designing methods of 
prognostication. Along with eugenicist Francis Galton, Pearson headed up two departments at 
                                               
13 "Jewish Statistics." The American Jewish Year Book 9 (1907): 431-35. 
14 Theodore Porter, Karl Pearson, 3: “We are reminded that rationality, even it its guise as calculation, does not 
reduce to scientific and administrative routines. In Pearson’s life we experience it in a scene of personal 
cultivation and social struggle, where it has inspired the fiercest of passions.”  
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University College London (UCL), where a number of young practitioners from Poland, India, and 
beyond would come to study.  
 
 
Francis Galton founded the UCL anthropometric laboratory in 1884 intended, “for the 
determination of height, weight, span, breathing, power, strength of pull and squeeze, quickness of 
blow, hearing, seeing, colour-sense, and other personal data.”15 This laboratory arrived out of a 
much longer history of heredity and social mapping through the acquisition, ordering, and 
management of human information. As Theodore Porter has recently shown, beginning in the early 
nineteenth century, human heredity data was collected in armies, prisons, immigration offices, insane 
asylums, and schools. As he describes, “The science of human heredity arose first amid the moans, 
stench, and unruly despair of mostly hidden places where data were recorded, combined, and 
                                               
15 Francis Galton, F.R.S., Anthropometric Laboratory, 1884.  
Figure 6: “Anthropometric Laboratory,” Frances Galton Papers, 
Digital Special Collections, UCL. 
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grouped into tables and graphs.”16 This information was generated on the transnational stage in 
Denmark, France, Germany, India, Latin America, and the United States. 
Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Anglophone statistics—in eugenics, heredity, 
and mathematical-statistics—asserted a new epistemology of calculated time through regression 
techniques and anthropometric measurement. Statistical regressions captured the past through 
discrete sets of anthropometric information, while asserting methods of analysis and interpretation, 
which subjugated classes and types of people, and reaffirmed Anglophone dominance over the 
future. Both the past and future were bound to mathematical process. Anthropometry achieved new 
power in the expansive eugenics movement, which advanced a social politics around physical and 
biological human difference stabilized by new methods of calculation. 
  In 1901, Karl Pearson established the mathematical-statistics journal Biometrika. The 
commencement publication stated its purpose: “It is intended that Biometrika shall serve as a means 
not only of collecting under one title biological data of a kind not systematically collected or 
published under any other periodical, but also of spreading a knowledge of such statistical theory as 
may be requisite for their scientific treatment.”17 Indeed, Biometrika would serve as a significant 
conduit for the distribution of statistical methods throughout the twentieth century. Biological data, 
the core currency of the initial program, was a data system to elucidate human difference and assert 
Anglophone control. Through Anglophone mathematical statistics, race science gained legitimacy as 
a mathematically proven program. The primacy of racial science to this program, is stated in the very 
first paragraph of Biometrika— “the first step in an enquiry into the possible effect of a selective 
                                               
16 Theodore Porter, Genetics in the Madhouse: The Unknown History of Human Heredity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2018): 2.  
17 Editorial, “The Scope of Biometrika,”Biometrika 1, no. 1 (1901): 1.  
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process upon any character of a race must be an estimate of the frequency with which individuals, 
exhibiting any given degree of abnormality with respect to that character, occur.”18  
At the turn of century, mathematical statistics became a field that rendered statistics to be a 
coherent science, through asserting laws of counting, measurement, and estimation over 
designations of data: biological data, heredity data, and anthropometric data. Karl Pearson’s new 
calculus of statistics hinged on key data architectures: chi-square test, standard deviation, correlation, 
and regression techniques, that were deemed the new fundamental methods of data organization. 
These methods of analysis circulated in publications and were widely and rapidly adopted in social 
planning, biometrics, medical analysis, bacteriology, food studies, and so forth. They were integrated 
into informational work just as they were being designed in academic settings. Biological data and 
regression methods were the foundational components of the new mathematics, which would 
spread into new applications and contexts through the interwar mathematical statistics movement.    
By the end of the 1930s, these data architectures—regression techniques, standard deviation, 
and correlations—would become dominant tools used in interpreting social and state information 
on the world stage. Tracking the nodes and routes of global trade, the interwar “mathematical-
statistics movement” became a vast enterprise. On the transnational stage, the Anglophone 
metropole distributed data and methods through widely-read publications such as Biometrika, but 
there were also mathematical-statistical journals based in Korea, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, 
Turkey, India, and Poland, to name a few, that were circulated transnationally. Some of the 
corresponding programs were colonial extensions of the Anglophone school; others were built after 
the Anglophone fashion. Yet other new statistics programs were entirely distinctive in their origins.  
                                               
18 Ibid.  
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Across these geographical contexts, new statistical methods were designed and employed to support 
local and regional political-economic projects, imbued with distinctive cultural and political 
complexities. My interest here is not just in the history of the mathematical designs, but in the 
history of computing and computation known through their applications.  
While statistical methods were shared and traded transnationally, these were made sense of 
in local contexts, with local epistemologies of data, and local processes of computational work, used 
for specific political and economic ends. I use ‘confidence-computing’ to give visibility to this larger 
information network, under the broader conditions of the confidence crisis, and also to describe 
work conducted in local contexts. The crisis of quantification catalyzed a widespread reconfiguration 
of planning processes, according to the “improved statistics.” But confidence computing only came 
to fruition after WWI. It was a new epistemology of planning and a labor of calculation traveling in 
the currents of postwar rehabilitation—state reorganization, colonial expansion, and a growing 
empire of western pricing logics. How and why did this new statistical calculus rise to global heights of 
quantitative governance?  
 
Quant Farms in England, India, Poland, and the United States 
In the period 1920-1940, “an improved statistics” emerged in response to the confidence 
crisis, as a means of quantifying confidence, uncertainty, and control that hinged on assessing 
likelihoods of error in statistical work. Improved statistics emerged at the nexus of the Anglophone 
field of mathematical-statistics, the rise of axiomatic probability theory and set theory, and the rise of 
industrial agriculture. I argue that as agriculture industrialized, it also became a data-driven program 
and an enterprise geared towards (un)certainty work. This new regime of planners went to work on 
the world stage to harness public confidence in new modes of agricultural production and oversight. 
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They reconfigured the incomprehensible destruction of the Great War into a mathematics problem, 
which they deemed to be a crisis of calculation and flagging public confidence in numerical 
oversight. The confidence crisis commanded explanation of the postwar moment, designed by 
political economists, statisticians, scientists, logicians, administrators, and bureaucrats, as well as 
agriculturalists and tradespeople, whose anxiety—a captivation with the past that manifests as a conditioned 
worry about the future—drove them to grasp after a world they could no longer control. This catalyzed 
the formation of new computing infrastructures in response. The central engines for the interwar 
mathematical statistics movement were agriculture and trade. Agriculture was the predominant site 
and environment for the second wave of mathematical-statistical production, following the 
anthropometric and heredity programs of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  
 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I develop histories for the Rothamsted experimental station 
outside of London, England, the United States Department of Agriculture’s experimental station in 
Beltsville, Maryland, the Indian Statistical Institute in Kolkata, India, and the Nencki Institute for  
 
Figure 7: “Poultry at Government Farm, Beltsville, Maryland,”  
1920, National Photo Company Collection glass negative. 
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Experimental Biology in Warsaw, Poland. By the early twentieth century, agricultural experimental  
stations patchworked the United States landscape and were burgeoning around the globe. The 
stations were laboratories, state managerial bodies, and education centers, situated on acres or miles 
of land. They were centers for environmental study, agricultural production, and nodes of economic  
exchange in the circulation of seed, plant, and food commodities. In the U.S. context, as emblems of 
nineteenth-century state science, the agricultural experiment station arrived at the nexus of land 
grant legislation, geological surveys, and global trade.  
The early twentieth century agricultural experimental station constituted of both the library 
and the laboratory for the new statistics. Situated as unofficial government planning centers, the 
stations collected and ordered data from various entities in farming, agrarian planning, census 
administration, and research in the agrarian sciences. They held the political-economic resources to 
design, implement, and circulate new modes of data management, and they drove the information 
revolution. In the early 1920s, at the height of the confidence crisis, the four stations in this 
dissertation were designed under new leadership to develop new methods of computational 
oversight, rooted in the tenets of mathematical statistics.  
 A significant dimension to the new statistics was the formulation of experimental design, the 
process by which a physical or environmental experiment in sugar beet breeding, bacteriology, and 
so forth were redesigned according to methods of probabilistic oversight. The “design of 
experiments” is the fundamental epistemic leap within twentieth-century computing; it is the 
presupposition that empirical processes should be represented and explained as mathematical 
phenomena, in order to garner certainty within them. Between 1920 and 1940, statistical 
experimental frameworks came to oversee these designs as industrial-agricultural methods.  
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Outside of the United States, the Rothamsted Experimental Station is considered to be the 
oldest experimental station in Europe, originally founded in 1843. A major turning point was in 1919 
when Rothamsted director Sir Edward John Russell gave eugenicist, statistician, and now 
agriculturalist, Ronald A. Fisher free reign to digest and make sense of the vast amount of data 
generated by the station. Fisher held vested interest in the advancement of mathematical statistics in 
the domain of agriculture. In 1925, Fisher published a treatise titled, Statistical Methods for Research 
Workers, which was a how-to book for statistical research workers, for applying the Anglophone 
calculus of statistics in real-world applications.19 This treatise and his later 1935, Design of Experiments, 
captures the indiscriminate enthusiasm of reconfiguring any program generative of data, as a 
methods-based experiment.20  
The confidence crisis was not confined to Anglophone providence, but had regionally 
specific manifestations throughout Eastern Europe, Latin America, and South and East Asia. This is 
especially clear in colonial contexts where capitalist logics from the U.S. and U.K. were failing to 
take hold. India was a major site for colonial projects pertaining to the confidence crisis.21 Local 
operatives in India worked towards the advancement of price mechanization driven by a desire to 
overcome flagging trade and distrust in foreign exchange. In 1921, Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, a 
Cambridge Mathematical Tripos and former student of Karl Pearson’s established a statistics 
                                               
19 R.A. Fisher, Statistical Methods for Research Workers (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1925). 
20 R.A. Fisher, Design of Experiments (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1935). 
21 For scholarship on the legacies of political quantitative population administration in postcolonial India, see: 
Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (New York: 
Columbia University Press: 2006), 34: “Unlike the concept of a citizen, which carries the ethical connotation 
of participation in the sovereignty of the state, the concept of population makes available to government 
functionaries a set of rationally manipuable instruments for reaching large sections of the inhabitants of a 
country as the targets of their “policies”—economic policy, administrative policy, law, and even political 
mobilization. […] This regime secures legitimacy not by the participation of citizens in matters of state but by 
claiming to provide for the well-being of the population. Its mode of reasoning is not deliberative openness 
but rather an instrumental notion of costs and benefits. Its apparatus is not the republican assembly but an 
elaborate network of surveillance through which information is collected on every aspect of the life of the 
population that is to be looked after.”  
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laboratory, which later became the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) in 1931. In 1931, India’s Imperial 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) funded the ISI for studies related to agriculture.22 
The Indian Statistical Institute grew out of a single-room statistical laboratory, founded in 1931 
Kolkata, India. Its founder, Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis had been a visiting student in the 
Anglophone school of mathematical statistics, and he travelled back and forth to London.23 His 
education at University College London with Karl Pearson and Ronald A. Fisher reinforced his 
fascination with an anthropometric social order. While anthropometry is a science of quantifying 
human populations, its methods begin with the individual human form, determining human 
difference through physical bodily assessments of human individuals. This includes observable 
measures that range from height, weight, motion, craniometry, and skin color, to theoretical 
measures in genetics and human behavior. Anthropometric measures are not objective, but laden 
with racialized, gendered, and other cultural valuations.24 In India, anthropometry is the longest-
used measure and science of human difference. It dates back to the eighteenth century and was 
strengthened through colonial and post-colonial technoscience.25  
The convergence of mathematical statistics with anthropometric reasoning, first through 
Francis Galton’s method of regression analysis and then through the experimental design work of 
                                               
22 Ghosh, Jayanta, Pulakesh Maiti, and Anil Bera. "Indian Statistical Institute: Numbers and beyond, 1931–
47." Science and modern India: An institutional history, c 1947 (1784): 1019. 
23 For primary literature on P.C. Mahalanobis’ life and influence, see: Mohan B. Reddy and Ranjan Gupta, 
“Introduction: P.C. Mahalanobis and the Symposium on Frontiers of Anthropology,” Human Biology 67, no. 6 
(1995): 819-825; C.R. Rao, “In Memoriam: Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis (1893-1972) Sankhyā: The Indian 
Journal of Statistics, Series B (1960-2002) 34, no. 3 (1972): 301-302. 
24 See, for example: Lundy Braun, Breathing Race into the Machine: The Surprising Career of the Spirometer from 
Plantation to Genetics (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Michael Yudell and J. Craig Venter, 
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Ronald A. Fisher, consolidated anthropometry as (un)certainty work—a practice of translating data 
into probability tables, according to new, postwar methods in mathematical statistics. For 
Mahalanobis, Fisher’s anthropometry laboratory symbolized the totalizing potential of the 
mathematical-statistical gaze over human identity and societal value.  
While functioning as a colonial laboratory, the ISI advanced its own distinctive philosophy 
of computation, unique to Indian consciousness and local politics. In its founding, many dimensions 
of the Indian Statistical Institute were modeled after the London school, especially Fisher’s 
anthropometric laboratory and Karl Pearson’s international journal Biometrika. But, like the other 
mathematical statistics publications, the ISI’s journal Sankhyā was designed to advance a locally 
rooted politics and an Indian national identity. In its commencement publication, Mahalanobis 
explicitly rooted the journal in 3,000 years of India’s history. He wrote:	 
 
[…] statistics finds adequate expression in the ancient Indian word Sankhyā. In Sanskrit 
the usual meaning is meaning is ‘number’, but the original root meaning was 
‘determinate knowledge.’ […] The history of the word sankhyā shows the intimate 
conexxion which has existed for more than 3000 years in the Indian mind between 
‘adequate knowledge’ and ‘number’ (sic). 26     
 
The founding principle of the journal was that ‘statistics’ aimed to give ‘determinate’ and adequate 
knowledge of ‘reality’ with the help of numbers and numerical analysis.27 Countering the larger 
cultural sense of indeterminacy, this philosophy of statistics as determinate knowledge became a 
legitimating apparatus in the computing work for India’s social and economic programs.28  
                                               
26 P.C. Mahlanobis, “Why Statistics?” Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics (1933-1960), 10, no. 3 (1950): 224-
225.  
27 Ibid.  
28 For a cornerstone text on the national imagination and its impact on questions of sovereignty, see: Partha 
Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1993).  
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Throughout the 1930s, Sankhyā published local research conducted by Indian practitioners 
as well as a percentage of publications from the transnational circuit. Annual reports were published 
that surveyed all printed periodicals on methods-based computing. These were pulled from Belgium, 
China, Finland, France, Japan, the Philippine Islands, Turkey, South Africa, and Poland, in addition 
to many other countries. It was common practice for the computing laboratories in each of these 
places to house a comprehensive library on current research from the other locations. The Warsaw 
publication Statistica was especially popular in Kolkata. As evidenced in the journals, confidence 
intervals, fiducial limits, interval estimates, and null-hypothesis tests were a major point of 
investigation for ISI researchers—these logics shaped their data politics towards advancing rural 
reconstruction and large-scale anthropometry programs throughout the twentieth century.29 
During the 1920s, The Indian Trade Commissioner was notably interested in building 
confidence to sustain the “normative order” or caste system, reflected in this 1926 British report 
which bemoans India’s lack of confidence in trade activity, which was considered a microcosm for 
the “world’s tendencies”: 
 
Now the first most obvious and most deep-seated cause of the economic ills from 
which we are suffering to-day is admitted on all sides to be lack of confidence. The primary 
producer is uncertain of the market for his goods. The manufacturer is uncertain as to 
the prices he must pay for his raw materials and the prices he will get for his finished 
goods. The merchant is uncertain of the charges he must allow for in calculating 
transport, exchange and interest costs. Labour is uncertain of employment and too 
often also uncertain of wages and hours of work. The shipowner cannot count on 
cargoes nor the banker on a safe return to his capital. At all points lack of confidence prevails 
and hampers legitimate trade.30  
 
                                               
29 See, for example: C. Radhakrishna Rao, “Statistical Inference Applied to Classificatory Problems,” Sankhyā: 
The Indian Journal of Statistics (1933-1960), 10, no. 3 (1950): 229-256.   
30 Lindsay, H. A. F. "World Tendencies Reflected in India’s Trade." Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 75, no. 
3876 (1927): 386. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41357454. 
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A publication in the Indian Journal of Statistics, Sankhyā reflected on the importance of “improved 
statistics” in solving the confidence crisis. Statistician S.K. Datta Roy wrote that “adequate operating 
statistics […] gave shareholders, employees and community accurate data upon which sound option 
may be formed as to the adequacy of the return on capital or remuneration of labour.” 
 Datta Roy was interested in establishing confidence in modern trade economies. He stated, “The 
confidence which should spring from such accurate and full knowledge [would] go far to eliminate the 
suspicion which makes the investors unwilling and workers discontented.”31 The Indian Statistical 
Institute was founded in 1931, constituting the institutionalization of mathematical statistics in India.  
By 1923 there were four satellites in India, the ISI journal, Sankhyā was internationally 
circulated, and ISI members made frequent visits to statistics laboratories in the United Kingdom, 
the United States, South America, Germany, France, and Poland. The India Statistical Institute came 
to power between 1920 and 1940 to address the confidence crisis, and garner authority within the 
postwar global economy. Statistical model makers operating in agrarian production and management 
established new institutions to facilitate the exchange of mathematical statistics on the international 
stage.  
Across colonial contexts, Western practices of price mechanization conflicted with already 
existent or emergent market and monetary systems. Laborers driving these systems, including 
merchants, tradespeople, and farmers, resisted the growing imperatives of a global trade economy. 
For example, in their study of interwar Poland, U.S. and British political economists insisted that the 
source of the economic crisis was the peasant farmers’ resistance to producing beyond their own 
needs. The basic tenets of modern capitalism—producing beyond one’s own needs and trading and 
                                               
31 Roy, S. K. Datta. "Railway Statistics." Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics (1933-1960) 4, no. 2 (1938): 242. 
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investing in invisible commodities—relied first and foremost on maintaining confidence or trust in 
the future of systems that did not yet exist.  
 
Epistemic Crisis: The Probability Problem  
The other major feature of the confidence computing movement is the ascendancy of 
axiomatic probability over statistical programs. The influence of physics, transnational philosophy of 
science movements, and the formation of new schools of logic in set theory and axiomatic 
probability theory converged on the new statistical methods. Uncertainty was a logic and 
computation problem. Administrators and laboratory scientists alike framed their inquiries as 
problems of enumeration, estimation, and prognostication as they attempted to grasp hold of 
slippery, shifting, and hard-to-measure entities. Shifting populations in rapidly changing nation states 
were as difficult to quantify and predict as the alpha particle.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, new mathematical approaches to old problems in 
electrodynamics and atomic theory abandoned former conceptions of space, time, and energy with 
rippling effects. Beginning in 1905, with the theories of Brownian motion and special relativity, an 
anxiety over the limits of materialism emerged. At the heart of this crisis was a worry over whether 
mathematical descriptions used to describe the world actually reflected the world itself. Central to 
these epistemic anxieties, of course, was Albert Einstein’s 1905 work on molecular energy and 
relativity theory. While he was not a lone contributor to these paradigm shifts, his anxiety about 
mathematical description, culminating in his 1937 decree that “mathematics is uncertain,” is 
particularly easy to follow.  
 Generally speaking, the crisis of materialism in the early twentieth-century physical sciences 
was a problem of predicting the future. Mathematical descriptions of atomic particles and quantum 
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events predicated a forward-moving direction of time and space. The geometric design of Hermann 
Minkowski’s 1908 space-time structure—a visual representation of Einstein’s relativity universe—
represented ‘events’ at specific space-time coordinates, measurable only in the direction of the future 
and never in the past. Erwin Schrödinger’s wave-particle equation mapped the evolution of a wave-
particle into the indefinite future, but as soon as it was measured, it collapsed into a singular 
numerical value—describing either a wave or a particle—as its evolution halted. 
Quantum mechanics broke from the classical understandings of motion, light, and energy as 
the Newtonian framework failed to describe the otherworldly properties of quantum particles. 
Quantum particles did not move in continuous trajectories or orbits but jumped between quantum 
states; they appeared and disappeared and obeyed strange and paradoxical laws such as Einstein’s 
second principle of relativity that states no particle can move faster than the speed of light. Whereby 
a particle moving at the speed of light within a frame of reference moving at the speed of light 
remains moving at the speed of light, or c * c = c. Quantum particles are also described as waves, a 
completely different configuration of matter, depending on the experiment and the timing of 
observation. This early twentieth-century crisis of measurement occurring at new and strange scales 
was a crisis of mathematical meaning. It catalyzed a search for imaginative mathematical description 
that could adequately predict the evolution of a theoretical particle, the frequency of a quantum 
state, and the physical properties of light.  
Uncertainty is not an accidental feature of the search for mathematical description in physics 
but was an intrinsic part of its design. It was a descriptor of the epistemological and ontological 
complexities of the physical world beyond human experience and a signifier of reconciling 
mathematical description across different paradigms of knowing. Uncertainty denoted an incomplete 
mathematical language of competing truths, describing realties in which physical entities could be 
both waves and particles.  
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At the turn of the twentieth century, axiomatic probability theory came to the forefront of 
statistical inquiry in the domains of physics and philosophy, as well as state management, a 
development which intensified after WWI.32 The confidence computing movement was a major 
force in advancing the new science of axiomatic probability over analysis, management, and control 
of statistical information. But at the same time, this move to reinterpret information as probability 
data catalyzed an epistemic crisis: should probability theory be accepted as a valid epistemology in 
state and science? And furthermore, what is uncertainty? Is it a language problem or a psychological 
problem? Is it measurable in terms of data a priori or in frequency? This multidimensional ‘problem 
of probability’ was a serious inquiry taken up by economists, politicians, physicists, and philosophers 
of logic. Their inquiries into probability lay at the nexus of truth and politics. Questions of logic, 
vagueness, and accuracy were either explicitly or implicitly entwined with questions of democracy, 
colonialism, war, and poverty.  
Congruent with this understanding of physical uncertainty as a search to reconcile competing 
paradigms, historians of physics have shown that the popular conception of Heisenberg’s 1927 
‘uncertainty principle,’ characterized as the fact that “a particle cannot simultaneously have a well-
defined position and a sharply defined velocity,”33 was not the central issue for Heisenberg.34 
Cathryn Carson argues that interpreting the ‘uncertainty principle’ as an “impossibility of knowing 
precisely,”35 flattens the epistemological and ontological complexity of measuring particles. 
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Science 21, no. 1 (2006): 70-98.   
33 Erwin Schrödinger, "Are There Quantum Jumps? Part I." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3, no. 
10 (1952): 109-23.  
34 David Cassidy, Uncertainty: The life and science of Werner Heisenberg (New York: Freeman, 1992). 
35 Cathyrn Carson, Heisenberg in the Atomic Age: Science and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
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Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty’ was an act of measurement “involving interaction between a classical 
measuring device and a quantum system to be measured.”36 This uncertainty required a view of 
measurement that allowed “a (movable) cut between classical and quantum.”37  
Heisenberg’s uncertainty was an acceptance that measurement of the quantum world 
necessitated a reconciliation of different paradigms of knowing. Following the pre-established 
tendencies of Weimar cosmopolitanism and transnational cultural exchange, the popular conception 
of Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’ proliferated throughout the 1930s intellectual community. 
The concept of indeterminacy had transcended the physics laboratory and permeated philosophy, 
logic, economics, and psychology. Philosopher’s guilds, intellectual centers, and professional 
organizations throughout Eastern and Western Europe and the United States engaged the problems 
of materialism brought on by the destruction of absolute space and time. Indeterminacy was 
manifest at every level of data and analysis.  
 
*** 
 
In 1920s and 1930s London, the bright lights of modern cosmopolitanism and modern 
science cast shadows of uncertainty over human experience and human knowing. The postwar 
formation and revivification of the nation state with its electrified metropolitan capital and promises 
of democratic order failed to distract people from the dark realities of modern empire and economy. 
Political instability and poverty remained the prominent forces shaping their lives. Additionally, new, 
everyday social changes, ranging from new technologies such as refrigeration and electricity, to new 
cultural and political forms such as labor rights and secularization, unsettled societal norms. Social 
                                               
36 Carson, Heisenberg in the Atomic Age, 72. 
37 Carson, Heisenberg in the Atomic Age, 72. 
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change brought social anxiety, at the same time as early twentieth-century advances in the physical 
and biological sciences opened new possible worlds and new scales of knowing from quantum states 
to the microorganic universe. Fundamental beliefs about the known material world were in question. 
These anxieties rippled through public imagination, colloquial language, and the formation of new 
social institutions.  
The mathematical statistics movement held its own distinct practices and conceptions of 
uncertainty computation, and it belonged to a larger uncertainty crisis. In the growing empire of 
probability, this was a dramatic moment of self-reflexivity that spread across disciplines and 
contexts. In fact, distinct threads in economics, mathematical statistics, philosophy, and physics 
shared a preoccupation with the ‘problem of probability’ in the interwar period. By the late 1930s, 
fascism became the movement’s central political preoccupation just as the ‘certainty’ possibility was 
more rigorously debated. The rise of fascism in Germany, Austria, and Poland later contributed to 
the physical emigration of logical empiricists to the United States.  
While the departments across University College London’s campus were diverse in their 
pedagogical and political makeup, there was a clear engagement with various iterations and 
interpretations of indeterminacy and uncertainty central to their research. UCL was founded in 1830 
in the center of London as a secular alterative to Oxford and Cambridge. In 1904, UCL became 
home to Francis Galton’s Eugenics laboratory, which would be inherited by Fisher ten years later. In 
the 1930s, UCL brought in a number of German, French, and Eastern European intellectuals, 
physicists, mathematicians, and logicians. This was part of a larger trend in the cosmopolitan 
exchange of mathematical methods and philosophical query, and many at the University College 
London were working on the problem of probability in their respective domains of study. 
The problem with probability—whether or not newly formed statistical worlds (political, 
economic, physical, biological) could and should be understood in probabilistic frameworks—
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preoccupied public figures, logicians, psychologists, physicists, and statisticians. The question of 
whether probability as a language and system of knowing should reign over these worlds was the 
quandary for both the ivory tower and the corridors of power, and there was no consensus. The 
‘probability problem’ was this: did the state of the lived world and the conflicting epistemological 
systems for knowing the world fit with probabilistic reasoning, calculations, and valuations? 
Accepting the probabilistic worldview meant that knowledge could never be absolute, as 
‘knowledge’ would then be reduced to a translation of likelihoods. Rejecting the probabilistic 
worldview also meant that knowledge could never be absolute, as it was believed that there would 
then be no unified mathematical description by which to measure the world. It was this indeterminacy 
about uncertainty that constituted the problem with probability, a double-layered doubt that 
contributed to the larger cultural malaise of postwar European society.38   
Beyond the elite logicians and scientists working in major cosmopolitan universities and 
through the transnational philosophy of science movements, the problem of probability shaped 
colloquial speech and the cultural imagination; it guided university-funded inquiry and was a widely 
discussed political and public forum topic. For some, it was a language (albeit a poorly defined 
language) befitting the anxieties of the postwar world; it offered a uniquely accurate description of a 
social fabric fraying and disintegrating just as it was being sewn. Religious leaders recast 
secularization as a rejection of ‘absolute knowing’ in favor of a faithless preoccupation with 
probabilistic thinking. They used these questions to respond to the everyday living conditions of a 
world shaken by war, as they reminded their congregations, of a “commerce halved in value, thirty 
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million workers unemployed, vast numbers of people robbed of their life’s savings by catastrophic 
monetary depreciations, foodstuffs burned or thrown into the sea in some places, people half 
starving in others.”39 The literary world embraced the concept of probabilistic reasoning or 
uncertainty in the psychological and emotional developments of their characters.40 These characters 
embodied situated human questions of emancipation, disenfranchisement, poverty, and statehood as 
part of the same condition of uncertainty.   
The probability problem took many technical and cultural forms. Just in London alone, the 
range of responses to the crisis of knowability can be seen in three exemplary texts. British 
economist John Maynard Keynes 1921 A Treatise of Probability stated a total rejection of Bayes’ 
Theory of a priori data. It was an effort to break from classical probability theory more generally in 
light of modern statistical methods, which rapidly popularized with mathematical statisticians and 
political economists.41 Keynes’ discussions of data resonated with growing trends in the logical 
empiricist movement, especially with the thought of the German philosopher Hans Reichenbach, 
founder of the “Berlin Circle” that was disbanded following their persecution under the Third 
Reich’s race laws. Shortly after Reichenbach was forced out of Germany in 1933, he published his 
own Theory of Probability.42 Finally, in 1935, English physicist and mathematician, Arthur Eddington 
offered a distinctive probability riddle in his text New Pathways in Science, a popular “laymen’s” book 
that would circulate through London and world. His book was an extended reflection on the 
multifarious uncertainties, irreconcilabilities, and areas of incalculability within quantum physics.  
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Guardian, January, 23, 1935.  
40 Amy Bell, “Landscapes of Fear: Wartime London, 1939-1945,” Journal of British Studies 48, no. 1 (2009): 153-
175.  
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The ‘probability problem’ circulated through these texts was not just a confrontation of abstract 
probabilistic reasoning, but an attempt to reconcile notions and philosophies of probability with 
data. Keynes wrote A Treatise on Probability Theory before WWI, but only published it in 1921. In it, 
Keynes argued that data, the material stuff that informs inductive statements, puts Bayesian logic to 
question. For him, knowledge was deeply contextual, and modes of bounded reason could not 
transcend material information. Bayes’ theory of a priori data was ill fitting in the world of material 
information. With this view, he wrote about the certainty possibility:   
 
The terms certain and probable describe the various degrees of rational belief about a 
proposition which different amounts of knowledge authorize us to entertain. All 
propositions are true or false, but the knowledge we have of them depends on our 
circumstances; and while it is often convenient to speak of propositions as certain or 
probable, this expresses strictly a relationship in which they stand to a corpus of 
knowledge, actual or hypothetical, and not a characteristic of the propositions 
themselves.	43    
 
Keynes’ treatise and engagement with the probability problem was specifically a study of the 
relationship between probability theory and data. His ultimate rejection of the older conceptions of 
the a priori data that “governed the minds of Laplace and Quetelet” was widely embraced by the 
mathematical statistics movement. Their experimental designs, statistical estimation methods, and 
data architectures existed in the same epistemic space between probability theory and empirical data 
that Keynes aimed to confront. Throughout the 1930s, his text was read and circulated by R.A. 
Fisher, the U.S. agricultural statisticians, Harold Jeffreys, and statistician Egon Pearson, son of Karl 
Pearson, and Jerzy-Spława Neyman. For them it reaffirmed the power of statistical inference in 
reconciling probability theory with the material world.  
                                               
43 John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise of Probability.   
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Not everyone who engaged the probability problem abandoned Bayes. In fact, it was 
precisely through the interwar uncertainty movement that the frequentist versus Bayesian debates 
crystallized. Countering the more vaguely defined but palpable malaise of cultural uncertainty, the 
logical empiricist movement desired to achieve precise definitions through rigorous engagement of 
uncertainty’s various epistemological expressions. The movement was not necessarily unified in its 
political or philosophical commitments, but the problem of probability was the central topic of 
inquiry. In 1938, German philosopher Hans Reichenbach noted that the movement had, “spread all 
over the world.”	 
American pragmatists and behaviorists, English logistic epistemologists, Austrian 
positivists, German representatives of the analysis of science, and Polish logisticians 
are the main groups to which is due the origin of that philosophic movement which 
we now call logistic empiricism […] and its representatives are to be found today in 
many other countries as well—in France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Finland, Denmark, and 
elsewhere.	44 
 
As captured in Reichenbach’s statement, throughout the 1920s and 1930s the logical empiricist 
movement held university strongholds in major European cities and in fringe organizations beyond 
the university. These included work at University College London and the Warsaw School of Logic. 
It was typical for logicians to make the transnational circuit to different universities. In his own 
experience, Reichenbach spent a good deal of the 1930s at the University of Istanbul working on his 
problem of probability. Throughout the 1930s he circulated three texts on the probability problem. 
These are their English titles: Atom and Cosmos, The Theory of Probability, and Experience and Prediction.   
 Reichenbach’s 1935 German edition of The Theory of Probability began with a quotation from 
Leibniz: “Les mathématiciens ont autant besoin d’être philosophes que les philosophes d’être mathématiciens.” 
Reichenbach makes clear that while probability’s philosophical intricacies had long been a meeting 
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point for mathematicians and philosophers, who often wore both hats, the turn of the twentieth 
century had catalyzed a revival of “the philosophical theory of the probability problem.”  
  Across the UCL campus from Karl Pearson’s statistics laboratory, in the school of 
education, a recent Jewish émigré named Max Black was working on an article on the topic of 
vagueness. Max Black was born in Baku, Azerbaijan, and spent a majority of his young life in London. 
He attended Cambridge between 1925 and 1929, concurrently with Bertrand Russell and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, who were major influences on him.45 During his subsequent year at Göttingen he 
wrote The Nature of Mathematics, an in-depth study of Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead’s 
Principia Mathematica and a survey of current trends in the philosophy of mathematics. Between 1936-
1940, Black taught at UCL’s Institute of Education before immigrating to the United States. The 
problem of uncertainty had been addressed by philosophers since the fin de siècle as the problem of 
‘vagueness’ in human language and reasoning.  
U.S. pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce first defined “vagueness” in the 1902 Dictionary of 
Philosophy and Psychology. He wrote there, “A proposition is vague when there are possible states of 
things concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain […] by intrinsically uncertain we mean not 
uncertain in consequence of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker’s habits of 
language were indeterminate.”46 Vagueness was the descriptor of philosophical complexity in the limits of 
language.47 Preoccupied with the problem of quantum measurement, these philosophers took the 
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position that uncertainty resided in the limits of human description. Throughout his lectureship at 
UCL, Black immersed himself in the quandary of the ‘vague’ inspired by Bertrand Russell’s 1920s 
work on The Analysis of Mind. Russell cast the analysis of mind as “an attempt to harmonize two 
different tendencies, one in psychology, the other in physics.” Russell drew stark delineations 
between the behaviorist psychologists’ unwavering “materialistic position,” where they “think matter 
much more solid and indubitable than the mind,” against the impacts of relativity theory that had 
“been making “matter” less and less material.”48 From either vantage, vagueness persisted in human 
expression.  
In Black’s work, ‘vagueness’ was an insurmountable characteristic of human language in the 
same way as ‘indeterminacy’ was an insurmountable characteristic of all physical measurement.49 
Citing English physicist Norman Robert Campbell, the crux of the argument was that “There is no 
experimental method of assigning numerals in a manner which is free from error. If we limit 
ourselves strictly to experimental facts we recognize that there is no such thing as true measurement, 
and therefore no such thing as an error involved in a departure from it.”50 For many within the 
logical empiricist movement, including Reichenbach and Black, vagueness described an inherent 
condition of the world across the domains of linguistics and laboratory science. Engagement with 
vagueness speaks to the efforts of the time to reconcile slippages across epistemological worlds, such 
as psychology and physics, where practitioners witnessed the persistent and intractable phenomena 
of uncertainty.  
A participant in this relentless desire to clarify uncertainty terminology, British physicist Sir 
Arthur Eddington spent a good deal of the 1930s making rallying cries throughout London about 
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his probability problem. During this time, Eddington was a leading member of a philosopher’s guild 
called the Aristotelian Society. Starting in 1920, the Aristotelian Society rented rooms on Gower 
Street on the University College London campus to engage current and pressing issues in 
philosophical thought. Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s the group worked on questions of 
mind, determinacy, and probability, predominantly in reference to Bertrand Russell. In 1928, 
epistemologist C.D. Broad worked with Keynes on the principles of probability and later developed 
an entire program on indeterminacy with Eddington. Mathematical statisticians, including Harold 
Jeffreys and H. Levy, contributed to the proceedings. The Aristotelian Society was a meeting place 
for those concerned with the limits of probability as mathematical language, description, and mind.  
Arthur Eddington’s 1935 New Pathways in Science broadcasted itself as a book written for the 
“laymen” public. Newspaper advertisements for New Pathways described,  
 
An entertaining wrangle between Maxwell’s Sorting Demon and Heisenberg’s 
Principle of Uncertainty is described. Determinism is compared with the gold standard 
of scientific law, while probability is described as the paper standard, until recently 
believed ultimately to be convertible into gold. Present-day physics is found to be off 
the gold standard.  
 
In this quote the epistemic crisis in physics was likened to the economic crisis following the fall of 
the gold standard, giving indication of the larger structure of feeling surrounding the philosophy 
guilds in interwar Europe. Eddington also put forth probability riddles that were in popular 
circulation, especially his 1919, “A, B, C, D probability problem.”  His probability riddle widely 
circulated in London and continues to be used in probability debates and pedagogical design to this 
day: 
 
If A, B, C, D each speak the truth once in three times (independently), and A affirms 
that B denies that C declares that D is a liar, what is the probability that D is speaking 
the truth? 
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Eddington’s response to the more general ‘probability problem’ was less vague than the logical 
positivists; he drew clear delineations in what he deemed to be a haze of uncertainty. He advanced a 
strictly frequentist interpretation of probability. “The common idea is that, since probability signifies 
uncertainty, a statement like the foregoing which contains two uncertainties ought to be reducible to 
simpler terms. But numerical probability is not an uncertainty; it is an ordinary physical datum—the 
frequency of a certain characteristic in a class.”51  
The American mathematical statisticians at this time took a stronger stance on the question 
of indeterminacy by simply skirting many of the complexities within the uncertainty crisis. They 
were eager to assert new statistical methods as the connective tissue between theoretical and 
experimental physics, between physics and society, and between epistemic reasoning and the 
ontological world. These mathematical designers believed that statistical computation methods 
offered the most apt description of the real world, and that these methods could manage uncertainty 
across the quantum, molecular, classical, and human scales. U.S. mathematical statisticians upheld 
the statistical method as the best way of addressing both indeterminacy and (un)certainty, which 
were frequently blurred together. They saw the statistical method as operable across scales of 
measurability, whether at the quantum scale, the molecular scale, or from 10,000 feet above ground.  
Statistical methods were asserted as the dominant epistemological framework for measuring 
social and physical worlds. Mathematician Warren Weaver, who would serve as central command for 
the applied mathematics group during WWII, made the resounding declaration that: “the first part 
of the twentieth century […] should be known as the reign of probability.”52 In 1931, U.S. 
                                               
51 Sir Arthur Edington, New Pathways in Science (Messenger Lectures delivered at Cornell University in April and 
May 1934) 
52 Warren Weaver, "The Reign of Probability." The Scientific Monthly 31, no. 5 (1930): 466.  
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mathematician H.L. Reitz was quoted in the Journal Science stating, “the principle of uncertainty in 
relation to either the position or the velocity of an electron is a statistical statement.”53 Building on 
Weaver’s declaration, he stressed that the early twentieth century should be characterized not by 
paradigm shifts in the physical sciences but by the rise of the statistical method. Just as he pondered, 
“Is the statistical method in science simply a substitute for the mechanistic method or a last resort 
when the situation becomes so complicated that we give up making predictions about each 
individual item by any calculable process?” 
As broadly sketched in this prologue, at the turn of the twentieth-century, a computational 
crisis in agriculture and global trade led to a grasp for control over extant and newly designed 
information structures. This occurred at the nexus of rising trends in axiomatic probability analysis 
and statistical oversight, the convergences of which were generative of a new conception of 
information: probability data. The larger tendency towards mechanizing probability or uncertainty in 
context of statistical experimentation was then made possible by the transnational agricultural 
experimental stations, which were positioned to command large bodies of information under the 
conditions of a growing industrial agriculture, and to exchange this information, data, and methods 
to other laboratories through new global trade systems. This early twentieth-century computational 
crisis, and emergent trends of (un)certainty work, is not a neat story of a single institution or 
individual, or even a discipline, that drove a new computational movement. What I described here is 
cataclysm of crises in statistical governance, physics, and philosophy that propelled forward a new 
regime of calculation and promise of uncertainty management. The drive to design certainty is 
thereby rooted in crisis and is a multinational and multidisciplinary enterprise. In the next two 
                                               
53 Weaver, "The Reign of Probability," 470.  
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chapters, I will detail the design and implementation of two data architectures, and their real-world 
applications, within this larger movement.  
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Chapter 2: Confidence 
 
1929 
The Origins of Confidence Computing in Warsaw, Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONFIDENCE is the first computing concept explored in this dissertation and is followed by two 
more: control and uncertainty. The computing concept ‘confidence’ is an expression of trust that a 
logician or statistical thinker holds in their experimental design and analysis. It is also an expression 
of trust that the public holds in numerical-economic informational systems and technologies. In the 
1920s, statistical thinkers designed new data architectures to quantify and mechanize confidence 
logics in data management. This chapter details the first numerical calculations for the confidence 
Figure 8: Image from: Henryk Arctowski, “Agriculture and 
Landownership in Poland,” Geographical Review 11, no. 2 (1921): 173.  
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interval parameter in 1929 Warsaw, Poland. After WWI, Poland became a sovereign nation state for 
the first time in 150 years and the dreams of a great agrarian nation state were complicated by the 
realities of extreme poverty, ongoing border disputes and turmoil, Jewish emigration and forced 
removal policy, inhumane labor conditions, the circulation of foreign capital, and efforts to stabilize 
paper currency. In order to establish public ‘confidence’ in growing western pricing logics, paper 
currency, and quantitative oversight more generally, fledgling agricultural administrative bodies 
turned their attention to “improving statistics.”  
This turn towards emboldening quantitative oversight in agriculture fueled the global 
circulation of new mechanized logics and data. In Poland, the newly formed Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics employed a fringe-computing laboratory at the Nencki Institute for Experimental 
Biology, a biometrics center, to compute tables for a “small farm problem,” deemed to be the 
central issue in managing Polish agriculture. There the first numerical calculations for the ufności 
przedzial  or confidence interval parameter were conducted. They were handwritten on graphed 
paper and calculated using an Odhner arithmometer machine. These calculations served as 
numerical limits for ‘uncertainty’ within a statistical experiment and were quantitative expressions of 
‘confusion’ that the statistical thinker—here Wacław Pytkowski—held in his method of 
interpretation.  
 In 1929, agricultural workers in Warsaw reconfigured the economic and statistical concept of 
‘confidence’ into a method of analysis that established limits for uncertainty in experimental design. 
In this context ‘confidence’ became a mechanized computing concept; what I call ‘confidence 
computing’ is a bounded philosophy of data production and analysis that galvanized agricultural 
management as (un)certainty work. In this historical and geographical context, (un)certainty work 
served the conflicting political aspirations of preserving peasant farming as the underpinning notion 
of Polish sovereignty, while also aspiring to make the Polish economy legible on the world stage as 
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part of a growing western pricing geopolitics. In the period between 1929 and 1939, a confidence 
computing collective emerged around Warsaw and nearby Lwów that integrating new methods of 
interpretation, inspired by rising trends in axiomatic probability theory, with tacit agricultural work. 
Applications include: Polish labor health analysis, virulent studies, sugar beet planning, and beyond.  
 
The Confidence Crisis in Poland  
In 1918 the dissolution of the Prussian empire and the end of the German war effort led to Poland 
achieving national sovereignty for the first time in 150 years. Immediate efforts were made to 
stabilize a democratic government and a centralized national economy. The initial move for a 
provisional democratic government was followed by a decade of shifting political initiatives, and 
Poland’s interwar borders remained unstable. There were uprisings and violent conflict along the 
German and Czech borders, territorial disputes with Ukrainians and Lithuanians, and in 1920-21, 
war broke out between the Poles and the Soviets.1  
Throughout this time, the Polish people maintained a provisional government with a 
working constitution and voting apparatus. In 1926, a coup d’état catalyzed a break from this initial 
provisional government and secured Józef Piłsudski’s regime, which has been described as a “semi-
constitutional guided democracy.’”2 Poland’s achievement of nominal sovereignty in 1918 did not 
usher in an age of peace and stability; it remained subject to ongoing war, violence, and political 
turmoil and the future of the new nation was radically uncertain.  
                                               
1 Michael Bernhard, “Interwar Poland,” in Institutions and the Fate of Democracy: Germany and Poland in the 
Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005): 78. 
2 Bernhard, “Interwar Poland,” 82.  
  73 
Against this backdrop of shifting political borders and contentious efforts to stabilize a 
voting government, in the early 1920s Poland was identified by Western analysts and statisticians to 
be a center of the confidence crisis. In the last chapter, I defined the transnational confidence crisis 
as a distinct period between 1900-1940 characterized by widespread anxiety and flagging trust in 
nineteenth-century modes of statistical governance and global trade. The confidence crisis catalyzed 
an effort to establish public trust in both new and old systems of numerical oversight. This was 
especially pronounced in 1920s and 30s Poland, where the landscape was being radically changed by 
internal statistically-driven rehabilitation efforts and external monetary and economic forces.  
Foreign capital began to circulate in Poland at the same time as Poland established a new 
national paper currency and new banking institutions to build confidence in its value. Throughout 
interwar Europe, confidence was the lubricant for circulating paper currency, as seen in this 
description of the German mark:  
The success of the rentenmark, backed by no liquid assets, is explained chiefly by the 
extraordinary growth of public confidence that it was a good currency and would not 
depreciate. This confidence so greatly reduced the desire to spend money quickly that 
the velocity of circulation was radically diminished. This confidence was strengthened 
by the refusal of the Rentenbank in January to grant additional credits to the 
Government, by the courageous restraint exercised in granting Reichsbank and 
Rentenbank private credits, and by the Expert Committee’s announcement (on 
February 2, 1924) that it would propose a gold bank of issue which should provide for 
the redemption of rentenmarks.3 
 
Here the rentenmark is described as an entity that does not have an underlying asset and that is 
valued through public participation in its circulation. Here confidence in paper currency is described 
as an affective belief in the future value of the currency, that would be manifest in public spending 
habits and reinforced by institutional policy.   
                                               
3 Joseph S. Davis, “Economic and Financial Progress in Europe, 1923-1924,” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 6, no. 3 (1924): 226.  
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Throughout the interwar period, Poland’s paper currency, the złoty, meaning the “gold,” was 
a central inquiry in confidence analysis. The currency was in a constant state of fluctuation. In the 
1920s it was afflicted by extreme inflation—it took hundreds of thousands of złoty to equal the U.S. 
dollar. Political economists and statisticians characterized this period of inflation as a crisis of 
confidence. Despite Poland’s hyper-inflation, throughout the 1920s it was considered by foreign 
interests to be an incredibly valuable territory and investment. The new country became a popular 
site of study by Anglophone and U.S. analysts that centered on public confidence-building in paper 
currency and global trade. They were intrigued by the extreme currency inflation across Eastern 
Europe more generally, in countries like Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Czechoslavakia. But Poland 
was seen as an ideal confidence crisis laboratory because it was a new, relatively-stable country with 
an abundance of natural resources. They contrasted the potential of this new country with Austria’s 
much-reduced resources, and Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria’s “overhanging cloud of 
reparations.”4 Due to its strong agricultural production, the Republic of Poland was also deemed a 
self-sustaining country.5 The land, resources, and geographical location attracted serious interest 
from Britain, the United States, and its surrounding countries especially Germany and Soviet Russia. 
This transnational preoccupation with Polish land and resources would only intensify under the 
growing shadows of Germany’s Lebensraum and Soviet collectivization programs.  
Situating currency and trade within the larger political realities of the Polish terrain, analysts 
determined that, “The whole situation was such as to undermine confidence in the future of the 
currency.”6 These outsider statisticians and economists drew correlations between shifting political, 
                                               
4 E. Dana Durand, “Currency Inflation in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to Poland,” The American 
Economic Review 13, no. 4 (1923): 593.  
5 Henryk Arctowski, “Agriculture and Landowndership in Poland,” Geographical Review 11, no. 2 (1921): 166.  
6 Durand, “Currency Inflation in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to Poland,” 603.  
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economic, and environmental conditions and the people’s “confidence” in monetary systems. Still, 
in their analysis, they treated Poland as a unit, with a homogenous landscape and people. Public 
‘confidence’ referred to a general public known only by their market participation. A 1936 reflection 
on the interwar period linked the failure of new monetary systems to flagging Polish confidence. 
The author writes that, “It was inevitable in a country which had so recently experienced paper-
money inflation that a crisis in confidence would eventually be engendered by issues of inconvertible 
paper money,” In turn, this produced “an effect on economic conditions and on people’s 
confidence in the złoty.” For outsider technocrats, the new Polish economy became a laboratory for 
understanding the confidence crisis. 
Internally, for the Polish elite, the confidence crisis pointed to the instability inherent in the 
project of cultivating a sentiment of Polish nationalism attached to new market and finance 
structures. Since the early 1920s, the heterogenous Polish population did not uniformly embrace the 
need for or trust in western pricing logics and foreign capital, or for generating capital by producing 
beyond the requirements of self-sufficiency. In referring to the initial 1921 elections that put 
Piłsudski in power, a U.S. economist remarked that, “The whole situation was such as to undermine 
confidence in the future of the currency […] it will take years to restore the confidence of the 
peasant in the advantage of producing a surplus beyond his own needs.” Due to the noted resistance 
of agricultural workers and flagging public confidence in paper currency, administrators, industrial 
heads, and entities such as the Finance Minister, went to work to build confidence in the złoty and 
in the tenets of western price mechanization more broadly.  
To calculate a people’s confidence in interwar Poland, analysts assumed a shared 
consciousness in national identity that did not exist. But more than anything, the Polish people’s lack 
of confidence was an outcome of surviving the labor and living conditions of a newly formed and 
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patchworked country. The Polish landscape and Polish labor conditions, and therefore the Polish 
people, were deeply heterogeneous and still suffering the continued impacts of WWI. After 1920, 
Poland was still fractured into former Russia Poland, former Prussia Poland, and former Austro-
Hungarian Poland. Within this general political landscape, after 1918, the country was divided into a 
mosaic of new provinces. As depicted in the heading map, these boundaries were drawn by various, 
sometimes conflicting interests.7 In some cases the provinces were determined by military oversight. 
Sometimes the crop boundaries of agricultural production—such as sugar beet regions – were used 
to demarcate the territories. Other borders were established through international sovereignty 
oversight such as the Peace Conference of Paris. Throughout the interwar period, the borders of 
Poland remained in flux, a radical instability reflected in efforts towards statistical oversight.   
Efforts to quantify Poland involved efforts to stabilize immigration and emigration statistics, 
population demographics, and labor statistics. Across the new province lines, Polish people were in 
a constant flux of internal migration movements as they sought after livable conditions. The peasant 
farming class was the most affected as they held little rights to designations of land ownership in the 
transitions from empire to nation-state, even though it was the source of their livelihood. Systematic 
internal migrations were also proposed to “balance” population densities—these proposals sought 
to relocate 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 people from one part of the country to another.8 Throughout the 
1920s, mass immigration and repatriation, as well as a steady stream of emigration contributed to a 
fluctuating people.9 This was documented in statistical population assessments and corresponding 
immigration and emigration policies. Throughout the 1920s, the population was deemed too small, 
                                               
7 Arctowski, “Agriculture and Landowndership in Poland,” 163. 
8 Arctowski, “Agriculture and Landowndership in Poland,” 170. 
9 Office of Population Research, “Demographic Problems of Poland,” Population Index 5, no. 4 (1939): 233-
238.  
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with death rates and emigration outweighing births. Into the 1930s, state entities determined an 
overpopulation problem in Poland.10 After 1936, in the name of this population problem, there were 
increased proposals for the systematic and forced emigration of Jews in an effort to build towards a 
racially- and religiously-defined “national unity.”11  
Initiatives to rapidly design a standard calculation of Polish labor failed to capture what was 
a dynamic labor population. Despite the high population density of Poland’s metropolitan centers in 
Warsaw and Cracow, the peasant farming class comprised a huge portion of the working population. 
For confidence builders, they were not easy to count due to their geographic dispersion across 
provinces and rural farm areas. For the same reason of geographical distance, these workers were 
also in a separate class from workers in the metallurgy and textile industries. This latter set of 
workers were able to organize through labor initiatives that were occurring on the international stage 
that had a Polish delegation. In the early 1920s, labor efforts such as the International Labor Office 
helped facilitate state actions in Poland towards work-shift organization delegated through the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Assistance and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in Poland.12 In 
the year 1920 alone, 250,000 textile workers and miners conducted around 300 individual strikes 
towards establishing just and livable working conditions in the new Poland.13  
                                               
10 This is emblemized by Max Weber’s sociology, see: Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930).  
11 Harry Schneiderman, “Poland,” The American Jewish Year Book 39 (Sept. 1937-Sept. 1938); In 1936, the 
proposed solution of Poland’s economic and social problems via the expropriation of the Jews was adopted 
as a government policy as part of the platform of a proposed new party calling itself “Camp for National 
Unity.”  
12 The International Labor Office held International Labor Conferences with Poland in attendance since its 
commencement conference in 1919 Washington, D.C.; See: “Industrial Relations and Labor Conditions,” 
Monthly Labor Review 15, no. 5 (1922): 27-43; “Labor Organizations,” Monthly Labor Review, 24, no. 4 (1927): 
74-76; “Directory of Labor Officials in United States and Foreign Countries,” Monthly Labor Review 19, no. 1 
(1924): 245-266.   
13 “Strikes and Lockouts,” Monthly Labor Review 13, no. 1 (1921): 218.  
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At the same time as the peasant farming class was not able to organize their labor in the 
capacity of the metallurgical workers, their farm land also became the primary site for the managerial 
overhaul. In response to the confidence crisis in Poland, agricultural became the primary focus of a 
growing statistical oversight. New centralized planning centers were formed, just as older Prussian 
institutes were repurposed. The larger agrarian landscape was drawn into composite units of rational 
production, usually delimited by crop type. These provincial bounds outlined nodes of analysis used 
in measuring gross domestic product and producing price indices. Price indices were the rational 
currency desired to make Poland legible to confidence builders to the transnational stage as part of 
an expanding world economy. Price indices were thereby needed towards a Polish nationalism and 
as such, crop production needed to be counted. Polish provinces were then designed as regions of 
calculation, parameters drawn to enumerate populations, assess rural density, and quantify material 
resources and food crop production.  
This sense of Polish nationalism hinged on organizing farm data, but interest in this data 
extended beyond the Polish borders in the context of numerically driven global trade expansion. 
Already in 1918, the American Delegation to the Peace Conference commissioned analysis on 
Poland, to estimate populations, yields, and crop production using a long survey of former Russian, 
Prussian, and Austrian data, with consideration of the current political reforms. An analyst from 
Lwów described the notion of progress associated with industrial land reform in Poland: 
The land-reform bill will specially aid in the opening of the north-eastern provinces—
now backward and sparsely populated—to the more enterprising and progressive 
farmers and peasants of Galicia. The peasants, however, cannot settle in the devastated 
country without provision being made for housing and supplying them with the 
necessary farm stock and implements. If agricultural machinery, tractors, and farm 
animals were available, the migration of the people from one part of the country to 
another could be organized on a large scale, and the improvement would be rapid. 
Thus the progress made will depend primarily on the means placed at the disposal of 
the Polish Government.  
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Here the analyst described the “backward and sparsely populated” farm workers in contrast with the 
“enterprising and progressive farmers of Galicia.”  His proposal was to redistribute the people 
through systematic internal migrations, so that the new provinces would have an equal distribution 
of producers and would be easier to count. Polish confidence—it was imagined—would be 
established through designing a landscape of neatly distributed populations and predictable farm 
production. Descriptions of Polish progress and reformation generally, were rooted in land reform, 
as agriculture was the largest producer of Polish commodities on the world stage. Postwar Poland 
comprised a heterogenous landscape and diverse people subsumed under an approximated 
imagination of national-economic identity. In designing this new configuration of the Polish 
economy, a new statistics went to work to garner confidence in its borders.  
 
Confidence Computing as State Making and Dissent 
Against the backdrop of political and economic uncertainty shaping the New Republic of Poland, 
and in the larger context of rational land reform, a collective of philosophers, statisticians, and 
agrarian workers advanced a new conception of agricultural work rooted in mathematical statistics. 
In 1929, the first numerical calculations for a new method of calculation—the ufności przedzial or 
confidence interval, were conducted in Warsaw, Poland in the context of assessing what they called 
the ‘small-farm problem.’ The confidence interval was an effort to give logical-mathematical 
structure and precise, computational meaning to the notion of confidence. The confidence interval 
reconfigured ‘confidence’ from its vague affective and economic descriptions into probability 
measures and a mode of calculation.   
 This new method was also designed in the context of the Anglophone mathematical 
statistics movement, but in its production, it was unique to Polish soil. In 1929, then 35-year-old 
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Jerzy Spława-Neyman had been living in Poland for ten years, working first as a field statistician in 
Bydgoszcz and then as a professor through the Nencki Institute of Experimental Biology. In the 
early 1920s Neyman visited London to work with Karl Pearson and had established a close 
friendship with his son Egon Pearson. Their ongoing correspondence throughout the interwar 
period reflects an effort to differentiate themselves from the older generation of mathematical 
statisticians by designing new methods of calculation reflective of recent trends in axiomatic 
probability theory and set theory, and responsive to their present-day work and living conditions. In 
1929, Neyman gave a lecture at the University of Warsaw, on what he proposed as ‘confidence 
intervals’ that could delimit intervals of certainty and uncertainty in statistical work. This design 
taken up by his student Wacław Pytkowski.14  
The first numerical calculations for the confidence interval were part of a growing dissent of 
the routines of thought and practice attributed to the Anglophone school of mathematical statistics. 
This tendency to put mathematics to questions circulated among a much larger community of 
statistical workers, who oversaw applications in agriculture, biometrics, and social statistics. Their 
epistemological practices were influenced not just by mathematical statistics, but by the foundational 
crisis in mathematics led by the French and German Schools, and the Warsaw-Lwów school of 
logic. I refer to this collective as “confidence computers.” Their work was empirical, rooted in 
analyzing scientific and social information such as mapping potassium levels in the soil, sugar beet 
harvesting, analysis of sickness experienced in Polish workers and on. Their work was also 
theoretical—within their field statistics they confronted the foundational and paradoxical logics in 
probability theory. This computing collective advanced a culture of dissent and philosophical 
                                               
14 I do not have a transcript of the lecture, but Pytkowski references it, see: Wacław Pytkowski, “The 
Dependence of the Income in Small Farms upon their Area, the Outlay and the Capital Invested in Cows 
(English Summary),” Bibljoteka Puławska 34 (1932): 51.  
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existentialism in the service of a dynamic movement to imagine sovereign Poland as a modern and 
prosperous agrarian nation state. The ambitions of their enterprise were part of a larger context of 
the transnational philosophy of science movements and scientific institutionalization occurring after 
WWI. Warsaw, in particular, was not just a central site for agricultural reform but a city that prided 
itself on scientific cosmopolitanism.  
Following WWI, Polish nationalists had moved to strengthen its scientific and technological 
powers in Warsaw. Science institutes founded or reformed during this time—most were formerly 
Prussian or German—integrated global trends in data production and statistical methods into their 
establishments. In 1918, the Warsaw-based Polish Academy of Sciences founded the Nencki 
Institute for Experimental Biology at the University of Warsaw, with hopes of becoming a world-
leading center of biometric research. Biometric research centered data and methods of calculation as 
part of a new scientific epistemology within eugenics, public health, and medicine.15  
The other major site for new methods was agricultural production. Following WWI, 
Poland’s State Research Institute of Rural Husbandry, which had existed in some form for over a 
hundred years, made moves to consolidate agrarian oversight. 16 Crucial to this trajectory was the 
1926 creation of the Department of Agricultural Economics (DAE) in Warsaw to be led by 
Franciszek Bujak, who is remembered as the first Polish economic historian.17 The creation of the 
DAE was a clear effort to reform the agrarian economy through comprehensive data collection and 
statistical analysis. Upon accepting his DAE role, Bujak immediately facilitated a data-collection 
                                               
15 Katrin Steffen, "Experts and the Modernization of the Nation: The Arena of Public Health in Poland in the 
First Half of the Twentieth Century." Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, 61, no. 4 (2013): 574-90. 
For an account of the coevolution of mathematical statistics and biometrics, see: Porter, Karl Pearson. 
16 “150 Years of Agricultural Research in Puławy,” Institute of Soil Science and Plant Cultivation State 
Research Institute, accessed April 8, 2017, 
http://www.iung.pulawy.pl/eng/images/pdf/folder_eng_sepia.pdf.   
17 “150 Years of Agricultural Research in Puławy,” 8.  
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campaign for a Polish “small-farm analysis” from which the first numerical calculations of 
confidence intervals would be made.  
While Bujak was not himself a theoretical statistician, his economic work was known to the 
global confidence knowing movement, which was defined by the efforts of political economists and 
statisticians to mechanize processes by which large amounts of data were collected, quantified, and 
managed. As already discussed, throughout the 1920s, an international campaign of agrarian 
economists moved to standardize data from world economies through the creation of price-tables.18 
Bujak’s price-tables for Poland were widely circulated and revered by agrarian economists in 
Western Europe and the United States as he produced impressive records purportedly dating back 
to the 12th century.19 Price indices were a highly-valued type of confidence data that burgeoned after 
WWI, in efforts to stabilize national identity as a function of economic strength. Discourse about 
the larger confidence crisis often invoked volatile prices, as measured by fluctuating price indices, as 
the core indicator of flagging public confidence.  
In tension with efforts to standardize price metrics on the international stage, Poland’s 
agrarian economy comprised a heterogeneous patchwork of peasant farms managed provincially by 
culturally and ethnically diverse peoples. The State Research Institute sought to enumerate the crop 
and material production of these farms, in order to translate those measures into price indices. This 
involved remapping Poland’s agricultural districts, (as mentioned above), and consolidating farm 
                                               
18 See: Arthur H. Cole and Ruth Crandall, "The International Scientific Committee on Price History," The 
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data. After creating the newly formed Department of Agricultural Economics, the State Research 
Institute acquired a number of regional agricultural experiment stations, including the Research 
Institute in Bydgoszcz and the Botanical and Agricultural Experiment Station in Lwów.20 These two 
experimental stations provided important statistical data, or what was called, materiały, for early 
confidence computing analysis.21  
The 1920s efforts to formalize peasant farm production metrics generated significant cultural 
tensions between farm workers and newly formed initiatives. But while there were tensions, there 
was not a stark bifurcation, and in fact many people working in the new statistics domains strongly 
identified with peasant farming. Like the larger population in Poland, these planners were culturally 
and ethnically diverse and held varying personal stakes in Polish nationalism. Notably, Franciszek 
Bujak maintained that it was his ties with peasant farming that provided the epistemic basis of his 
economic work.22 Many of the workers at the newly formed state institutes and agricultural 
experimental stations had grown up on farms, where they continued to work as they pursued 
university education in Cracow, Warsaw, Bydgoszcz, and Lwów. Their work reflected a sentiment of 
working towards a new Poland, while trying to preserve the traditions of peasant farming. Polish 
modernism therefore was not situated antithetically to regional production. Rural agrarianism was 
upheld as the means by which Poland would become a powerful and independent nation state.  
The Polish intelligentsia proved another influential group in the formation of Warsaw’s 
scientific establishment and in the confidence computing movement. Beginning in 1921, a collective 
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of university philosophers and logicians established themselves as the Warsaw School of Logic, a 
philosopher’s guild between the University of Warsaw and the University of Lwów.23 Distinct from 
the agricultural economists and biometricians, this group advocated for an engagement with 
philosophical logic, largely preoccupied with recent advances in set theory from France and 
Germany. The Warsaw School of Logic was an enterprise of a distinctively Polish sensibility. 
Ultimately, the confidence computing work central to this story did not occur in the lofty towers of 
the academy but in the everyday practices of seed counting, in which questions of mathematical 
logic studied within university walls converged on the new designs for local agricultural reform. 
 
The Warsaw School of Logic and the Crisis of Foundations  
In the 1920s, The Warsaw School of Logic at the University of Warsaw was completely 
enthralled with Théorie des Ensembles or Set Theory logic.24 Set theory is a mathematics of organizing 
mathematical objects into sets—a framework for describing mathematical objects that could 
potentially be applied across various fields of mathematics.25 In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, set theory was a movement towards a universal system of mathematical logic 
catalyzing a crisis of consciousness. This period in mathematics is also known as “the foundations 
crisis,” as the new drive towards a universal logic of mathematics yielded just as many foundational 
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24 Murawski, The Philosophy of Mathematics, 33.  
25 See: John Mayberry, “On the Consistency Problem for Set Theory: An Essay on the Cantorian 
Foundations of Classical Mathematics,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Two foundational 
philosophical texts in théorie des ensemble include: A.N. Whitehead, “Introduction Logique a la Géométrie,” 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 15, no. 1 (1907): 34-39; Bertrand Russell, “La Théorie des Types Logiques,” 
Revue de Métaphysiqe et de Morale 18, no. 3 (1910): 263-301.  
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contradictions as the bad old system it was supposed to supplant.26 The time period would soon 
come to be identified with Hermann Weyl’s 1921 paper, “On the foundational crisis in 
mathematics,” in which he dramatically likens the logical crisis in set theory with the turmoil of the 
postwar world: “the antinomies of set theory are usually regarded as border skirmishes that concern 
only the remotest provinces of the mathematical empire that can in no way imperil the inner 
solidarity and security of the empire itself or of its genuine central areas.”27 Weyl’s work was written 
in the postwar German context and so inspired by the larger crisis of confidence in the shaky 
promises of modern progress. In the following passage, he explicitly uses ‘paper currency’ as a 
metaphor for the classical use of existential statements: 
The point of view sketched above only expresses the meaning which the general and 
existential propositions in fact have for us. In its light mathematics appears as a 
tremendous “paper economy”. Real value, comparable to that of food products in the 
national economy, attaches only to the direct, simple singular; general and existential 
statements participate only indirectly. And yet we mathematicians seldom think of 
cashing in this “paper money”! The existence theorem is not the valuable thing, but 
the construction carried out in the proof. Mathematics is, as Brouwer sometimes says, 
more activity than theory. 28  
 
A leading logician at the Warsaw school, Wacław Sierpiński, took on the crisis of 
foundations in mathematics as a core component of his research and pedagogical initiatives. 
                                               
26 The most commonly referred to paradoxes in set theory, are ascribed to Georg Cantor, Bertrand Russell, 
and Richard. For a description of Bertrand Russell’s paradox and extensive bibliography on the foundational 
crisis in mathematics, see: Stephanie Aleen Dick, “After Math: (Re)configuring Minds, Proof, and Computing 
in the Postwar United States,” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2014): 23. For long-view histories on the 
emergence of set theory and its discontents, see: Ivor Grattan-Guinness, The Search for Mathematical Roots, 
1870-1940: Logics, Set Theories and the Foundations of Mathematics from Cantor through Russell to Gödel (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); Joseph Dauben, Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); David Rowe, “Anxiety and Abstraction in Nineteenth-
Century Mathematics,” Science in Context 17, no. ½ (2004): 23-47.  
27 Translated quote from: Hermann Weyl, Selecta Hermann Weyl, Birkhäuser, Basel, 1956; quote found in: Dirk 
Van Dalen, “Hermann Weyl’s Intuitionistic Mathematics,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 1, no. 2 (1995): 147.   
28 Dirk Van Dalen, “Hermann Weyl’s Intuitionistic Mathematics,” The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 1, no. 2 (1995): 
147.   
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Beyond this, Sierpiński founded the journal Fundamenta Mathematicae, which galvanized a singular 
focus on set theory. The preface to the journal’s first edition began: “Lorsqu’on conçut en 1919 le project 
hardi d’éditer un périodique consacré exclusivement à la Théorie des Ensembles et à ses Applications.”29 This 
interest in set theory was underpinned by a preoccupation with the philosophical concept of 
correspondence: the idea that ‘truth’ was a relational property.30 Distinct from the positivism of the 
Vienna circle, the Warsaw logicians were not preoccupied with a one-to-one correspondence of 
mathematical description to real world objects but with examining the relations between mathematical 
objects.31 They maintained that mathematical architecture deserved to be studied in its own right as 
“[mathematical] logic [was] an independent and autonomous mathematical discipline and not only a 
mathematical method or tool.”32 The Warsaw School of Logic aspired to build a distinctive 
community of philosophers and mathematicians through a shared engagement with pure 
mathematical rationality. They believed this would constitute a thriving Polish intellectualism and 
culture known throughout the world.  
In 1923, Sierpiński had tasked his current student Jerzy-Spława Neyman (at that time, a new 
arrival in Warsaw) with a query about measurable set theory. At that time in France, mathematician 
Emile Bórel and his student Henri Lebesgue had surmised that a closed empty set in Euclidean 
space could be measured by summing the series of intervals belonging to each point within the set. 
So Sierpiński asked Neyman if it was possible to measure a series of intervals covering the set E and 
find that the sum of their lengths is smaller than infinity or the measure of the outer bounds of the 
                                               
29 “Préface À La Nouvelle Édition,” Fundamenta Mathematicae 1 (1920): V-VI.  
30 “The Correspondence Theory of Truth,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed December 19, 
2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/.  
31 Michael Friedman, "Hempel and the Vienna Circle," in Logical Empiricism in North America, ed. Gary L. 
Hardcastle, et. al, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2003): 94-114.  
32 Murawski, The Philosophy of Mathematics, 32; Georg Cantor, “Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten 
Mengenlehre” Mathematische Annalen, 49 (1897): 207-246.  
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set E. Sierpiński’s question may have been intended as a reductio ad absurdum but Neyman proved it in 
the positive.33 He manipulated what was understood as the outer bounds of the set E by covering it 
with another open set H, and thereby introduced ambiguity about which numbers belonged to 
which set thus making possible a sum of numbers smaller than infinity.  
At the core of his proof, Neyman revealed ambiguity in the established precepts of 
measurable set theory. This challenged the dominant preconceptions of the French School and 
showed that uncertainty exists in even the staunchest of mathematical truisms. Neyman’s impulse to 
test the limits of the bounded set, part of the larger movement of confronting mathematical 
foundations, captures a defining feature of Polish confidence computing. By virtue of the Warsaw 
School’s dominance in the University, the language of axiomatic probability theory was present in 
the minds of Warsaw’s mathematicians and statistical workers who trained there. As will soon be 
discussed, this informed their movement to translate points of unknowability in statistical work into 
probabilistic language.  
Neyman worked to establish an applied statistics enterprise in Warsaw. In 1928, he managed 
to secure laboratory space at the Nencki Institute for Experimental Biology. This space consisted of 
two rooms, two Sunstrand electrical adding machines, and two Odhner arithmometers.34 Within 
these two rooms Neyman founded and operated the “Biometric Laboratory of the Warsaw Scientific 
Society,” and the “Mathematical Statistics Group of the Horticultural Faculty of Warsaw 
Agricultural College.” The space was a meeting point for logicians, philosophers, and statisticians 
                                               
33 Jerzy Spława-Neyman, “Sur un théorèm métrique concernant les ensembles fermés,” Fundamenta 
Mathematicae, 5 (1924): 329-330. At the end of this paper Neyman writes, “Je citerai enfin le problème suivant 
qui m’a été communiqué par M. Sierpiński.” 
34 Mirosław Kryśko, “The History of the Mathematical Statistics Group at the Horticultural Faculty of the 
Central College of Agriculture in Warsaw, and the Biometric Laboratory at the Marceli Nencki Institute of the 
Warsaw Scientific Society,” Statistics in Transition – New Series 13, no. 3 (2012), 617.  
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working in different domains of field work. They were interested in how well probabilistic 
frameworks fit statistical research in the laboratory, and the group included theorists and logicians, 
farm workers, state workers, and statisticians, as well as those who wore many hats.35 Neyman also 
had three student workers: Wacław Pytkowski who was studying to be an agricultural engineer; 
Karolina Iwaszkiewicz, a horticultural student training in biometric research and statistics; and 
Stefan Moszczeński, who came from the Agricultural Economy Group at Warsaw Agricultural 
College.36  
In 1929, through a local Warsaw press, the group began publishing Statistica, the memoirs of 
the biometric laboratory collective, and this would continue through 1937.37 Part of the initial 
collective, philosopher and logician Janina Hosiasson (1899-1942) was a student of Warsaw 
University and a core member of the Warsaw-Lwów school of logic.38 She trained with ethicist 
Tadeusz Kotarbinski and logician Jan Łukasiewicz.39 Her work, part of the foundations crisis in 
mathematics and rising popularity of axiomatic probability theory, was directed towards assessing 
the logical foundations of probability theory and its relationship to data.40 She directly confronted 
                                               
35 People involved with the laboratory included Janina Hosiasson, Stanisław Kołodziejczyk, J. Mydlarski, M. 
Górski, Stanisław Kołodizejczyk, Stanisław Saks, Henryk Wilenski, Kazimierz Korniłowicz, Tadeusz 
Matuszewski, Jan Piekałkiewicz, Antoni Przeborski, and Josef Przyboroski.  
36 Ibid., 618.  
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analysis. This is best evidenced by Iwaszkiewicz’s erudite knowledge of the international medical community’s 
standards of toxicity. Between 1920 and 1935, the Nencki Institute facilitated an exchange of scientific 
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(The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989).  
39 See: Anna Jedynak, “Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaumowa: The Logic of Induction,” in ed. Władysław 
Krajewski, Polish Philosophers of Science and Nature in the 20th Century (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001).  
40 J. Hosiasson, “Why do we prefer probabilities relative to many data?” Mind XL, no. 157 (1931): 23-36.  
  89 
paradoxes in probability theory, and she translated three of Bertrand Russell’s books into Polish. In 
1929, she wrote a piece in the commencement publication of Statistica, entitled: “Quelques remarques 
sur la dépendance des proabilités posteriori de celles a priori.” This piece illuminated a paradox within recent 
Anglophone theories of probability, in application to frequency curves and statistical methods.41 In 
its founding, the Polish mathematical statistics group was a coming together of philosophy with 
statistical work. Core to this program was a desire to question the foundations of probability, and 
what it was doing to the world.  
 
The Small-Farm Data Problem 
The fascination with uncertainty driving the new mathematics collective rapidly extended into 
applications in biometrics, agriculture, and state statistics. The same year of the laboratory’s 
founding at the Nencki institute, statistics student Wacław Pytkowski was commissioned by the 
State Research Institute, to conduct a flagship analysis of Polish Small Farms. The impetus driving 
Pytkowski’s first project, was the availability of data being generated by newly formed state 
institutions, which Neyman referred to as a “treasure trove of valuable information.”42 For the ‘small 
farm problem,’ the Department of Agricultural Economics provided information collected in 1927 
and 1928.  
The program was designed to reformulate Polish farm production into quantified 
information conforming to Western capitalist logics. A majority of this production was generated on 
                                               
41 Janina Hosiasson, “Quelques Remarques sur la dépendance des proabilités a posteriori de celles a priori,” 
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Macmillian Company, 1915).  
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small peasant farms. In 1927, Poland’s GDP was 62% agriculture and peasant farmers owned 68% 
of the cultivable land.43 That year had been profitable for Polish agriculture due in part to an increase 
of foreign investment from countries like France and the United States.44 This influx of western 
capital, and the promise of further growth, motivated the Department of Agricultural Economics to 
seek a mechanism for assessing the profitability of small farms in Poland. This was seen as a means 
of stabilizing capital. Poland’s drive to reform as a sovereign nation state was not independent of 
global pressures to make its economic and market formations legible to foreign investors, political 
economists, scientists, and other governing bodies. In this view, efforts to enumerate and manage 
the Polish production economy would depend on a clear ordering of regional and individual small 
farm data.  
Given the heterogenous farming traditions spanning the patchworked landscape, there was 
limited information on small farm production, despite recent efforts to aggregate data. This was a 
problem that the current director of the BAE, agricultural economist Witold Staniewicz, wanted to 
correct. Staniewicz, who had taken over Franciszek Bujak’s directorship in 1927, described Poland’s 
central agricultural and economic problem as being the “problem of small farms.”45 He wrote, “The 
basis of the agrarian structure [is] a large number of small farms carrying on a traditional natural 
economy.”46  
Small farms referred to farms that measured at less than 20 hectares. Despite their small size, 
in aggregate, they were the dominant producers of agriculture in Poland.47 However, given their size, 
                                               
43 Witold Staniewicz, “The Agrarian Problem in Poland between the Two World Wars,” The Slavonic and East 
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46 Ibid. 
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it was difficult to collect enough data about them to accurately assess their profits.48  The 1927/1928 
data collection project entitled “Analysis of Small-Farms in Poland” had initially been facilitated by 
Bujak, but Staniewicz, who had been teaching agricultural economics at the University of Warsaw, 
gave the data to Wacław Pytkowski of the newly formed mathematical statistics group. Staniewciz 
viewed Pytkowski as a highly competent theoretical statistician who could aid the department in 
stabilizing a mechanism for assessing small farm profitability.49 Aware of the mathematical 
movement, it was hoped that statistical inference could help make sense of small-farm data, which 
suffered from being underdetermined. This was a small data problem. Statistical inference was 
needed to help make sense of an agrarian economy about which there was minimal information.  
The Small-Farm analysis was designed to answer questions such as: “What would be the 
effect of adding 100 złoty to the total outlay of a farm of a definite type other factors remaining 
constant?”50 Questions like this one were typical in confidence building and were usually treated with 
some mode of regression analysis. Regression analysis, dating back to Carl Gauss and first named by 
eugenicist Francis Galton in the nineteenth century, was an established method of estimating the 
relationship between variables (such as farm outlay and number of cows on a farm) by holding one 
variable constant while assessing variability in its dependent variables. Given the already adopted 
frameworks of the mathematical-statistical worldview—rooted in the central limit theorem—it was 
assumed that greater quantities of data would yield better defined bell curves and give a clearer 
determination of averages and deviations from the average.  
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At small scales, when the data was insufficient to yield a clear view of things, there was a 
small data problem. Probability was invoked to fill in the gaps. Pytkowski designed the confidence 
interval to estimate mathematical-statistical values—such as averages and deviations—in a small set 
of data. Logical hypotheses would be asserted about a set of data, such as the numerical value of a 
mean value. New methods of calculation were designed to assess the level of confidence one could 
have in that hypothesis. In 1929 Warsaw, Pytkowski was developing this architecture for assessing 
the logical validity of methods (regression analysis) used in assessing the small-farm data problem. 
The hypothesis in this example is the estimation that the value q lies within a certain range of 
numerical values. What is in question, for Pytkowski, was how certain he could be that his 
estimation was correct, based on the analytic method used. His eventual ufności przedzial or 
confidence interval, hearkened back on a longer tradition of measuring confidence, from which the 
Polish school would break.  
As covered in chapter 1, regression analysis was the modus operandi of late nineteenth 
century statistical work especially in the evolutionary and life sciences, named in Francis Galton’s 
eugenics movement. In Galton’s universe, confidence was both a statistical and affective concept 
pertaining to the trust he held in the specific technique of regression analysis, which ensured he 
could draw general laws or “hereditary conclusions” from his data.51 In the 1870s, Galton worked to 
discover the statistical properties of inheritance in nonhuman species such as plants and animals. 
While his methods and data were limited, Galton was “confident that these laws were universal and, 
once discovered, could be applied to inheritance of intellectual and moral traits.”52  
                                               
51 Francis Galton, "Discontinuity in Evolution." Mind 3, no. 11 (1894): 362-72; Francis Galton, "Family 
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This philosophy of regression operated at once as a mathematical mode of reasoning, a 
descriptor of biological and evolutionary processes, and as a means of stabilizing social hierarchy.53  
This triadic meaning is best captured in Galton’s 1889 address to the Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland, in which he stressed the confidence he had in regression analysis as a 
classificatory principle in human history: “…what is confessedly undefined in the individual may be 
definite in the group, and the uncertainty as regards the one is in no way incompatible with statistical 
assurance as regards the other.”54 Quantitative linkages drawn between individual traits and social 
position achieved legitimacy largely because of the confidence held in the statistical technique of 
regression analysis.  
By the early twentieth century, the law of regression was ubiquitous throughout the 
psychological, medical, and social scientific fields especially in political economics and agronomics. 
This widespread adoption of regression architectures set an important precedent for the rise of 
mathematical statistics in the twentieth century by establishing authority in bounded mathematical 
mechanisms to govern social, political, and economic systems.  
Arguably, regression analysis itself may be considered algorithmic: it is a rote mode of data 
collection and processing that dictates a precise order to its computation and interpretation. 
Regression analysis also constitutes an economy of logic that depends on confidence in both its 
affective and technical meanings to hold power. The eugenics movement was a deeply ideological 
social philosophy stabilized by seemingly banal administrative procedures and computations. It was 
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precisely the affective confidence generated in regression techniques, that reinforced the authority of 
numbers in the social and political world.  
In his Small-Farm analysis, Pytkowski put to question the limits of Anglophone trends in 
regression analysis in the analysis of Polish small-farms and thus introduced doubt into the 
prevailing confidence of regression technique. As a tuning apparatus, he employed a new method of 
assessing and measuring statistical error and a new philosophy of computation, both of which 
centered uncertainty in the experiment. In estimating an unknown value in a general population set 
using known values from a random sample set, there is an inherent likelihood of error. The English 
school accounted for statistical error by measuring the misfit of data after statistical experiments were  
complete. These measurements were often computed with R.A. Fisher’s coefficient of determination  
equation: 1 − 𝑟-√𝑛 which measured how well a regression line fit the data.55 Pytkowski saw the  
coefficient of determination equation as an insufficient post hoc calculation. He believed error 
should be at the forefront of the experiment as engaging unknowability was the whole point of 
statistical analysis.  
Pytkwoski’s term Ufności (or confidence) was therefore cast as logical reevaluation of the 
teachings of the Anglophone school. He maintained that the tendency to calculate a multiple  
regression surface on the entire body of material could not “be approximated with any sort of  
accuracy” as the respective calculations were “complicated to the degree of being prohibitive.”56 In  
efforts to address the problem of accuracy, Pytkowski organized the data into “class intervals” 
before calculating his regression analysis. He drew up charts to classify the data in a way that would 
honor its provincial idiosyncrasies, privileging three factors: farm size, outlay, and capital invested in  
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cows. For example, Pytkowski equated his outlay intervals to 300 złoty, relative to farm size. If a  
farm had spent far less than 300 złoty on upkeep that year, it would no longer be part of the relevant 
analysis. After carefully classifying the 1927/1928 data on the gross outlay, area, and net profit of 
Small Farms, Pytkowski then calculated partial correlations and regressions for each one of his class 
intervals. The ufności przedzial (or confidence interval) concept was outlined as a mechanism for 
measuring confusion in his regression analysis.  
This design further department from another well-known anglophone data architecture, 
William Gosset’s t-distribution equation. Scottish mathematician William Gosset, who published 
under the pseudonym “Student,” had developed the t-table in 1908 to achieve greater confidence in 
the industrial applications of his work. An employee at Guinness Brewery in Dublin, Ireland, Gosset 
was tasked with estimating the production of hard versus soft wheat grain in beer production, a task 
that depended on sample sizes that were too small to assume a normal distribution. Gosset designed 
a standardized chart that provided probability values for sample sets under 30, when the mean value 
of the general population set was unknown. Again, the impetus in designing his model, here a 
mobile table of numerical values, followed a real problem in agrarian work. By the time of 
Pytkowski’s small-farm analysis, Gosset’s tables were well-known in Poland.  
In calculating numerical values for the confidence interval parameters, Pytkowski 
manipulated Student’s t-distribution equation.57 Instead of estimating a single characteristic value for 
the general population set, as with Student’s equation, he drew a range of possible values by 
bounding the upper and lower limits of where that value could probabilistically be in the general 
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population set: 𝑈. − 𝑆√𝑛/! 𝑡	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑈. + 𝑆√𝑛/! 𝑡58 Then using the t-distribution table, he chose a confidence 
factor, or the numerical measure of the confidence he wanted to have that his characteristic value 
would be in that range of possible values. In Pytkowski’s design, statistical workers could choose in 
advance a confidence factor, e.g. equal to 0.05. As determined by the confidence factor, the 
probability of an erroneous assertion about where the value was located in the predetermined range 
necessarily equaled the predetermined 0.05. The numerical calculations for ufności “designated 
boundaries for the risk of confusion.”59 By putting forward a range of values, and relinquishing 
hopes of 100%, certainty, Pytkowski could purportedly quantify the level of uncertainty or 
confusion in his analysis.  
The 1927-1928 Polish Small-Farm Analysis constitutes the first numerical calculations of what 
would later be known around the world as the confidence interval parameter. Pytkowski had first 
engaged the concept of statistical intervals in Neyman’s lectures at the Nencki Institute’s biometric 
laboratory and was eager to implement his interpretation of the mechanism in his analysis as it 
resonated with the larger objectives of his work. His objective was not to design a generalizable 
mechanism for assessing small-farm profits, but to design a mechanism that could delimit 
unknowability within the small-farm assessment and then express that unknowability in probabilistic 
language. Stressing this point, Neyman wrote the next year that the Small-Farm problem could not 
be solved in one publication as the price of crops and soil in 1927 and 1928 were radically different 
from the conditions of the economic crisis following 1929.60  
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The earliest iteration of the confidence interval is not recognizable by today’s understanding 
of computer algorithms. Firstly, machines did not compute it. A group of human logicians collected 
the data, devised a logic of interpretation, conducted the computational labor, and provided a 
numerical value to represent a certainty of interpretation, rarely above 95%. The Polish philosophers 
embraced confidence as a mode of reasoning that dictated direct and ordered engagement with 
uncertainty in statistical work and statistical governance. I have outlined their method of calculating 
unknowability—(un)certainty work—in three stages:  
STEP ONE: Identify as many points of unknowability in the field or laboratory 
experiment as possible using a combination of statistical knowledge and tacit field 
and economic knowledge    
STEP TWO: Express these points of unknowability in the language of axiomatic 
probability theory 
STEP THREE: Test the probability of being right about the probability of being wrong  
 
 
Biometrical Uncertainty  
 
 
Figure 9: Trans. Sugar Beet map of Poland, 
Statisticia (1933) 
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(Un)certainty work in the context of Polish land reform consisted of holding an experiment still, 
unearthing the limits of human knowability within it, and translating this uncertainty or 
unknowability into probabilities. Their (un)certainty work luxuriated in the limits of the data and the 
analysis, as well as the limits of the experimental design. This is clear in the small-farm analysis that 
established the experiment as a hypothesis test of two years of small-farm data. This (un)certainty 
work was applied in agricultural, scientific, and social scientific experiments. The year prior to 
Pytkowski’s small-farm analysis, Karolina Iwaszkiewicz arrived at the Nencki Institute to pursue her 
doctorate in horticulture and mathematics and lecture in practical statistics. Over the next decade 
she would publish over a dozen papers on her statistical work.61 One of Iwaszkiewicz’s more notable  
projects was a reassessment of a common biometric procedure: measuring the poisoning power of a  
given solution.62 In question was how biometric scientists should think about their statistical 
estimations of virulent units (such as the bacterium diplococcus). In her assessment she replaced 
analysis of causal claims in medicine with a computational process of bringing uncertainty to bear on  
the experimental design. 
Her analysis sought to explain the following type of scenario: “Why, when two animals which 
have been injected apparently with identical doses of toxin does one die while the other remains healthy?”63 
Iwaszkiewicz’s objective here was not to provide a causal explanation for the deaths of mice, but to 
critically examine the dimensions of this problem and reveal points of unknowability in its 
procedure. To begin, the two most apparent points of unknowability known throughout the medical 
community were the chemical nature of the toxin and the “content of poison in any one batch of 
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the drug.”64 Neither one of these were observable or measurable and therefore needed to be 
estimated.  
The objective, therefore, was to estimate how many virus units N were in any one batch of 
the drug. In current practices of biometric research, this number N could easily be estimated using 
Poisson’s probability law. But Iwaszkiewcz chose to resituate it as a point of investigation as she 
maintained, “we cannot hope to be able to give a complete solution of this very complicated 
problem.”65 She first tested the hypothesis that the estimate of virulent particles followed Poisson’s 
law and then pushed beyond these more obvious points of uncertainty. There was “another possible 
source of error” in the experiment’s design—variability in different mice bodies such as age, health, 
and breed.66 Using current research from the Medical Research Council’s Department of Biological 
Studies in London, Iwaszkiewicz drew confidence measures for variability of mice bodies in the 
mice population showing that much was still unknown about them. Ufności was the mechanized 
process by which innumerable points of unknowability within an experiment were expressed in 
probabilistic language.  
Unknowability remained even in the conclusion of Iwaszkiewicz’s assessment. She argued 
that even the unstated initial assumption—that truly equal volumes of poison were injected into the 
animals—was not really measurable in the existing data. But by the new methods, even 
unknowability about this dataless hypothesis could be expressed as a probability. Her rigor and 
precision in unfolding the layers of uncertainty within biometric experiments is paradigmatic of the 
new statistics. Confidence computing unraveled experimental frameworks by revealing designs that 
were partial, incomplete, porous, and tattered. These experiments were then reconfigured according 
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65 Ibid., 105. 
66 Ibid., 103. 
  100 
to a new logic of interpretation, which asserted an interval of uncertainty—95%--as the guiding 
epistemology and boundary of interpretation.  
 
A Confidence Collective 
Concurrent with Pytkowski’s Small-Farm analysis and Iwaszkiewicz’ work on virulent particles, a 
cadre emerged around the Nencki Institute, the State Research for Rural Husbandry, and the 
University of Warsaw. Their planning work in many cases made use of the confidence interval 
architecture but in all cases demonstrated the same rigorous (un)certainty work from which the 
mechanized expression of ufności first emerged. These statisticians worked with each other in places 
like the Central College of Agriculture in Warsaw and the Institute of Plant Breeding and 
Agricultural Experimentation.  
This network worked on various problems pertaining to Poland’s rehabilitation efforts in the 
domains of agriculture, biometric research, and social policy. Investigations fell under four rough 
categories: agricultural experimentation (including plant breeding and field sampling), agricultural 
industries (including brewing, milk and cheese production), chemical engineering, and economics.67 
Investigations included estimating potassium levels in fertilizers and sickness in Polish workers. 
Across these many areas of research, confidence computing operated between epistemic uncertainty 
in statistical work and the limitations of experiments known from local field or laboratory work.  
Józef Przyborowski and Henryk Wileński were statisticians affiliated with the Statistical 
Laboratory at the Central College of Agriculture in Warsaw and worked at a seed sorting station at 
                                               
67 Jerzy Spława-Neyman, “The Development of Industrial Applications of Statistical Theory in Poland,” 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 30 (1935): 707. 
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the University of Cracow. One of the station’s daily tasks was testing red clover and other small 
seeds for dodder, a parasitic plant that invaded crops. Since this random selection process comprised 
the “routine work” of the station, the statisticians maintained it should have “a sound statistical 
basis.”68 Their central question was, in the random selection of clover seeds, does the distribution of 
dodder seeds follow Poisson’s probability law? In testing this hypothesis, they revealed further 
points of uncertainty, particularly in the seed sorter’s claim to have selected the seed “at random” in 
the first place.  
In reality, they argued, dodder seeds were significantly heavier than clover seeds and during 
transport would shift to the bottom of the sacks that held them, especially since the seeds were 
typically transported over broken or nonexistent roads. It was clear that seed selected from the top 
of the sack was probabilistically different from seed selected from the bottom. So Przyborowski and 
Wileński redesigned the sampling experiment by developing new tables that compared their testing 
of Poisson’s hypotheses at the top and the bottom of the sack. This gave a more accurate account 
about what could be known about homogeneity in a mix of dodder and clover seeds. The Polish 
collective of practical agrarian philosophers defined confidence as a measure of uncertainty. Their 
algorithm both admits of and embraces the limits of human reasoning, of experimental data, and of 
variability in the conditions of the world.  
(Un)certainty work was a visual overlay that delimited what could and could not be known in 
an experiment, as expressed probabilistically. In 1935, Neyman and two of his colleagues at 
Warsaw’s Central College of Agriculture, T. Matuswski and J. Supinska applied confidence logics to  
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the popular “dilution method” being used in bacteriology across many biological fields.69 
The dilution method in bacteriology can be traced back to Louis Pasteur. Around 1875, Pasteur 
obtained pure cultures of bacteria by diluting the original inoculum during several successive  
 
 
transfers to a suitable culture medium.70 The method consisted in diluting the original population, 
usually in powers of 10, and inoculating equal volumes of the diluted material into liquid media.71 
What was considered to be an inherently statistical problem was the assessment that “if growth 
occurs from the inoculation of 1 cubic centimeter of a 1:100 dilution and not from a 1:1000 dilution, 
the number of organisms present in the original material is said to be between 100 and 1000 per  
 
                                               
69 Matuszewski, T., J. Neyman, and J. Supinska. "Statistical Studies in Questions of Bacteriology. Part I. The 
Accuracy of the "Dilution Method"." Supplement to the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 2, no. 1 (1935): 63-82. 
70 H.O. Halvorson and N.R. Ziegler. “Application of Statistics to Problems in Bacteriology.” Journal of 
Bacteriology 25, no. 2 (1932): p. 102.  
71 H.O. Halvorson and N.R. Ziegler, Bacteriology, 1932, p. 102.   
Figure 10: Matuszewski, T., J. Neyman, and J. Supinska. "Statistical Studies in 
Questions of Bacteriology. Part I. The Accuracy of the "Dilution Method"." 
Supplement to the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 2, no. 1 (1935): 66. 
  103 
cubic centimeter.”72 Dilution methodology was developed to determine the number of bacteria in a 
given solution when other methods could not be used due to flawed experimental conditions. When  
debris or other imperfections prevented the bacteriologist from actually counting the bacteria, there 
was a need for a reliable statistical mechanism to estimate these numbers.  
Throughout the 1920s, food industries such as beer brewing, cheese making, and meat 
curing relied on dilution methodology because estimating bacteria populations was essential to 
replicating their food production processes. By the 1930s, there was a distinct quantitative turn in  
bacteriology that sought new statistical techniques and means for more efficient control over 
bacteriological experimentation. The dilution method in particular had “been devised inter alia to 
estimate the concentration of bacteria which are living and are able to develop under given  
conditions of nutrient, temperature, etc.”73 By the time of the Warsaw experiment, many statistical 
estimation techniques were circulating—such as the method of maximization—to try and estimate 
original population values. Confidence intervals were employed to test the validity of these 
preexisting estimation methods and techniques and rework the experiment and experimental testing 
by its logic.  
 In Neyman, Matuswski, and Supinska’s dilution experiment, they tested the veracity of 
population estimates of an unknown parameter, λ —the original suspension of bacteria. Unlike 
other dilution method estimation techniques at the time—including Fisher’s fiduciary limits—they 
gave “up constructing a unique estimate of λ.”74 So the point of the confidence gaze was not to find 
the probability of the actual bacteria population in the original suspension population, λ, but to test 
the veracity of the probability claims made about the original suspension population. The process of 
                                               
72 H.O. Halvorson and N.R. Ziegler, Bacteriology, 1932, p. 102.   
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reimagining the experiment in terms of confidence intervals, depended “very much on the 
arrangement of the experiment.”75 The purpose of their experiment consisted in describing the 
accuracy of the estimate based on the total number of fertile samples.76 This meant that the entire 
process of experimentation was reworked according to confidence interval framing, from 
determining the objective of the problem, to selecting and computing the data, and finally to the 
conclusions drawn from that data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This figure is a visualization of confidence intervals for the dilution experiment. 77 The 
unknown parameter λ, or the original suspension concentration, is related to the empirical series x—
the individual bacteria or groups of bacteria seen in many dilution samples. These intervals are 
limited by the confidence coefficient a, designated here as 95% of unity. It is depicted that for each 
of the x intervals, the bacteriologist could estimate—with 95% certainty—that the population 
estimate λ is contained within its corresponding confidence interval. Furthermore, this visualization 
reinforced the epistemic parameters of the experiment: “The smaller the value of λ, the greater the 
                                               
75 Matuszweski, Neyman, and Supinska, Dilution Method, 75. 
76 Matuszweski, Neyman, and Supinska, Dilution Method, 64. 
77 Matuszweski, Neyman, and Supinska, Dilution Method, 68. 
Figure 11: Confidence Interval for Dilution 
Experiment 
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probability the number of fertile tubes will equal zero and vice versa as λ approach[es] infinity.”78 
Here a three-point relationship was designed between the known variables xn, the unknown 
parameter λ, and the confidence coefficient a.  
The uncertainty of the original concentration of bacteria is directly linked to empirical data 
generated in dilution tests, by the designed confidence coefficient—with 95% certainty. Certainty and 
uncertainty were held in suspension by a predetermined probability. The logics of uncertainty, 
therefore, permeated the very process of sampling and the very design of the experiment. 
Biometrical procedural was designed in terms of probability data and analysis. 
The crisis of foundations guiding the initial impulse to put mathematical truisms to question 
was adopted by a more practically-minded cadre of statistician that integrated experimental 
knowledge in medicine, agriculture, and biometrics into their mathematical work. Pytkowski’s 
calculations for the small farm problem represented an effort to mechanize ‘confidence’ as a process 
of calculation in statistical study. This mechanism for quantifying confusion—confidence intervals—
was a mathematical architecture designed to operate on economic information by employing the 
tenets of axiomatic probability theory in practice. The epistemic and economic crises shaping 
intellectual cosmopolitanism in interwar Poland converged on the new method. Although this 
method was designed to mechanize confidence and uncertainty, it was admitting of its own 
limitations, and in fact it was a method of embracing the limits to knowledge within a given 
experiment. Discrete experiments conducted by the confidence collective, from seed-sorting to 
bacteriology, spoke to the much larger experiment of drawing boundaries for Polish nationalism. 
The materiały feeding the experiments was generated, valued, and circulated through larger state-
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making projects. The Polish conception of (un)certainty work advanced in its designs a dissent of 
Anglophone experimental design. It was a confrontation with mathematical foundations and axioms 
in applications towards a new Poland, drawn as a series of statistical provinces.  
WWII disbanded the confidence computing collective in Warsaw, Poland and the Warsaw-
Lwów school of logic and destroyed their records. By the late 1930s, tensions mounted as proposals 
increased for the forced emigration of Jewish citizens. Academic and university positions in Poland 
were no longer stable and many made efforts to leave. Neyman emigrated in 1935 to London to 
work with Egon Pearson. The mathematical statistics laboratory at the Nencki Institute was soon 
shut down, and the last Statistica printed in 1937. After the Nazi invasion, their libraries were 
destroyed. On September 1, 1942, the mathematics library at the University of Warsaw was 
destroyed by fire. Again, between April and December 1944, the private mathematics collections 
were systematically burned, destroying work and data from the prewar and wartime periods. Many 
members of the Warsaw-Lwów philosopher’s guild and the Nencki Institute were murdered during 
the war. After arriving in the United States in 1937, Neyman worked to place many members of his 
former community in university positions, without success. In his post-WWII second-edition book 
on probability and statistics, he commemorates the loss of his friends.79  
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Agriculture, 1952): iii.  
 
  107 
 
Figure 12: Jerzy Neyman’s Dedication to Lectures and Conferences on Mathematical Statistics, 1952 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2, contains material as it will appear in Dryer, Theodora. “From Soil to Bombs: A 
History of Uncertainty Computing” (In Review HSNS). The dissertation author was the sole author of 
this material. 
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Chapter 3: Control 
 
Seeds of Control                                                   
Sugar Beets, Control Logics, and New Deal Data Politics, 1920-1940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sugar Seeds and Statistical Control  
What do sugar beets have to do with telephone transmitters? And what are the social and environmental 
implications of reconfiguring industries, as distinctive as agricultural breeding and industrial 
manufacturing, under a shared program of data-driven control analysis?  In the New Deal era, 
mathematical control logics came to power at the nexus of agricultural planning and industrial 
Figure 13: “White Improved Vilmorin Sugar Beet,” Wiley, 
Farmers’ Bulletin 52 (1889), United States Department of 
Agriculture. 
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factory production. As with confidence, control is a computing concept that holds a variety of 
technical, political, and affective meanings. In the interwar period, confidence logics in probability 
and statistics converged with quality control logics—giving a distinctive corporate industrial framing 
to the new statistics. This is emblematized by a mathematical model that circulated alongside 
confidence logics. This control was a matter of stabilizing economic profit and industrial efficiency—
another computing concept at work in state and military projects throughout the twentieth century.1 
The central laboratory for the expansion of control logics was not the factory floor, but agricultural 
oversight at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In the 1920s and 1930s, the sugar beet industry, in 
particular, went through a series of transformations that made it an ideal laboratory for developing a 
statistical control state. This confluence of corporate agriculture, method-based statistics, and 
industrial sugar beet production would flourish after WWII. 
In the Spring of 1937, Jerzy Neyman arrived from London to give a series of lectures related 
to agricultural planning at the Beltsville, Maryland USDA Graduate School. His invitation was part 
of a larger initiative to seek counsel from international technocrats, economists, and agriculturalists 
on central planning in agriculture. Prior to arriving in the United States, he had been in 
correspondence with soil scientist Edwards Deming, who was then organizing conferences, lectures, 
publications, and a new pedagogical initiative on the topic of statistical control. The USDA 
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experimental farm in Beltsville, Maryland had long been linked to the Rothamsted experimental 
station in London, and therefore Neyman, who was currently at UCL, was on the circuit of visiting 
speakers. Deming requested that Neyman give lectures on practical, field-based statistics that would 
be of use by the practically-minded U.S. agriculturalists. Over the span of a month, he drew in 221 
participants to his mathematics lectures. 
Neyman’s lectures evoked interest from economist Milton Friedman, who was currently in 
D.C. working on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal agricultural programs, and Charles Sarle, who 
was forming a farm statistics program as part of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. 
Transforming the farm economy into a mathematically-guided enterprise was of great interest to 
these administrators; it was part of a larger movement to establish economic and political control of 
agricultural production through mathematical oversight.2  
Neyman’s first lecture was on a modern view of classical probability theory. His second lecture 
was on practical uses of probability, and his third lecture on the testing of statistical hypotheses, 
rooting the statistical work in foundational axiomatic probability theory. In his second lecture, 
Neyman worked through examples from Poland, sharing the methods, data, and analysis from the 
clover seed experiments, the bacteriology experiments, as well as data from sugar beet and oat 
sampling. He spoke about the many uses of probability in application, promoting his colleagues in 
Poland: “Two bacteriologist friends of mine, Miss J. Supinska and Dr. T. Matuszewski, were 
interested in learning whether the calculus of probability could be applied to certain problems 
concerning the colonies of bacteria on a Petri-plate.” Their sugar beet data provided a visual 
representation of the high value of information organized for probability analysis.  
                                               
2 Delivered by Jerzy Neyman, Lectures and Conference on Mathematical Statistics (Washington: The Graduate 
School of the USDA, 1937), USDA Graduate School Collection. Box 11: Graduate School USDA 
Publications. Special Collections, National Agricultural Library. 
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Throughout the years of the Great Depression, the USDA positioned itself as a scientific and 
political center geared towards building an economically stable society through a thriving agricultural 
economy and “good thinking.” Good thinking was a matter of asserting a scientific, data-driven 
approach to social problems against the laissez-faire policies that were blamed for the economic 
depression— it was believed that a controlled state of mind would yield a controlled national 
economy. In line with this general political atmosphere and invoking Polish (un)certainty work or 
the practical application of probability to the world, Neyman said that there were three dimensions 
that should be studied.3 
1. a mathematical theory; 
2. the frequency of actual occurrence; 
3. the psychological expectation of the participant. 
 
Emphasizing the importance of ‘mind’ in applied probability, Neyman wrote: “It will be noticed that 
the theory of my first lecture has nothing to do with the “state of mind,” though having found that 
the probability of a certain property is equal to e.g. to 0.0001, the state of our mind will probably be 
influenced by this finding.”4 
 Neyman’s final lecture on statistical inference addressed the problem with control in 
agriculture and statistics. At this time, administrators at the USDA were fervently discussing the 
apparent lack of control in agricultural planning and the agricultural economy and the search for 
new technical solutions. The year prior, Ronald Fisher had visited the school in order to lecture on 
randomization and the new null-hypothesis method—the process of asserting the hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference between specified populations in order to falsify it. Fisher was 
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advancing a central principle in his recently published, The Design of Experiments, that control equated 
to randomization, and that experimental design should always include control elements that are not 
altered by the experiment. For example, to test the effect of virulent material injected into 6 rabbits, 
there needs to be a number of rabbits in the study that are not injected by the toxic fluid, to serve as 
controls.  
Uncontrolled experiments, he argued, relied on common sense in their assessment whereas a 
controlled experiment, “is aimed deliberately at demonstrating beyond a question, or at excluding a 
possibility that any unforeseen accident has affected the interpretation that we place upon the data.”5 
A controlled experiment is guided by the logic of null-hypothesis.6 At this point in time, randomized 
control experiments were not common practice and were being advocated for by technicians like 
Fisher as part of a larger control logic initiative. This was a contested view. As Fisher remarked, “I 
have been recommending randomization for experimental projects and though a great many people 
agree with me, a great many do not.”7    
 Experimental control was the leading concern of the New Deal statistics programs, and 
visiting speakers catered to this topic. On April 7, 1937, Neyman gave a special lecture on certain 
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problems of sugar beet breeding. His focus on varieties of sugar beets was taken from sugar beet 
breeders in Poland and the mathematical results were computed by Mrs. Y. Tang, M.Sc. of the 
University College London. The example provided was from the Seed Testing Commission of the 
Polish Beet Sugar Industry, who wanted to breed to new varieties of sugar beets for sweetness with 
varieties of unknown seed origins.8 
In Poland it is usual to take as standard the variety which in the preceding year proved to be 
the sweetest. The beet sugar industry arranges each year competitive experiments with a number of 
varieties produced by several leading firms. Those experiments are carried out in a number of places 
all over the beet growing districts of Poland, and all according to a certain fixed method, with the 
same number of replications, etc. The seeds are purchased on the market by a special committee and 
set out to stations bearing conventional numbers but not the names of the producers. 
The Polish sugar beet seed problem existed as a result of the data economy surrounding the 
varietals in Poland. The problem was designed to estimate the unknown origins of the varietals, as 
they were linked to different values of sweetness. This is to say that the process predicting the 
sweetness of yields in sugar beet breeding was contextually specific to the customs of seed 
circulation in Poland. Since seeds were circulated without the names of the farms that generated 
them, these origins needed to be estimated. In order to achieve a “controlled” experiment the Polish 
experimenters selected varieties of seeds from the same bag of seeds, for 4 of the 13 experiments, 
“to serve as control of the accuracy of the experiment.”9 Control was a matter of stabilizing the 
experimental conditions—Neyman exhorted his audience to “make your experiments as accurate as 
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possible; if you cannot improve the method of experimentation, then increase the number of 
replications.”10   
 At the time of Neyman’s lecture series, sugar beet production in the United States was 
undergoing radical transformation. That year congress passed, “The Sugar Act of 1937,” an 
extension of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, that classified sugar as a basic commodity, under 
government control.11 The Act was intended to salvage an ailing sugar industry and also to address 
child labor.12 Although the sugar industry had grown since WWI, consistent U.S. sugar beet 
production was relatively new. The sugar economy did not take off until after 1890, due to a failure 
of U.S. agriculturalists to model French and German sugar beet breeding in the U.S. climate. Despite 
the conditions of climatic drought and economic uncertainty following the great depression, sugar 
beet production ballooned in the 1917-1935 period, driven by industrial transformations including, 
“increased applications of electricity that made possible the use of instruments and devices for 
facilitating precise control of chemical processes… improved modes of coordinating mechanical 
operations,” and the “Size and shape of plot in relation to field experiments with sugar beets.”13 In 
this context of rapid industrialization, sugar beet breeding was determined to be out of statistical 
control.  
The description of a lack of controllability over the U.S. sugar industry had a much longer it 
history, as U.S. sugar beet breeding failed to take hold for nearly 150 years. I describe U.S. sugar beet 
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breeding in three historical stages. The first period, 1800-1890 was overall marked by failure. While 
sugar beet factories popped up, it wasn’t until 1870 that the first commercial factory was established 
in California. I describe the 1890-1920 period as “beet dreams,” when U.S breeders persisted to 
expand the enterprise through trial and error, as there was no model that could be transplanted. 
For example, in 1899 H.W. Wiley wrote, “The experience of more than ten years in California has 
shown that the climatic data, regarded as of prime importance in beet culture in Europe, [is not] 
rigidly applicable to this country.”14  In this time of beet dreams, the dream of a profitable sugar  
 
 
industry persisted, and a sugar beet belt was imagined as the ideal area of land for growing sugar 
beets in the industrial-agricultural economy, after a century of trial-and-error. It was designed with 
statistical weather data collection: 15   
For growing most crops, the weather is even more important than the soil. The 
conditions of climate best suited to growing the sugar beet differ from that of many 
crops, and the weather that would seriously impair the production in other crops, may 
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15 Clinton Dewitt Smith and Robert Clark Kedzie, “Sugar Beets in Michigan in 1897,” Michigan State 
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Figure 14: “The Theoretical Beet-Sugar belt of the United States” 
in H.W. Wiley, The Sugar Beet: Culture, Seed Development, 
Manufacture, and Statistics (Farmers’ Bulletin No. 52, 1899): 5. 
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be well suited to the crop of beets with a large content of sugar.  In Germany, it has 
been found that a certain average temperature for the several months from May to 
November, and a certain average rainfall during these several months, are best adapted 
to the growing of the crop. Such a “sugar beet belt” sweeps through the lower 
peninsula of Michigan. 
 
This theoretical belt was an outcome of mapping the ideal climatic conditions for sugar beet 
breeding following a century of failed attempts to directly model after European breeding programs. 
It is a map generated from statistical weather information.16 By the late nineteenth century, this 
landscape was drawn as the ideal U.S. sugar beet breeding ground—it was an experimental landscape 
painted across the United States. Significantly, this same ribbon of landscape would become the 
target area for cloud-seeding experimentation in the Cold War period (chapter 5).  
I describe the third stage of sugar beet breeding as “crisis and confidence,” in the 1920-1940 
period. During this time a lack of controllability was asserted over the sugar beet belt and new 
models and methods for statistical oversight were applied. Given its longer history of failure, the 
U.S. sugar beet industry was seen as a program that had only been made possible through 
technological and scientific prowess. The sugar industry, therefore, was ‘industrial’ from seed to soil 
to refinery, and statistical information stabilized the entire process. Weather data was analyzed to 
determine the ideal breeding belt, statistics was collected on breeding patterns and placement, labor 
information was used to compare hand labor cost to the cost of mechanized processes that became 
more popular in the interwar period. U.S. sugar beet breeding was a statistical and technological 
enterprise.  Plant Pathologist George H. Coons at the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils and 
Agricultural Engineering wrote a dramatic retrospective on the modern crisis of the U.S. sugar beet 
and the high value of science and technology in its survival:  
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Nor did the demands on science end with the launching of the beet-sugar enterprise, 
for crisis after crisis has confronted the new industry. From the beginning, sugar from 
the sugar beet was in competition with tropical and subtropical sugar. Even around 
the factory itself, the sugar beet has had to maintain itself against other crop plants 
competing for the farm acreage. […] plant breeders have constantly increased the 
productivity of the sugar beet; agronomists have discovered efficient methods of 
growing the crop; chemical engineers have improved the processes of sugar 
manufacture; and against epidemic diseases resistant varieties have been bred. Only 
through these contributions of science has it been possible for the sugar beet to 
survive. 17   
  
 The many dimensions and processes associated with sugar beet breeding evoked interest 
from rising regimes of industrialists and technocratic oversight. For industrial agriculturalists, the 
sugar beet belt was an ideal laboratory for expanding logics of efficiency and control. Under the 
conditions of industrial agriculture, farm-management became an industry of calculation, of crop 
production and resource consumption, prices and tariffs and human and machine labor. Sugar 
industry companies—leading the reconfiguration of the landscape into sugar beet grids—also 
oversaw much of the farm production and labor.18 Sugar beet production was assessed in terms of 
hand labor calculations—the number of workers and time it would take to pick sugar beets by hand. 
New Deal legislation had contributed to a drastic shift in labor conditions for sugar beet workers. In 
1933 Minnesota, for example, 80% of field workers were white farmers; by 1937, New Deal 
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during the summer to care for the industry. Mexican labor is much in evidence in recent years. Child labor is 
utilized to some extent without any injurious effects.” Curtis Marez calls this the “agribusiness gaze,” see; 
Curtis Marez, Farm Worker Futurism: Speculative Technologies of Resistance (Minneapolis: Minnesota University 
Pres, 2016).  
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legislation emboldened white farm owners to “turn anew to migrant workers […] and almost three-
fourths of the Valley sugar-beet laborers were Mexican American.19 Sugar beet companies in 
Michigan, the largest sugar-beet producing state, staffed their fields by seasonal labor contracts with 
Mexicans who had migrated from other midwestern states.20 The shifting climatic and political 
conditions of the U.S. sugar industry corresponded to a constantly changing labor force and efforts 
towards managerial control.  
 For statisticians, the sugar beet belt was an ideal laboratory for inferential analysis. They 
deemed that sugar beets offered a uniquely “controllable” laboratory for agrarian analysis, largely 
ascribed to their annual and biannual harvesting customs and the even spacing of their seeds.21 For 
example, an analyst noted that, unlike the uncertainties of computing sugar cane, “The beet sugar 
industry […] presents no such accounting problem. The beets are planted in the spring and 
harvested in the fall; so that the expenditures incurred by the companies in growing beets are almost 
entirely confined to one fiscal year.”22 Sugar beet breeding also contained a multitude of analytic 
points from spacing and harvesting to soil analysis and labor calculations, all of which were tied to 
economic trade and tariff and state policy, as with the AAA.  
 
 
                                               
19 Jim Norris, “Bargaining for Beets: Migrants and Growers in the Red River Valley,” Minnesota History 58, no. 
4 (2002/2003): 199.  
20 See: Zaragosa Vargas, “Life and Community in the “Wonderful City of the Magic Motor”: Mexican 
Immigrants in 1920s Detroit,” Michigan Historical Review, 15, no. 1 (1989): 45-68; Dennis Dodin Valdes, Al 
Norte: Agricultural Workers in the Great Lakes Region, 1917-1970 (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1991).   
21 Sugar beet breeding itself was believed to skirt problems of computing under limited information as an 
ideal commodity. Since, for example, it skirted the tariff problems with sugar cane production since sugar 
cane took 18 months to grow and was incommensurable with accounting logics. Sugar beets were also 
considered to better withstand weather, one of the greatest variables in sugar beet analysis.  
22 Joshua Bernhardt, “The Flexible Tariff and the Sugar Industry,” The American Economic Review 16, no. 1 
(1926): 182-191.  
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Mathematical Statistical publications on sugar beets expanded during the interwar period 
including publications such as, “The analysis of variance illustrated in its application to a complex 
agricultural experiment with sugar beet.” The subject also started to show up in pedagogical training, 
for example, “To illustrate, the statistician may be asked to draw a sample of sugar-beet farms in this 
country, in order to provide, at minimum cost, certain information about sugar-beet growing which 
is needed for policymaking.”23 While sugar was not a leading industry in the U.S. context, sugar-beet 
analysis was a site common to agricultural experimental satiations around the globe and therefore a 
shared site for the exchange of methods and data.  
Throughout the New Deal period, statisticians working at the Department of Agriculture 
invoked a specific notion and technical meaning of control in reference to the ailing sugar beet and 
agricultural planning more broadly. This definition of control was founded on a material industrial 
planning tool designed in the Bell Laboratories, at the heart of industrial America—the Quality 
Control Chart (QCC) designed in 1924. The QCC offered a bounded mode of computing and 
                                               
23 W.G. Cochran, “Graduate Training in Statistics,” The American Mathematical Monthly 53, no. 4 (1946): 193-
199.  
Figure 15: F.A. Stilgenbauer, “The Michigan Sugar Beet 
Industry,” Economic Geography 3, no. 4 (1927): 486 
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managing “quality control” in industrial manufacturing, an aspiration that was rapidly spreading 
within the domain of agriculture. As part of a growing computational culture in industrial 
agriculture, the QCC and its corresponding theory Statistical Quality Control (SQC), were widely 
promoted as a mechanized data-driven managerial science. This managerial approach promised a 
statistical control state over data as an accepted mathematical limit over statistical variance.  
Like confidence logics, control was a mathematical architecture and limit applied to real-world 
processes. Political, affective, and technological notions of control were reconfigured into a 
mechanized process. In the early twentieth century, industrial agricultural emerged as a complex 
confluence of machine and economic transformations—agriculture was saturated with industrial 
logics. Critical to this convergence, I argue, was the adoption of data-driven analysis and the 
proliferation of confidence and control logics.   
Data Architectures on the Factory Floor:  Statistical Quality Control 
In its initial 1920s design, the Quality Control Chart merged progressive-era control logics 
with new statistical methods rooted in axiomatic probability theory, which drove a modernizing 
language of control logics. Prior to its formulation, industrial oversight was not a statistical program. 
Within this production of statistical quality control analysis, engineering data and industrial data 
developed as distinct conceptions of statistical information. The QCC design and SQC, more 
broadly, were part of a new managerial class within the expanding U.S. telecommunications industry. 
Bell Telephone Laboratories technicians Walter Shewhart, Victoria Mial, and Marion Carter 
designed the analysis chart to oversee statistical data management in industrial manufacturing. The 
chart was originally entitled “Inspection Engineering Analysis Sheet.” It comprised a formatted table 
of calculations pertaining to a new mode of informatics—engineering data—that was manufactured 
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and collected on the factory floor.24 The entire inspection process of industrial manufacturing was 
reformulated as a bounded mathematical statistical process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The design of the QCC, a prototype of which is pictured here, emerged from a longer 
history of control thinking in U.S. industry and telecommunications, which was, in turn, part of a 
larger impetus to reinterpret manufacturing as a data-driven enterprise and to delegate human 
computational labor and decision in corporate capital processes to quantitative methods. Similar to 
confidence, the QCC redefined control as a set of mathematical limits over data. 
Walter Shewhart first started as a quality inspector at Western Electric in 1920, overseeing 
quality production of telephone-receivers.25 In 1925, Western Electric Company partnered with 
                                               
24 W.A. Shewhart, “Quality Control Charts,” Bell System Technical Journal 5 no. 4 (October 1926): 600.  
25 For a comprehensive study of this inspection regime, see: Paul J. Miranti, "Corporate Learning and Quality 
Control at the Bell System, 1877-1929," The Business History Review 79, no. 1 (2005): 54; for a discussion of 
Walter Shewhart in history of computing, see: David Alan Grier, “Programming and Planning,” IEEE Annals 
of the History of Computing 33, no. 1 (2011): 86-88.  
Figure 16: W.A. Shewhart, “Quality Control Charts,” Bell System Technical 
Journal 5 no. 4 (October 1926): 600. 
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AT+T and became Bell Telephone Laboratories. Headquartered in New York city, Bell Telephone 
Laboratories was widely known as a center for American electrical engineering and technological 
innovation. It was also an important site for the development of new managerial and organization 
structures to oversee rapidly growing telecommunication industries. Paul J. Miranti shows how, 
during this time period, the Bell System made conscious efforts to extend “quality assurance” 
capabilities.26 They hired technical employees to research new inspection capabilities for stabilizing 
and controlling a rapidly growing telecommunications industry. Bell Telephone Laboratories 
employed technical personnel such as Shewhart to streamline capital production through the 
“modernization” of industrial manufacturing processes. This was an emergent managerial science in 
the context of growing corporate integration in the United States.  
   Prior to the design of the SQC model of management, United States industrial 
manufacturing was not considered to be a mathematical or a statistical program but a human 
managerial program of training human “inspectors” to oversee technological production. These 
inspection regimes adhered to cultural values of control and efficiency through counting and 
accounting for time. Managerial control and control logics fueled the progressive era’s rapid 
industrialization and corporate capitalist expansion, spurring efforts to stabilize managerial control 
over the time logistics of expanding technological infrastructures such as the railroad and postal 
systems. Time and labor measurements were organized into managerial instruments such as 
bookkeeping charts, timetables, and graphs to assert managerial authority over a limited domain of 
calculation.  
                                               
26 Paul J. Miranti, " Quality Control at the Bell System, 1877-1929," 39-71. 
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The reduction of oversight to a limited number of quantifiable factors gave a structure to 
managerial labor—control was linked to time measurement. Alfred Chandler’s Visible Hand 
describes the managerial revolution as, “a large number of full-time managers to coordinate, control, and 
evaluate the activities of a number of widely scattered operating units.”27 While the means took 
different forms, these control logics persisted in new manifestations throughout the twentieth 
century and would later gain considerable power in command and control logics of the Cold War 
period.  
Control was a dominant social value in progressive-era industrial society.28 It was a social 
belief that managerial oversight and modern scientific methods could stabilize predictive expertise 
over market processes. Control was a tendency towards the quantification of economic and 
technological integration delimited by managerial instrumentation. The specific managerial creed of 
quality control pertained to corporate capitalist oversight of factory production manifest through a 
new managerial order. On the factory floor, inspectors assessed daily manufacturing processes for 
quality assurance by mapping out the quality of machine products over time—usually recorded on 
an annual and semiannual basis—to assess their profitability. Quality control was a means of 
achieving higher quality at lower cost by streamlining production, isolating human and machine 
errors, and reducing human inspector and computational labor.29 It was a tendency towards 
constricting resources needed in the production processes, for profit. 
                                               
27 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977): 79.  
28 For comprehensive studies on American control systems, see: James R. Beringer, The Control Revolution: The 
Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); David 
Hounshell, From American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1984).  
29 For comprehensive studies on the relationship between organizational design and corporate capitalism, see: 
Louis Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History” The Business History 
Review, 44/3 (Autumn 1970): 279-90; Hunter Heyck, "The Organizational Revolution and the Human 
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Invoking the larger mathematical statistics movement, Shewhart maintained that it was 
possible to make accurate predictions using a minimal amount of observed sampling data.30 
Shewhart worked on the problem of estimating product quality using small sample sets in order to 
minimize the inspection labor needed to oversee product quality. By the early 1920s, Shewhart had 
become very interested in the Anglophone mathematical statistics movement. He read published 
material and housed a copy of Karl Pearson’s Grammar of Science in his Bell Telephone Laboratories 
office.31 Additionally, he was aware of the growing interest in mathematical statistics in United States 
agriculture. As he reviewed this literature, he came to believe that the problems seen in industrial 
manufacturing were inherently statistical problems and that new methods circulating the 
international stage could help streamline inspection work by achieving accurate predictions from a 
small set of randomized quality inspection tests.  
Shewhart and his team asserted that there was a lack of control and a lack of profitability 
within quality control management because quality control was inherently a statistical problem that 
should be solved with probabilistic oversight. They reconfigured the problem of quality control as a 
twofold problem of statistical sampling in industrial inspection. First, they argued that statistical 
sampling was needed because it was actually impossible to enumerate the products and their 
components. Given the larger number of transmitters in a product line, it was impossible to test 
                                               
Sciences," Isis 105, no. 1 (2014): 1-31; David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of 
Corporate Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
30 There is a longer history to integrating mathematics in industry noted by Bell technicians. For example, Bell 
employee George Camble wrote, “The necessity for mathematics in industry was recognized at least three 
centuries ago when [Francis] Bacon said: “For many parts of nature can neither be invented [discovered] with 
sufficient subtilty nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity nor accommodated onto use with sufficient 
dexterity without the aid and intervening of mathematics.”  See: George A. Campbell, “Mathematics in 
industrial research,” The Bell System Technical Journal 3, no, 4 (1924): 550-557.  
31 P. C. Mahalanobis, "Walter A. Shewhart and Statistical Quality Control in India," Sankhyā: The Indian Journal 
of Statistics (1933-1960) 9, no. 1 (1948): 52; Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) originally published 1895. 
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every cell item. This was especially true in “destructive tests” that destroyed machine parts. Second, 
they argued that statistical sampling would help reduce inspector computational labor. Bell 
Telephone Laboratories manufactured 150,000 transmitters every year. It was not economical to 
employ inspectors to test every one of the 150,000 items, while also managing the bookkeeping. 
The Statistical Quality Control chart was designed to generate and structure industrial data 
for a specific mode of computational work. Control was thus designed in 1924 as a bounded 
computing mechanism that asserted mathematical limits for uncontrollability and statistical error 
within a manufacturing process as a means of reducing inspector labor. The affective and economic 
meanings of control were thus designed as a mechanized process. 
 
Manufacturing Data and Mechanizing Error  
In practice, the QCC was designed to uphold quality control while reducing inspector labor 
and delegating assessments and decisions about the quality of manufacturing process to 
mathematical assessment. It was designed to tell “the manufacturer at a glance whether or not the 
product has been controlled,” by visually laying out the limits of possible variances in the production 
process.32 The chart was a bounded apparatus that directed ‘stages of computation,’ starting with 
collecting and calculating frequency observations of product quality, estimating future product 
quality, and analyzing the validity of those predictions. The promise behind the design was to isolate 
and control the factors in machine processing that could impact product quality—asserting a 
mathematical control vision over the entire enterprise. This apparatus became the technical object 
for a new approach to quality control in industrial manufacturing—statistical quality control—that 
                                               
32 W.A. Shewhart, “Quality Control Charts,” 603.  
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advanced a data-driven approach to industrial manufacturing and fueled a cultural belief that 
mathematical prognostication in machine production was possible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with other data architectures, the QCC configured data according to contextually specific 
empirical and epistemic meanings. Inspired by the mathematical statistics movement, as well as the 
material crisis in physics that had abandoned the idea of true measurement of a physical quantity and 
turned attention to its most probable value, statistical quality control advanced a probabilistic view 
of material processes. Frequency distributions collected from sampling real measurements and real 
observations were interpreted in terms of probabilities that would ultimately describe the physical 
process. Speaking to the slippage between math and material, for the SQC regime, error or variance 
in the observations were considered to be inherent in “the statistical nature of the phenomenon 
under question.”33  
                                               
33 W.A. Shewhart, “Some Applications of Statistical Methods to the Analysis of Physical and Engineering 
Data,” Bell System Technical Journal 3, no. 1 (1924).  
Figure 17: 160330 Telephone transmitter, Richard C. Winckel, 
Western Electric, Filed: Sep. 2, 1924, Pub: Oct. 19, 1926. 
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For example, in the case of carbon microphones—a key component in a telephone, the 
physical manufacturing process needed to be “controlled within very narrow limits [elsewise] wide 
variations [would be] produced in the molecular properties of the carbon.”34 From vibrations and 
sound disturbances, to machine chamber conditions, and the precise mixtures of gases and 
temperature, the conditions by which carbon was manipulated in the production process needed to 
be highly controlled. This was difficult in corporate production that valued quantity over precision. 
Frequency data collected to assess the quality of the molecular properties of carbon depended on 
electric resistance tests as observations. Notable changes in the resistance measurements would 
indicate heterogeneity in the carbon samples.35 Controllability was assessed down to the molecular 
constitution of machine parts.36 
Each year the Bell System produced upwards of 150,000 transmitters, a major and expensive 
production process that Shewhart understood to be “out of control.” Homogeneity was intrinsically 
impossible at each stage of production beginning with the raw granular carbon material from which 
transmitters were made to the analysis of their production. Under commercial conditions, there were 
clear problems with observation and estimation, as variation in the quality of product could occur at 
any stage of the process from parts production to assembly. Beyond variability in the material and 
process conditions, observers were limited by the economy of time. Statistical quality control was a 
research philosophy that aimed to translate quality inspection into a concrete computational process 
through delimiting the bounds of the controllable statistical state.  
 
                                               
34 Shewhart, “Some Applications of Statistical Methods,” 47.  
35 160330 Telephone transmitter, Richard C. Winckel, Western Electric, Filed: Sep. 2, 1924, Pub: Oct. 19, 
1926.  
36 Richard Winckel’s Western Electric diagram patent of a telephone transmitter captures the many material 
parts of the transmitter technology, each with their own material constitution and capacity for electricity. 
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Shewhart and his team of computers, Victoria Mial and Marion Carter, designed the Quality 
Control Chart (QCC) to mechanize error management and establish mathematical control metrics. 
The design of the chart was first produced from a large-scale data analysis conducted by Mial and 
Carter. The guiding question in their interpretation was: “Do these data present any evidence of a 
lack of control?” These women conducted the experimental results, which involved collecting 
thousands of frequency observations, conducting statistical estimation calculations, and designing 
graphical representations of the quality observations. They designed and calculated control as an 
acceptable limit to error theory. That acceptable limit was defined as when the “four statistics”—
average, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis—fell within the limits established by current 
practices of sampling theory.37 Shewhart emphasized that, “the preparation of such a chart requires 
but a small amount of labor on the part of a computer,” papering over the amount of labor that 
went into configuring it in an effort to underscore its promise of efficiency.38  
By mechanizing the processes by which observational ‘error’ was measured and assessed, 
authority over the production process blurred between the inspector and the inspection chart. The 
                                               
37 Shewhart, Quality Control Charts, 601. 
38 Ibid, 602. 
Figure 18: W.A. Shewhart, “Quality Control Charts,” Bell System 
Technical Journal 5 no. 4 (October 1926): 600. 
  129 
inspector was situated to think about engineering and industry production as both a physical and 
mathematical process. Underpinning this reformulation of industrial processes was the 
conceptualization of industrial data and engineering data as a distinct form of highly generative 
statistical material.  
In other words, manufacturing data was not homogenous, it was variant and entangled in the 
physical machine processes from which it was generated. SQC therefore was a system of analysis 
responsive to a particular kind of data manufacturing. The conceptualization of the QCC was drawn 
in analogy with problems in physics to underscore the fact that there was both a physical and 
mathematical processes as shown with the carbon microphones. The QCC was designed to isolate 
and control specific factors that would improve the product—e.g. transmitters, telephones, etc.—
without changing the whole manufacturing process.39 Throughout the 1920s, the QCC and statistical 
quality control more generally was promoted as a modernizing tool in industrial manufacturing.  
This production logics reconfigured managerial control as a statistical program that could 
achieve a “statistical control state” over manufacturing processes. This drove a strong progressive 
narrative that mathematical control logics could transcend the manufacturing industry.  
In the mid 1920s, SQC piqued the interest of mathematician and administrator Edwards 
Deming, a mathematician working at the USDA’s Bureau of Nitrogen and Soil. A shared 
modernizing effort to mechanize processes of data-driven research was evident in both industry 
production and agricultural planning.  For example, though technicians at Bell Telephone 
Laboratories designed the QCC, the USDA widely proliferated this tool to advance agricultural 
research pedagogy. In this vision, dreams of modernizing the United States economy were shared 
between industrial practitioners and agricultural administrators. There was a shared initiative to 
                                               
39 Shewhart, Quality Control Charts, 593.  
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‘modernize’ administrative and managerial processes through reformulating them as data-driven 
research. In analogy with ‘manufacturing data’, agricultural data was described as ‘first principles’ and 
‘elements’. The QCC would come to serve as a data architecture operable across both domains of 
research.   
At this time, The USDA aimed to bolster the U.S. economy by implementing a new 
pedagogical initiative to train science researchers. Akin to the drive to modernize industrial 
manufacturing, numerous administrators, politicians, scientists, and statisticians working for the 
USDA were preoccupied with achieving authority over the central tenets of scientific research. 
Increased discussion of ‘scientific first principles,’ ‘fundamental research,’ and ‘good data’ were 
circulated. The shared interest in modernizing research across industry and agriculture provided the 
conditions for SQC to become of central interest for the USDA’s Graduate School’s pedagogical 
initiatives. Data-driven analysis became the ideal for this work. The USDA’s Graduate School hoped 
to bring up a new regime of statistical researchers under the New Deal for the advancement of what 
some envisioned as a better socialist society.   
A new technocratic managerial class desired control over factory production for profit just as 
the federal government desired to coordinate and control American farming for the advancement of 
social welfare and economic control. The movement nonetheless achieved relative consensus across 
the industrial-agricultural divide and between different scales of organization.40 I argue that these 
domains shared a commitment to building a control state through data-driven research and new 
methods of interpretation.  
 
                                               
40 Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factor: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003).  
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American Farm Data: The USDA Graduate School  
Between 1920 and 1940, the United States Department of Agriculture acquired new authority as an 
intermediary between federal oversight and state policy. Efforts to assert the USDA as a major 
institution for social policy were heightened again during the New Deal period (1933-1940) as 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration held majority congressional power in 
implementing new agricultural policy. The federal government went to work to try and coordinate and 
control American farming.  
The effort to coordinate and control American farming was catalyzed by a number of 
considerable transformations beginning in the 1920s, when large-scale industrial farming 
technologies such as tractors immediately impacted the landscape. But as Deborah Fitzgerald shows 
in Every Farm a Factory, efforts to rationalize, organize, and industrialize American agriculture were 
not just driven by new technology but by a new logic of production41—a future-looking industrial 
ideal that the heterogonous patchwork of farming practices and problems could be made modern. 
Undermining this ideal of a new farming society were the realities of social, economic, and climatic 
crises. Economic depression, drought, fluctuating and dying commodities markets, and 
impoverished farming communities brought the optimistic projection down to cold earth. In 
response to these realities, administrators were emboldened in their drive to modernize agriculture 
through statistical data control. They believed that agricultural science, research, and production 
should be reconfigured by scientific principles and this would better the agrarian economy and the 
lives of American farmers.  
It has been well documented that both agriculture and industry experienced a turn towards 
quantification during the interwar period. This was driven by larger enterprises such as 
                                               
41 Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory, 16-17.  
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institutionalist economics but was also manifest in regional planning practices.42 In her study of 
regional farm production, Fitzgerald rightfully situates this turn as a response to economic and 
climatic crisis: “with the Great Depression coming fast on the heels of the farm depression, it is little 
wonder that farmers became more numerically inclined by the 1930s.”43 Indeed, there was a grasp 
for control over the shifting uncertainties of interwar agriculture that was thought to be recoverable 
in numerical planning. A wide range of political agendas blurring corporate capitalist and socialist 
ideologies motivated this turn towards a data-driven research agenda.  
The USDA headquarters in Beltsville, Maryland became the central cite for this work. In 
1921, President Warren G. Harding appointed Iowa-born Henry C. Wallace as Secretary of 
Agriculture. Wallace was an ideal candidate for the position having “been in contact with actual 
farming” his whole life.44 Periodicals emphasized his experienced roots as a “dirt farmer” and 
suggested that he overcame this status through his agricultural college education, where he 
“witnessed the discovery of important scientific principles and their practical application to 
agriculture.”45 Despite his public climb to scientific and administrative power, Wallace remained 
vigilant in his goal of addressing class discrimination in American farming as emblemized in his 
posthumous 1925 book, In Debt and Duty to the Farmer.46 For Wallace, American farming was built on 
poverty and this was an administrative problem that could be solved through advancing scientific 
                                               
42 A good paper on the interwar formation of sociological labor data: Olaf F Larson and Julie N. 
Zimmerman, “The USDA’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics and Sociological Studies of Rural Life and 
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education. This approach to social welfare was of institutionalist economics, a class-conscious 
movement emergent in 1918 that followed the work of Thorstein Veblen.47 
Four years prior to his death, Wallace founded the United States Department of Agriculture 
Graduate School to advance the education of USDA workers. Henry C. Wallace and his son Henry 
A. Wallace, who would later be appointed Secretary by FDR in 1933, furthered an interest in income 
distribution and a socialist view of farming labor that would significantly shape pedagogical 
initiatives at the School. The New Deal science worker was to be trained in statistical methods and 
socialist politics against what was described as the powerful mythologies of corporate capitalism. 
Here there was a blurring of capitalist logics (profitable efficiencies in quality control) with a drive 
towards ‘first principles’ that held radically different political and cultural meanings.  
Immediately after taking his 1921 appointment, Henry C. Wallace announced the Graduate 
School in an official statement: “The Department of Agriculture proposes to establish this fall an 
unofficial system of advanced instruction in those scientific and technical subjects related to the 
work of the Department, in which adequate instruction is not otherwise available in Washington.” 
The purpose of the unofficial graduate school, according to Wallace, was “for greater usefulness 
through better training and increased knowledge.” Two kinds of courses were offered the first were 
“lecture and drill courses on […] certain fundamental subjects in which the personnel of two or 
more Bureaus may be interested” and the second were “intensive graduate training in special 
topics.”48 The school offered extended education for USDA employees to better their research work 
and advance their participation in civic society. Located on the Department of Agriculture’s 13,000-
                                               
47 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (New York: Dover Thrift 
Editions, 1994). 
48 Unknown. 1921. “Plan to introduce graduate studies at the USDA Graduate School in 1921.” Special 
Collections, USDA National Agricultural Library. Accessed March 26, 2018, 
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acre farm in Beltsville, Maryland, the idea for the school stemmed from a study group conducted at 
the Bureau of Standards in 1908. While it never established its own building, it held classes in the 
Agricultural Department, in the Interior Department, and in the Smithsonian Institution.49 Under 
the watchful eye of the public and congressional pundits, the school was careful not to use 
government resources. Classes were held only in the early mornings and the late evenings to avoid 
use of ‘government time’ and only the director received direct monetary support from the 
government.  
The Graduate School was established to “provide training for young scientific workers.”50 It 
promoted a forward-looking education initiative of building a new economy through modern modes 
of scientific research and socially conscious politics. Mathematical statistics was a central component 
of this modernizing effort. In its founding year, the Graduate School offered courses in specialized 
topics: Physics of the Air, Mathematical Statistics, Economic Entomology, Soil Physics, Agricultural Economics, 
Plant Genetics, Plant Physiology, Animal Genetics, and Plant Cytology. Mathematical statistics was built into 
the founding education initiative. Mathematician, Mr. H.R. Tolley taught the school’s first course, 
“Statistical Methods” The course description stated its aims as:  
A review course in the underlying principles, development and application of 
statistical methods, including application of averages, frequency distributions, 
measures of deviation, dispersion, association, and correlation. Methods of 
collection, tabulation, analyses, and preparation for publication will be illustrated. 51 
 
The 1920s courses on statistical methods centered on methods based on the standard use of the law 
of averages whereas later courses into the New Deal period were increasingly focused on new 
                                               
49 Alfred Friendly, Agriculture’s School Is on the Upgrade.  The Washington Daily News, Tuesday, August 30, 
1938. USDA Graduate School Collection. Special Collections, National Agricultural Library.  
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51 Course Promotional Materials. 1921. USDA Graduate School Collection. Special Collections, National 
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methods and models, including confidence intervals, null hypothesis tests, and statistical quality 
control. From its inception, the statistical methods courses were attended by between 50% and 75% 
women. The Department of Agriculture in Beltsville was an administrative center that employed a 
number of women who were trained in accounting and bookkeeping and staffed as human 
computers. The statistical methods courses were initially thought of as an extension of this work.  
 
The Statistical Control State 
On March 4, 1933, the Bell System’s Walter Shewhart gave a lecture at the Graduate School 
on “The Specification of Accuracy and Precision.” The lecture was delivered the very same day and 
hour that FDR delivered his inaugural lines, “The Only Thing We Have To Fear Is Fear Itself.”52 
The new President advocated that day for engagement “on a national scale in a redistribution […] to 
provide a better use of the land for those best fitted for the land […] helped by national planning for 
and supervision of all forms of transportation and of communications and other utilities which have 
a definitely public character.”53 This vision of America depended on a unified political order and the 
formation of an administrative bureaucracy that could control these projects at the state and 
institutional level. 
Under the New Deal, the USDA Graduate school became a thriving educational center and 
a permanent feature of the Beltsville farm, though still not endorsed or funded by government 
bodies, which were predominantly under the control of subscribers to Hoover’s associative politics. 
Throughout the 1930s, the school continued to receive widespread critique from local D.C. 
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politicians and national interests that wanted separation between ‘university’ and ‘government’. This 
political backlash was heightened after the USDA began to implement New Deal legislation in 1933, 
the year FDR instated Henry Wallace as Secretary of Agriculture. Like his father, Wallace believed 
that the USDA had an important role in implementing New Deal programs on the state and regional 
level. It was the USDA’s role to educate the scientific community and public on what they referred 
to as first principled research and implement this policy through establishing a new bureaucratic 
order that could sustain it.  
Efforts to establish control at the state level and in scientific practice collided in the 
pedagogical initiatives of the USDA Graduate School that were developed for both USDA 
employees and the public. This included courses for USDA employees, a USDA Graduate School 
printing press, and a number of public lectures and conferences. As the first wave of New Deal 
policy was implemented, the Graduate School promoted statistical methods developed at the 
Rothamsted Experimental Station outside London and the Bell Telephone Laboratories Statistical 
Quality Control to educate their scientific workers: the “discoveries of this station have been so 
outstanding that scientists from all over the world deem in a privilege to visit there and acquaint 
themselves with its methods.”54  
A long-standing tradition of the school was to host visiting speakers from statistical 
experimental stations around the world. Edwards Deming directly facilitated exchanges with 
statisticians at Bell Telephone Laboratories and the Rothamsted Station. As early as 1927, Deming 
had become interested in the work of Dr. Walter Shewhart and Bell Laboratories. By 1933, Deming 
facilitated Bell Telephone Laboratories and the Department of Agriculture to co-sponsor Shewhart’s 
commissioned talks. These talks were organized under the umbrella topic of “The Statistical Method 
                                               
54 John R. Mohler, Address to the Graduate School: Scientific Research, November 20, 1936, USDA Graduate 
School Collection. Special Collections, National Agricultural Library.  
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from the Viewpoint of Quality Control,” which would later become the title of Shewhart’s 
influential 1939 book, due largely to the support of the Graduate School.55 Throughout 1933, 
Shewhart gave four talks at the Graduate School on statistical control and the limits of variability.   
Deming’s reflections on SQC makes clear the direct analogy drawn between industrial 
manufacturing and agriculture in conceptualizing data-driven research. He said, “we in agriculture 
are faced with the same problems” as in manufacturing.56 However, he argued that agriculture had 
more at stake and was in greater need of control due to the temporal delays in sugar beet breeding. 
He wrote:  
 
When machines are turning out piece parts by the thousands or even millions month, 
the industrial statistician does not have to wait long to see [their] predictions tested 
out. In agriculture, years are often required—a crop must be sowed and harvested 
again and again […]. With time in our favor it is easy to become careless about 
fundamentals.57   
 
Deming maintained that what agriculture should gain from industry was the concept of a statistical 
quality control state, asserting that without control, “the statistician’s calculations by themselves are 
an illusion if not a delusion.”58 While the process for achieving statistical control was indeed difficult, 
Deming and Shewhart promoted the need for the control chart and attention to the physical 
mechanism of the experiment or production process. Here agricultural testing and industry 
production blurred as two iterations of the same method of computation. In Deming’s words: “The 
state of statistical control [was] therefore the goal of all experimentation.”59 
                                               
55 Walter A. Shewhart, Statistical Method from the Viewpoint of Quality Control (Washington, The Graduate School, 
USDA, 1939).  
56 W. Edwards Deming, Foreward From the Editor in Statistical Method from the Viewpoint of Quality Control 
(Washington, The Graduate School, USDA, 1939): iv. USDA Graduate School Collection. Special 
Collections, National Agricultural Library. 
57 Ibid, 1939: iii.  
58 Ibid, 1939: iv.  
59 Ibid, 1939: v.  
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Achieving a statistical control state was directly linked to market control in both industry and 
agriculture. This sentiment is captured in another enthusiastic assessment from Deming:  
When control (that is randomness) exists, the setting of limits within which certain 
percentages of the next 100 or 1000 measurements will lie is a purely statistical job, and 
the scientist’s work is finished when [s/he] turns over the data, so obtained, to the 
statistician. In this ideal sate of control, attainable in industry but hardly ever in the 
laboratory, such limits can actually be set, and as a matter of record are working in the 
economic advantage of both buyer and seller of raw materials and manufactured 
products. 60   
 
In the ideal state of control, which was a computational process as well as an economic process, the 
researcher could define the limits of uncontrollability and use this knowledge to their advantage. The 
idea that data could be transferred from scientist to statistician underscores the new 
conceptualization of statistical informatics as a commodified material in a modernizing state.   
Under the New Deal, the United States Department of Agriculture became a dominant 
institution in seeding scientific data production and collection. Increased references to ‘data’ as 
‘industrial data’ and ‘engineering data’ in the case of Bell Laboratories and ‘agricultural data’ followed 
the redefinition of statistics as a science of estimating and testing aggregated data in the name of 
economic production. Data generated and circulated in the formation of the New Deal economy 
held particular meaning for its administrators and practitioners. It was valued in terms of its 
controllability.   
 
Control Thinking for “A Better Society”  
FDR’s two waves of legislation in 1933 and 1935 were geared to improving agriculture 
through the formation of new bureaucratic bodies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. This was 
                                               
60 W. Edwards Deming and Raymond T. Birge, On the Statistical Theory of Errors, 1934. USDA Graduate School 
Collection. Special Collections, National Agricultural Library.  
  139 
largely a response to Herbert Hoover’s “failing” associative state and to the collapse of laissez-faire 
market capitalism more generally, which USDA administrators blamed for the current lack of 
economic control in agriculture.61 FDR’s 1935 Resettlement Act emboldened the USDA in their 
bureaucratic overhaul. Following the second wave of New Deal legislation in 1936, the Graduate 
School hosted a series of lectures on the organizational culture and initiatives of the Department of 
Agriculture, to help integrate New Deal policies into daily operations for administrative staff and 
scientific workers.62 These lectures were organized into an official course for science workers to 
teach “the purpose of the work they are doing [and] how it contributes to public welfare.”63 Wallace 
was especially interested in treating the political miseducation of science workers who, he said, 
unthinkingly subscribed to corporate capitalist or orthodox dogma.  
Throughout 1936, statistical control methods, described as ‘research consultation,’ were 
promoted as a necessary mode of “clear thinking” in improving scientific research and regulatory 
work. Clear scientific thinking would provide the “foundation stones” to further Wallace’s vision 
articulated by USDA Bureau of Animal Industry’s John R. Mohler: 
1. The basic fact that research is the best means by which man controls and improves 
his environment 
2. The knowledge that responsibility for conducting research rests on a relatively small 
group of persons having suitable ability and training  
3. Research by Federal and State agencies is a wise investment authorized by Congress 64 
 
Administrator John R. Mohler further advocated that mathematical statistics was key to thinking 
clearly in all research work. Addressing the importance of ‘consultation’ across disparate fields and 
departments, Mohler argued that cross-pollination was key to strengthening the USDA’s scientific 
                                               
61 John R. Mohler, Address to the Graduate School: Scientific Research, November 20, 1936, USDA Graduate 
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62 Lectures 1927-1940, USDA Graduate School Collection. Special Collections, National Agricultural Library.  
63 Graduate School U.S. Department of Agriculture, Special Series of Lectures on Department of Agriculture Objective. 
Lectures 1927-1940, USDA Graduate School Collection. Special Collections, National Agricultural Library. 
64 John R. Mohler, Address to the Graduate School, 1936. 
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research directives. Part of the connective tissue, he contended, was knowing how to control 
statistical data across various scientific fields. He emphasized, “Mathematics is now playing a very 
important part in many lines of research work.”65  
In a colorful example of ‘research consultation’ Mohler described a case where a biologist by 
the name of Dr. Dorset “consulted other specialists freely” due to his recognition that all fields in 
agriculture could enrich his knowledge. Dr. Dorset had wanted to know how many times he needed 
to repeat his sugar beet field experiment so that the results were reliable “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” He obtained the answer from a well-trained statistician in the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, M. Alexander Sturges:  
A succession of seven positive results in a row in the same experiment gives, as the 
chance of error, only 1 in 128. By conducting the test three more times, getting 10 
positive results in a row, the probability of error is only 1 in 1,024. In the type of work 
under consideration the probability of being right at least 999 times in 1,000 was 
deemed adequate.  
 
Dr. Dorset’s problem generated in scientific research became a problem of statistical control. Even 
though this example lacked the specific oversight of the QCC, it captured the popularizing idea of a 
statistical control state, that it was adequate to be right 999 out of 1,000 times and the researcher 
could therefore be confident in their assessment. Mohler concluded his ethnographic study of 
scientific workers: “Knowing well that ‘all progress is wrought in the mystic realm of thought’, we 
look to scientific workers to blaze the trail.”66 
The turn to first principles in agrarian planning under the New Deal was deeply politicized. 
Mohler used a popularizing terminology ‘superstitions’ to refer to the practices in laissez-faire market 
capitalism and corporate governance that were thought of as currently rotting the minds of 
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Americans, preventing them from thinking clearly. He argued that these “unscientific forces” were 
the enemies of progressive agrarianism, and that “the curious ceremonies” surrounding these 
enterprises produced “superficial” and unscientific knowledge.67  
 
The Politics of “First Principles”  
In 1938 and 1939 the USDA Graduate School hosted a third series of widely-publicized 
lectures on ‘American Democracy’ just as the school was falling under widespread public critique for 
its use of government funds and perceived authoritarian socialist politics.68 A public discourse of 
fear of too much control fell over the school and its research programs. In February of 1938 the 
Washington Times announced the democracy talks, depicting Secretary of Agriculture Wallace as the 
“Farm Fuehrer.”69  
Visiting British statistician Hyman Levy spoke on the relationship between science and 
democracy. Levy was at the time both a member of the British Labor Party and the Soviet 
communist party. His talk resonated with the importance of unifying science towards progressive 
ends, stressing the point that statistical work was not an apolitical enterprise. That same year his 
book on modern science was published, developing a thesis that offered a Marxist analysis of 
scientific production akin to that produced by Boris Hessen a few years earlier. Levy maintained that 
‘democracy’ was strictly a product of industrial force, using Isaac Newton’s work as an example of 
science that was produced by commercial and other social factors. In explicit consideration of the 
                                               
67 For a leading example of this rhetoric, see: Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 1937). 
68 In attendance were various statisticians, administrators, economists, and scientists concerned with the state 
of democracy, including émigré physicist Albert Einstein.  
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political nature of ‘first principles’, Levy critiqued the Vienna circle as an apolitical campaign. “There 
is a school of philosophy of which many of you must know, the logical positivists, who consider that 
the essential problem is to discover how to ask a question. They are not concerned with the actual 
question so much as the way in which the question should be asked.” Levy also admitted that, 
“Today in Europe it is rather dangerous to ask questions; it is much safer to discuss how a question 
should be asked.”70  
Despite the political backlash seen in the school’s lack of support from Congress and in 
critical public opinion, SQC education was in full fruition by the late 1930s. In 1938, Graduate 
School Director A.F. Woods published a letter addressed to the “statistically minded research 
workers in Washington” announcing the return lectures by Walter A. Shewhart of New York’s Bell 
Telephone Laboratories.71 By this time, Shewhart was president of a joint committee of the 
American Society for Testing Materials, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the 
American Statistical Association, and the American Institute of Statistics. Through the formation of 
these committees, SQC was situated as a guiding approach to economic planning. It was gaining 
momentum as a modernizing ideal in capital production and scientific research. Woods wrote, “The 
officers and staff of the Graduate School are highly desirous that he contents of this letter be given 
as wide publicity as possible.”72  
By 1938, the Graduate School offered 125 courses up from 70 in the previous years and half 
of these were method-based courses: 17 accounting and mathematics courses, 17 in economics and 
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law, and 16 in statistics.73 The QCC was increasingly thought of as the technical expression of 
method-based thinking in scientific research and public welfare. Deming edited dozens of talks and 
books on achieving statistical control in agrarian research. Out of eleven texts officially published by 
the USDA Graduate School, half of them were a promotion of Quality Control.74 The 1939 
Graduate School publication, Statistical Method from the Viewpoint of Quality Control became the 
textbook on SQC logics. Miriam Harold, formerly Miriam Carter, produced the book for Shewhart 
and Deming: she accumulated and analyzed the data for the case studies, designed the figures, and 
compiled the contents.   
 Statistical quality control was promoted as a new managerial science that could benefit all 
branches of economic oversight. The Statistical Method textbook began with a grandiose history of 
control logics dating back to 8,000 BC, when humans were first attempting to fit of stone parts 
together.75 The timeline titled “Some Important Historical Stages in the Control of Quality” showed 
“little, if any, control” from 1,000,000 BC to 300,000 BC, which was “the beginning of control.” 
The following historical stages included, 1787—the introduction of interchangeability; 1870—the 
introduction of ‘go-no go limits’ in manufacturing; and, finally, the crowning achievement in 1924—
the advent of the Quality Control Chart.76 Shewhart and Deming’s promotional and pedagogical 
materials continued to print during WWII and increased during the 1950s under the auspices of the 
burgeoning managerial sciences. 
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The 1924 QCC design constitutes an effort to mechanize control as a mathematical limit in 
machine processing and computational work. Prior to this moment, control held technical and 
affective but not axiomatic meanings in industrial processes. Within confidence logics—confidence 
intervals and null-hypothesis—control held slippery meanings as processes of randomization were 
highly debated in statistical field work. The merging of these two logics, gave a distinctive meaning 
to control that adhered to progressive ideologies of corporate capitalism. Akin to procedures in the 
larger confidence computing movement, the chart was a visual representation of computing steps 
that the managerial inspector “could view at a glance,” thus reducing human computational and 
managerial labor in quality control oversight. This move reflected the larger cultural commitment to 
control that had galvanized during the progressive-era industrial revolution as a guiding logic in 
reconfiguring industrial managerial labor. SQC logics mechanized control as a computational 
process and a mathematical limit to error analysis.  
The politics of control logics shown in this chapter raise important questions about the role 
of data analysis in stabilizing political-economic processes. In this story we see a complicated 
blurring of socialist and capitalist ambitions at the level of the QCC and confidence logics as they 
proliferated in agricultural planning. The transformations in administrative oversight that I have 
outlined hold significant implications for agriculture. Edwards Deming and Walter Shewhart’s 
friendship is emblematic of the marriage between industrial manufacturing and agriculture that 
galvanized during the New Deal period. During this time, scientific research initiatives in agriculture 
merged with industrial planning logics and were rewritten as “essentially statistical.” Radically 
distinct social enterprises in agriculture and industrial manufacturing were thereby reconfigured to 
be part of the same epistemic and procedural program. At the root of this transformation was 
conceptualizing data—collected from frequency observations of machine parts on an assembly line 
or collected in soil and harvesting samples—as probability data. Given the mass levels of production 
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in the telephone and sugar beet industries, estimation methods became the means by which labor 
could be reduced as they operated on small sets of randomized data as opposed to the entire 
experiment.  
In 1947, Charles Sarle, administrator of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, wrote on the 
relationship between corporate agriculture and statistical oversight:  
As a nation’s economy becomes more diversified and complex, demand for 
agricultural statistics increases. Demand is not only for broader coverage of agriculture, 
but also for other facts relating to the ever-changing agricultural process, for statistics 
at more frequent intervals, and for greater accuracy. This demand is accelerated by the 
strain put upon a nation’s economy at war. When national economies are subjected to 
world-wide depression and governments embark on production control and price-
support programs, the demand for more and better agricultural statistics increases 
almost overnight. 77   
In this passage, Sarle speaks to the role of crisis in catalyzing the need for control and the generation 
of information and systems of information that occurred in the New Deal era. The processes of mass 
industrialization and managerial oversight that transformed U.S. agriculture created a demand 
economy for probability data. As indicated here, this was only emboldened by WWII that had put a 
strain on agricultural production, especially sugar, in the war time economy.78 Analysts noted that 
WWII galvanized a corporate agricultural economy that hinged on control logics: “Before the war, 
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the tractor was […] calling attention to the importance of controlled spacing of seedling by precision 
planting. […] Processed seed, introduced in 1942, was almost universally adopted by 1947.”79  
These efforts to attach economic control to the control of mathematical experimental design, 
that came into fruition during the New Deal initiatives, would galvanize in bombing campaigns and 
weather control programs during WWII and the Cold War decades. New Deal planning initiatives 
established a number of computing principles in state and social management—randomization, the 
law of large numbers, inferential management, and industrial data—that would come to fruition in 
the wartime economy in the form of new military computing methods. A precedent was set in New 
Deal planning that would achieve new heights—from 10,000 feet—during WWII. Efforts to map 
populations and landscapes into a series of controlled statistical experiments is a defining feature of 
twentieth-century quantitative governance. Significantly, beginning in the 1990s, there has been a 
resurgence of SQC Big Data algorithms, a control oversight that was formerly conducted by human 
practitioners.80 SQC and the computing concept of control more generally is a prolific belief that 
electronic digital computing processes are in control of data.  
 
Chapter 3, contains material as it will appear in Dryer, Theodora. “Seeds of Control: 
Algorithmic Computing and the New Deal Farm Economy, 1933-1940” in Algorithmic Modernity, eds. 
Massimo Mazzotti and Morgan Ames. Forthcoming with Oxford University Press. The dissertation author 
was the sole author of this material. 
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Chapter 4: (Un)certainty  
 
Machine over Mind  
Uncertainty Work in India’s Rural Reconstruction Programs  
and as U.S. Military Method  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes or No?   
In 1945, United States polymath Herbert Simon published an overview of current scholarship in 
statistical hypothesis testing, asking whether statistical methods could aid with binary, “yes or no” 
decision-making. Simon was then a professor of Political Science at Illinois Institute of Technology, 
where he worked closely with the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, as part of his 
Figure 19: Composite Plot of Incendiary Sticks” in “Bomb Patterns” appendix 
to M. Eudley, et. al., “A Cooperative Study.” Neyman Papers, Carton 5, 
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 
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interest in the growing field of U.S. econometrics. This was an enterprise geared to reconfiguring 
economic processes according to algorithms designed to achieve optimality and efficiency.1  
Simon’s review of trends in mathematical decision making explicitly critiqued Polish 
mathematician Jerzy Neyman’s agricultural work of the past decade and statistical hypothesis-testing 
more generally. Simon had a decided preference for the null-hypothesis model, which he deemed to 
be a crucial apparatus in binary decision-making. Neyman and his best friend Egon Pearson had 
designed the null-hypothesis experiment in mid-1930s London, but its circulation among U.S. 
mathematicians spiked during World War II. For Simon, the null-hypothesis model offered a 
preferred statistical method, with more concrete outcomes. He wrote: “Tests of significance were 
originally conceived as a means of measuring the “degree of certainty” or conversely the “degree of 
doubt” of statistical conclusions […] now decisions are all-or-none phenomena. Even the decision 
“to doubt” or “not to doubt” represents a clear dichotomy.”2  
Simon was not alone in his thinking. Following the end of WWII, experts and public alike 
hailed the vaguely-defined ‘statistical method’ as a defining technology in “yes or no” decision-
making. These discourses – driven by the growing belief that mathematical oversight had helped 
“win the war”3 – were fueled further by technological dreams of new electric computing machines.  
                                               
1 For institutional history on the Cowles Commission’s influence in econometrics, see: Phillip Mirowski, 
Machine Dreams: How Economics Became a Cyborg Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Phillip 
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2 Herbert A. Simon, "Statistical Tests as a Basis for "Yes-No" Choices." Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 40, no. 229 (1945): 80.  
3 The first formal announcement that applied mathematics had helped win the war was: Vannevar Bush, 
James B. Conant, and Warren Weaver, “Probability and Statistical Studies in Warfare Analysis,” Summary 
Technical Report of the Applied Mathematics Panel, NRDC, Washington D.C., 3 (1946). In 1980, military 
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“The Mathematical Sciences and World War II,” The American Mathematical Monthly 87, no. 8 (1980): 607-621. 
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In these future-looking descriptions, statistical methods often functioned as part of machine 
cognition. In 1949, the popular Scientific American published a piece on ‘Mathematical Machines,’ 
stating “A NEW revolution is taking place in technology today […] the mechanization and 
electrification of brains.”4 The ‘revolution’ here was a total displacement of human calculation, 
communication, and control with information-processing systems that could produce “an ‘on’ or 
‘off’ signal […] a decision between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ […] a judgement as to ‘more’ or ‘less’ […] a logical 
discrimination among ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and ‘neither.’”5 These decision-making machines were imagined to 
take over ‘subjective’ procedures such as medical diagnosis, which were previously considered 
“important multidimensional, multivariate and multidecision problem[s] of mathematical statistics.”6 
                                               
America,” (PhD diss. Pennsylvania University, 2015); Alma Steingart, “Conditional Inequalities: American 
Pure and Applied Mathematics, 1940-1975,” (PhD diss. MIT, 2013).  
4 Harry M. Davis, "Mathematical Machines." Scientific American 180, no. 4 (1949): 30-31: “The Digital Idea: 
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5 Davis, "Mathematical Machines," 28-29. 
6 J. A. Rafferty, "Mathematical Models in Biological Theory." American Scientist 38, no. 4 (1950): 549-79.  
Figure 20: “Mathematical Machines,” Scientific 
American 180, no. 4 (1949) 
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From medical diagnostics to bombing strategy calculations, decision-making machines promised 
‘certainty’ and ‘instantaneity’ in decision-making processes. The electrification of brains meant that 
decision-making processes previously carried out by human hand-labor calculations, and priced in 
time frames of days, weeks, and months, could be reduced to mechanical seconds.  
Today, Herbert Simon is hailed as the pioneer of decision-theory and algorithmic computing 
and indeed as the originator of the concept of ‘bounded rationality.’7 I begin this chapter with Simon 
in order to pinpoint a distinct moment when mathematical statistics was positioned as the basis of 
mechanistic (non-human) planning and as a foundational architecture in the design of electric 
computing machines. Furthermore, 1945 has become the historiographical origin point of the 
twentieth-century computing sciences, including algorithmic theory, information science, and the 
decision-making sciences, of which Simon was a prominent part. But these were part of a wider 
context, which has so far been overlooked.8 What I designate as the rise of mathematical certainty-
making projects in the 1950s and 1960s United States indicates a larger shift in social epistemology. 
In this time period, the probabilistic worldview was increasingly accepted as a sufficient explanation 
of knowledge, aligned to an advancing politics. This social epistemology drove business logics, 
                                               
7 For example: James G. March, "In Memoriam Herbert Simon (1916-2001)." Journal for East European 
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printed articulation of bounded rationality, see: Herbert Simon, Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical 
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market logics, public health metrics, and scientific assessments, to name but a few of the probability-
driven social infrastructures. 1950s and 1960s uncertainty management programs hinged on the 
promise of binary or singular outcomes as well as the concept of instantaneity in mathematical 
computing processes.9  
I argue against the idea of a progressive linear shift from prewar, doubt-laden statistical 
estimation to certainty computing methods at the dawn of the digital age. This technologically 
determinist explanation of the mechanization of statistical computing obscures the significant 
cultural, political, and epistemological dimensions to this history.10 Firstly, uncertainty management 
is a transnational and transdisciplinary story. As shown throughout this dissertation, the 
mathematical statistics movement was a multinational information movement involving the 
widespread exchange and proliferation of new computing methods that were made manifest in local 
contexts. The cultural and technological values and computing concepts fueling this movement were 
complex and layered in their meanings, applications, and politics. They involved a wide array of 
actors and interests in global trade and agricultural development, in industrial planning, and in 
biometrics and social statistics. Uncertainty was no different. Secondly, the creation and use of 
probability tools and probability data involved complex interplays between two epistemic projects: 1. 
delimiting uncertainty within computing work, and 2. providing evidence in decision-making 
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et. al., “Decision Making and Problem Solving,” INFORMS 17, np. 5 (1987): 11-31; Herbert A. Simon, 
“Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, The American Economic Review 49, no. 3 
(1959): 253-283; Martin Shubik, “Studies and Theories of Decision Making,” Administrative Science Quarterly 3, 
no. 3 (1958): 289-306; William A. Wallace and Frank De Balogh, “Decision Support Systems for Disaster 
Management,” Public Administration Review 45 (1985): 134-146.  
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processes towards certain outcomes. These are not linear steps but processes that occur at the same 
time.  
Putting binary decision logic into a wider context raises some intriguing historical and 
philosophical questions. If mathematical statistics—as shown in the first two chapters—was a 
movement to design data architectures that could translate points of unknowability into probabilistic 
language, where uncertainty is < 1, then how did this become a basis for binary decisions, where 
probability is either 1 or 0? Furthermore, at what point did so many become committed to the 
probabilistic world view (uncertainty) as the dominant epistemological framework for computational 
work, data management, and numerical oversight? And how does this commitment to certainty-
making as social epistemology tie into military control?  
The latter question marks a shift from management of uncertainty to the political production 
of certainty outcomes. I contextualize this shift in the rising aerial-bombing economy at mid-century. 
The conditions of U.S. militarism, which dominated the geopolitical landscape in the twentieth 
century, saturated computing work with values of optimality that killed the earlier philosophy of 
science movements. The computing concepts engaged in chapters two (confidence) and three 
(control) of this dissertation clearly embraced the impossibility of mathematical certainty. The Polish 
measure of confidence (ufności) was a spatially-represented measure of confusion, with ‘certainty’ 
operating as a heuristic limit. The control logics guiding the U.S. agricultural programs promised a 
controlled state of randomized information within larger processes of inherently uncontrollable data, 
both physical and mathematical. Optimality, like these other computing concepts, holds a variety of 
meanings and expressions. As I will show in this chapter, optimality is technical approach to 
computing that privileges yes/no outcomes and efficient methods. It also a way of seeing, a visual 
standpoint that was generated from 10,000 feet.  
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In this chapter, I aim to contextualize Simon’s uncertainty binary by again situating CI data 
production and architectural design within a larger genealogy of mathematical uncertainty hearkening 
back on the material crisis physics and foundational crisis in mathematics at fin de siècle described in 
earlier chapters. Continuing to explore the development and proliferation of CI logics, I contrast the 
computational work involved in post-colonial anthropometric laboratories in India, with that of 
Allied military campaigns. In analyzing the latter, my geographic contexts or ‘data laboratories’ 
extend to areas in North Africa, India, Germany, Japan, and Indigenous and U.S. National Park 
Land that were transformed into what I call ‘destruction data’ sites. This work enfolded the mass 
collection of bombing data into the cyclical production of uncertainty computations used to 
rationalize military tactics.  
In earlier chapters, my foray into uncertainty began in 1920 and 1930s when null-hypothesis, 
fiducial limits, and confidence intervals were used to define different modes of uncertainty 
computation. Surrounding this work was a potent anxiety about the probabilistic world view that 
shaped the larger culture of research and politics at University College London. The ‘probability 
problem’—whether or not this epistemological world view could and should reign over society—
was rigorously debated throughout the logical empiricist movement, and in economics and physics 
research. This crisis of epistemes catalyzed different avenues of research and different political 
responses. But it was, in fact, the shared intellectual and political preoccupation of computational 
research in the interwar period. The probabilistic worldview had been rapidly gaining power and 
prominence since the turn of the century, and this was a dramatic moment of self-reflexivity. 
Uncertainty was a widely contested social epistemology; it was not an assumed explanation of the 
world, nor was it rote and mechanistic.  
During WWII, military-driven research reconfigured uncertainty management processes, 
ultimately black-boxing their preexisting complexities within a shell of certainty-making procedures. 
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Throughout WWII, earlier political and philosophical engagements with computational uncertainty 
did not go away but were obscured by a new “labor of calculation” promulgated by mathematicians 
working as military personnel that upheld optimality.11 These certainty-making politics ultimately 
worked to legitimate military violence and American expansion on the world stage.  
This production of military certainty is what I designate as ‘bombsight optics.’ The mass 
destruction of civilian areas in allied bombing campaigns was ultimately documented and archived in 
terms of likelihoods and binary measures—the success or failure outcomes of their predictions. 
WWII reconfigured interwar (un)certainty work with all the force and impact of the U.S. aerial 
bombing economy. Both the outer shell of their research—the promise of certainty in military-
economic decision-making—and the complexities undergirding this promise, have persisted into 
late-twentieth- and twenty-first-century digital and big data computing initiatives.12 
I argue that the complexities of interwar (un)certainty have not disappeared. By developing 
this longer history of uncertainty as a logical framework for social and scientific explanation, its 
function in late-twentieth- and twenty-first-century computing and society can become visible. In 
Simon’s view, the effort to confront and manage the limits of uncertainty in interwar agrarian 
experimentation was only a precursor to a more valid program: “that statistical tests must give yes-
or-no answers.”13 Was 1945 Herbert Simon correct? Did the tendency to measure degrees of 
uncertainty and doubt constrict into an improved binary architecture that could achieve certainty?  
My answer to Simon is yes and no.  
                                               
11 Desire for Pentagon based computing technology found in a prospectus titled “Prospectus for an AF 
Mathematical Computation Center,” from Stanford University Archives, Additional Materials: Guide to the 
George B. Dantzig Papers—SC0826; ACCN-2006-167, Box 2, Folder 23. 
12 Comprehensive overview of OR literature and the use of ‘war memory’ in founding and expanding the 
Cold War decision-sciences.   
13 Herbert A. Simon, "Statistical Tests as a Basis for "Yes-No" Choices," Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 40, no. 229 (1945): 80-84.  
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Uncertainty in Kolkata, India 
In the same post-war moment when machine brains and the impulse of “yes or no” certainty 
began to dominate the technocratic imagination in the United States, some prominent agrarian 
administrators remained staunch in their prewar commitment: that one could only measure the limits of 
uncertainty, never certainty itself. What was at stake was not a matter of semantics, but a loss of control 
over prewar establishments. While United States statistics institutes rapidly reconfigured their work 
for the aerial bombing economy, other national statistics enterprises held more stake in their 
preestablished technoeconomic orders. The Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) headquartered in 
Kolkata, India, for example, continued to expand its agricultural and anthropometric programs 
through WWII and the period of decolonization, when it was officially recognized by India’s 
parliament in 1956. Throughout this time, the ISI advanced uncertainty management in population 
studies and economic analysis. Confidence logics were at work in colonial education initiatives, in 
farming labor calculations, and as a legitimating logic for India’s racialized caste system. 
Anglophone conceptions of mathematical statistics were at work through the ISI. For 
example, throughout the 1930s, Pandurang Vasudeo Sukhatme and Egon Pearson worked together 
on confidence intervals and fiduciary limits to capture uncertainty in sampling small databases.14  
This was a small data problem. Small data problems were problems where the standard deviation, and 
therefore the mean value of a sampling set, was unknown. Visual diagrams demonstrated how a very 
small calculation of uncertainty could be mapped out into calculable regions. In fact, it was precisely 
the insufficiency of the data that made this analysis possible. Pearson and Sukhatme wrote: “An 
                                               
14 E.S. Pearson and A.V. Sukhatme, “An Illustration of the Use of Fiducial Limits in Determining the 
Characteristics of a Sampled Batch,” Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics (1933-1960), 2, no. 1 (1935): 13-32.  
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important point which these diagrams illustrate clearly is the great range of uncertainty that must 
exist inevitably when estimates of a standard deviation are made from a small sample.”15 Diagrams 
were important visual tools in representing the precision values of estimation, e.g. with 90% 
confidence limit chosen in advance, plotted against the real number of samples. This chart is a 
bounded representation of all the possible measures of uncertainty, given the small sampling data, 
and the predetermined confidence level chosen at 90%. This example was a rote part the 
pedagogical initiatives run by the ISI.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite training in industrial and corporate applications of CI logics, agriculture and 
populations studies were the central sites for interwar (un)certainty work in India. This was catalyzed 
in part from the wave of rural reconstruction initiatives that began in the 1920s. Statistical oversight 
functioning through institutes like the ISI also held providence over a network of local institutes. By 
the mid-1930s, (un)certainty work was a growing computing practice in India’s agricultural 
administration. The statistical laboratory at Kolkata held oversight in the field of agriculture with 
                                               
15 E.S. Pearson and A.V. Sukhatme, “An Illustration of the Use of Fiducial Limits,” 21.  
Figure 21:  “An Illustration of the Use of Fiducial Limits in Determining 
the Characteristics of a Sampled Batch,” Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of 
Statistics (1933-1960), 2, no. 1 (1935): 13. 
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studies that included: crop census, effects of pests on sugarcane, soil deterioration, effect of feeds on 
yield of milk, cotton experiments, marketing and yields of rice, and many more. One example is the 
Visva-Bharati Institute in Bolpur, where they collected data from villages, houses, and observatories 
on the production and circulation of agricultural goods. 
Statistician Santipriya Bose’s 1936 study of rice profit estimates in the village of Bolpur 
exemplifies the conceptions of ‘uncertainty’ that prevailed in ISI’s 1930s planning initiatives.16 
Uncertainty was considered to be an inherent component of any statistical estimation process. It was 
a normal part of estimation work that could be identified in calculable profit margins and delimited 
by confidence intervals.  An unquestioned belief guiding this work was that the more robust the data 
set, the more likely one could delimit uncertainty. In her analysis of rice production, Bose considered 
her data to be a near complete labor and production information set, which allowed her to “easily 
calculate the uncertainty of the difference between the value of the produce and the cost of human 
labor.”17  
Bose’s analysis of human labor was organized into a caste hierarchy of laborers who worked 
within the larger system of rice cultivation.18 In her study, there was no bargā or land given out on 
lease for a shared basis. The owners cultivated with the help of “family labor” māhindar—farm 
servant paid in cash plus food and krishān—landless farm laborer paid in cash plus food. Labor was 
calculated in terms of “man-days” per acre. Wages for labor varied between two and half annas and 
five and a half annas per diem. Bose valued the labor in terms of capital production. For example, 
                                               
16 Santipriya Bose and P.C. Mahalanobis, “Marketing of Rice at Bolpur,” Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics 
(1933-1960), 2, no. 2 (1936): 105-124.   
17 Santipriya Bose, “Marketing of Rice at Bopur,” 106.  
18 See: Sankyā 91 (1937): “Marketing of Rice at Bolpur: The marketing of rice at Bolpur has been studied in 
relation to the the cost of production, and a number of different factors such as rice-mills, brokers, stockists, 
freight, and transport. Although the cultivator supplies both capital and labour and bears the greater part of 
the risks of profit goes mostly to the middlemen. A paddy pool is likely to be helpful but will require a 
working capital of at least ten lakhs of rupees to be successful in this area.”  
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she wrote, “The cultivator although the most important agent as producer is the worst sufferer. He 
is a financier who has to supply his own capital, he has to work himself as a labourer, and on top of 
it he bears all the risks.”19 She decided that because of her robust information set, there was low 
uncertainty in calculations pertaining to labor cost estimates, but that estimating the cost for 
cultivators who did and did not own land held wider margins of uncertainty—indeterminate 
uncertainty.  
Bose defined an “indeterminate” uncertainty that occurs when either the data, or the 
processes by which the data had been measured and assessed, could not be accounted for 
mathematically. For example, if a human computer employs a quantitative value in the estimation 
work that was intractable, the calculations would yield, “an undetermined margin of uncertainty.”20 
This is to say that if a value for something like labor cost is estimated without recorded evidence or a 
clearly outlined method of estimation, this obscures the entire estimation or hypothesis-testing 
process. Indeterminate uncertainty is therefore not measurable, and intervals cannot be drawn to 
delimit it. In the case of marketing rice at Bolpur, “indeterminate uncertainty” was a product of the 
political structure of the data. Due to the fact that the cultivator was valued to have the highest labor 
risks as the sole financier, and their work was not measurable in terms of acreage and man hours like 
the lower classes of laborers, this generated an indeterminate uncertainty in calculating estimating 
their labor cost. 
Bose’s assessment of rice profits outlines the two main interpretations of (un)certainty work 
in the context of India’s rural reconstruction program. Uncertainty calculations that were focused on 
the margin of error in estimating labor costs, reaffirmed the preexisting labor structure at the level of 
data and analysis. 
                                               
19 Bose, “Marketing of Rice at Bopur,” 119. 
20 Ibid, 106. 
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The rationalizing efforts of rural reconstruction initiatives and anthropometry programs 
were the two most prominent domains of statistical-computing research in 1920s and 1930s India. 
Without the immediate impacts of a rapidly-growing aerial bombing economy, as in the U.S. 
context, these uncertainty management programs continued to gain power through the 1940s and 
1950s. As treated in Kavita Philip and Benjamin Zachariah’s comprehensive studies,21 India’s 
century-long history of anthropometric work in measuring and categorizing human difference was 
emboldened in 1945, when Mahalanobis and industrialist Rajendra Nath Mookerjee designed and 
implemented a powerful statistical anthropometry program.22 Their 1945 Anthropometry Survey of 
Bengal, India was organized and driven by uncertainty management logics. These programs were 
designed to quantify ‘social capacity’ along racialized caste lines, exemplified by their map of 
                                               
21 Kavita Philip, Civilizing Natures: Race, Resources, and Modernity in Colonial South India (Rutgers University Press, 
2003); Benjamin Zachariah, “Uses of Scientific Argument: The Case of ‘Development’ in India, c 1930-
1950,” Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 39 (2001): 3689-3702.  
22 See: D.N. Majumdar, C. Radhakrishna Rao, and P.C. Mahalanobis, “Bengal Anthropometric Survey, 1945: 
A Statistical Study,” Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics (1933-1960) 19, no. 3/4 (1958): 201-408.  
Figure 22: D.N. Majumdar, C. Radhakrishna Rao, and 
P.C. Mahalanobis, “Bengal Anthropometric Survey, 
1945,” 212. 
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“Undivided Bengal showing the districts and some of the important centers visited for obtaining 
samples of individuals.”23 In their 1945 study, after dividing 3,250 people into districts according to 
caste, religious affiliation, and ethnic identifies, confidence logics were used to test the mean values 
of these groups, reaffirming district lines. Anthropometry was a reconfiguration of the Anglophone 
eugenics programs used to stabilize social hierarchies in colonial India. Here (un)certainty work is 
seen as much more than a particular outcome of technological choice: it drove a specific social order 
and reaffirmed colonial technologics.24  
In 1950, Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis was elected General President of India’s Statistical 
Institute. In his inauguration speech, he stated in no fewer than sixteen different ways that 
prediction is, “never absolutely certain, it is [only] possible to estimate the limits of uncertainty.”25 
For Mahalanobis, the certainty movement represented a political economic shift that threatened 
India’s larger agricultural and anthropometric establishments. Throughout WWII and the early 
postwar years, Mahalanobis had worked with many U.S. mathematicians on wartime advances in 
decision theory, including U.S. statistician Abraham Wald before he died in an airplane crash in 
southern India.26 The growing attention to optimality that had permeated decision designs in U.S. 
planning were of question for Mahalanobis, but he remained staunch in his commitment: “The 
                                               
23 D.N. Majumdar, C. Radhakrishna Rao, and P.C. Mahalanobis, “Bengal Anthropometric Survey, 1945,” 212. 
24 Philip, Civilizing Natures, 148: “Rationalist, technoscientific modernity is often regarded as radically disjunct 
from the morally charged universe of religion. If we ask how religious and humanist principles were translated 
into practice, what changes they required from colonized groups, and what specific economic needs 
motivated the systematization of particular ways of knowing and controlling, we find that religion and science 
appear contradictory only at the level of official, or high discourse. If we look at lower order or ground-level 
practices, we can see that this discursive contradiction is really a functional constituent of the kind of order 
that colonized societies had to be brought into as a result of their structural position in a global network of 
extraction, production, and distribution of resources.”  
25 P. C. Mahalanobis, "Why Statistics?" Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics (1933-1960) 10, no. 3 (1950): 195-
228.  
26 See: “Prof. Wald Reported Among Victims of India Plane Crash,” Columbia Daily Spectator 52, no. 15, 
December 1950; also his last work that advanced a logic of optimality over statistical decision-making: 
Abraham Wald, Statistical Decision Functions (London: Chapman and Hall, 1950). 
  161 
decision about the optimum design must necessarily involve a margin of uncertainty in such 
estimates or forecasts. Refinements in the design which go beyond the actual margin of error or 
uncertainty are of not much use.”27   
 Advancing the political importance of (un)certainty work in India, Mahalobis reconfigured 
the ancient doctrine of Anekāntavāda, yielding the “Syādvāda system of prediction.”28 This was a 
reinterpretation of the Sanskrit theory of conditioned predication into seven expressions of 
statistical uncertainty. This conceptualization of uncertainty was taken up by Marxist statistician, 
John Scott Haldane, who expatriated from England and became a naturalized citizen of India after 
the Suez Canal crisis, which he deemed a reprehensible act of the British government. He wrote, 
“The search for truth by the scientific method does not lead to complete certainty. Still less does it 
lead to complete uncertainty. Hence any logical system which allows of conclusions intermediate 
between certainty and uncertainty should interest scientists.”29 In his framing, these are the 
saptabhangīnaya or seven types of prediction:  
 
(1) syādasti.      May be it is.  
(2) syātnāsti.     May be it is not.  
(3) syādasti nāsti ca.     May be it is and is not.  
(4) syādavaktavyah.     May be it is indeterminate.  
(5) syādasti ca avaktavayaśca.    May be it is and is indeterminate.  
(6) syātnāsti ca avaktavyaśca.   May be it is not and is indeterminate. 
(7) syādasti nasti ca avaktavayaśca.    May be it is, is not, and is indeterminate.  
 
It is clear that the multifarious politics of (un)certainty work extends beyond technological 
choice measured in computing labor and time processing. In this brief exposition of the Indian 
                                               
27 See: P.C. Mahalanobis, “Some Aspects on the Design of Sample Surveys,” Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of 
Statistics (1933-1960) 12, no. ½ (1952): 7.  
28 See: P.C. Mahalanobis, “The foundations of statistics,” Dialectica 8 (1954): 95-111. Historiography: 
https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-024-0852-2_739 
29 J.B.S. “The Syādvāda System of Prediction,” Sankhyā: The Indian Journal of Statistics (1933-1960) 18, no. ½ 
(1957): 195-200.  
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Statistical Institute and its political projects, (un)certainty work manifested in different ways. 
Anglophone theorizations of industry control in India reaffirmed a racialized labor caste system in 
rice cultivation projects and through the regional organization of population assessment. Exploring 
the contrast between the Indian and U.S. contexts, it becomes clearer that Herbert Simon’s certainty 
statement reflects a contextually-specific valuing of instantaneity and machine precision in the 
context of U.S. militarism.  
  
Bombing Laboratories and Destruction Data    
  Uncertainty politics in the WWII military economy emerged from generating data from 
10,000 feet above the earth, “the view from above” and through processes of mass destruction and 
land alteration.30 In WWII (un)certainty work, just as in the earlier cases, data architectures were 
designed to respond to a particular corpus of information. In order to engage the meanings of this 
information, it is important to look beyond the university laboratory spaces where the data was 
computed. The wartime mathematics laboratory involves the larger spaces and environments altered 
for this computing work. This includes proving grounds on U.S. and allied soil, official military 
theatres, colonial territories, private computational centers, and university statistics departments. 
Military theatres and proving grounds on U.S. soil were reconfigured as experimental stations for 
                                               
30 For literature on the view from above and aerial governance, see: Jeanne Haffner, The View from Above: The 
Science of Social Space (Cambridge: MIT Pres, 2013); Seeing from Above: The Aerial View in Visual Culture eds. Mark 
Dorrain and Frédéric Pousin (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013); Caren Kaplan, Aerial Aftermaths: Wartime From 
Above (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018); Life in the Age of Drone Warfare eds. Lisa Parks and Caren 
Kaplan (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017). For literature on the politics of mass death under capitalism, 
see: Charles Thorpe, Necroculture (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Jacqueline Wernimont, 
Numbered Lives: Life and Death in Quantum Media (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2019). 
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testing probabilities. These spaces were linked by a growing initiative to generate, collect, and 
compute what I call ‘destruction data.’   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DESTRUCTION DATA is first and foremost generated through processes of mass 
destruction. Beyond this, there are two defining epistemic characteristics of the data. First, the 
valuation of destruction data hinges on a mathematical truism: the central limit theorem. The 
valuation of destruction data was towards the accumulation of ‘mass data,’ advancing the notion the 
more data produced, the higher likelihood of accuracy in predicting future bombing activity. This 
literally abided by the law of very large numbers. Underscoring this point, Neyman wrote in a 1943 
field report, “Further trials prove nothing unless they are made in very large numbers so that a 
statistically reliable result is obtained.” Second, as a corollary, destruction data is analyzed strictly as 
information for future bombing activity, or for more destruction. This data is synonymous with 
“operational data” as named by military personnel. The main point is that destruction data generated 
from mass incendiary and firestorm bombing was valued as useful precisely because it was 
numerous, not because it was accurate or complete.    
 
Figure 23: Handling Field, Valparaiso Fla. 1935, soon to 
become Eglin Field Proving Ground. 
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The destruction data computations designed to “make sense of” military theatres across the 
world were stabilized by experiments on U.S. soil. Throughout WWII, proving grounds and nuclear 
testing grounds became permanent features of the U.S. landscape. On the east coast, the Aberdeen 
proving grounds outside of Washington D.C. stretched through the Maryland marsh.  In the 
Southwest, the Yuma proving grounds covered 1,400 square miles in Arizona’s Sonoran Desert. 
Eglin Field consumed 400,000 miles of Florida’s land and water. Beyond the proving grounds 
allocated for ordinance and bomber experiments, land in New Mexico and Nevada, as well as atolls 
near Hawaii, were the main wartime nuclear testing grounds. Other smaller testing grounds sprung 
up throughout the Northeast corridor and the Midwest.  
While military establishments and proving grounds on U.S. soil were not new in the 
twentieth century, the rise of aerial bombing initiatives rapidly expanded the land allocated for 
military consumption. Military and civilian landscapes blurred as bombs, bombing waste, and 
nuclear material slowly saturated the earth without much public awareness or protest. For low-level 
personnel working within the military, the distributed allocation and tiered secrecy of their work 
contributed to the banality of these programs.     
Figure 24: Aerial Schematic of Amagasaki, Japan from a 1945 
report on probabilities of material destruction with firestorm 
bombing. Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley. 
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In this case of (un)certainty work, the bombing data collection process began on November 
8th, 1942 in what was called Operation Torch, a four-day allied bombing campaign to secure all ports 
along the North African coast between Casablanca and Algiers.31 The design behind Operation 
Torch’s strategy bombing had been in the making for some time. In 1941, the Air War Plans 
Division projected that the US Army Air Force would conduct systematic “precision bombing” in 
daylight, while the Royal Air Force would conduct mass air attacks at night.32  
This vision of synchronized allied aerial warfare was realized in Operation Torch. After only 
four days, the 12th division of the U.S. Air Force and the 8th division of the Royal Air Force littered 
the North African shores with a tonnage of bombs, thereby seizing much of the territory from the 
Axis powers, and clearing a beach path for Allied ground troops. Operation Torch set a precedent 
for continued bombing activity in the region. Between 1942 and 1944, the beaches of North Africa 
were destroyed—a choice that introduced havoc and instability on local populations in ways that 
impact this region to this day.  
In analyzing United States military training grounds and military theatres, it is easy to forget 
that their “data collection” process extends to colonial contexts. Before the firestorm bombings in 
Japan and Germany, the initial dataset that was generated and valued by statistical bombing analysts 
was produced in bombing campaigns over North Africa. While “total war” is often remembered in 
the European and Pacific theatres, the war also stretched throughout the colonized world in the 
Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa. These sites for combat were translated into laboratories as 
the ascendant technoscientific community labored to compute the success or failure of bombing 
scenarios in these regions.  
                                               
31 David Jablonsky, War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 75-93. 
32 Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2016), 31.  
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This connection was not unique to the Second World War. The rise of aerial bombing in the 
twentieth century marked a 10,000-foot high grasp for power that began in 1911 when the first aerial 
bomb was dropped over Libya.33 Italian forces seeking to conquer Ottoman territory in North 
Africa carried out these first bombing runs. One of the Italian officers later became one of the 
strongest advocates for unrestrained bombing of civilian targets. In the First World War, he 
unsuccessfully advocated for daily bombing runs against Austrian civilians in order to destroy 
morale. During the Second World War, technoscientific military analysis depended on colonial 
laboratories for bomb sampling data. The probability tables developed were initially based on 
scenarios and data collected in North Africa. Colonial violence and modern militarism have never 
been distinct. 
In the days following Operation Torch, the United States Demolition of Obstacles to 
Landing Operations Committee (DOLOC) articulated the problem: “To determine and to 
characterize the efficiency of the best methods of bombing a beach selected for landing invasion 
troops so that a substantial path across the beach could be cleared of land mines.”34 Destruction data 
generated abroad was then collected and fed back into U.S. and UK statistics laboratories such as 
the UC Berkeley Statistics Laboratory and the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study. The DOLOC 
committee had strategized with the newly formed Applied Mathematics Group (AMG), and 
Vannevar Bush’s National Defense Research Council, and commissioned the Berkeley Statistics 
Laboratory to work on this problem.  
 
                                               
33 Aerial aftermaths, governing from the skies, etc.  
34 M. Eudey et. al., “Cooperative Study on Probability of Exploding Land Mines by Bombing,” April 1, 1944, 
Jerzey Neyman Papers, BANC MSS 84/30 c, Carton 5. The Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley (henceforth: Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley). 
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Labor of Calculation  
The mostly west coast mathematics cooperative group included members from the Berkeley 
Statistics Laboratory, Stanford University, and the Institute for Numerical Analysis. The Applied 
Mathematics Group (AMG) via oversight at the National Defense Research Council (NDRC), 
assigned them the specific problem: “Probability of exploding land mines by bombing.” Throughout 
the remainder of the war, the cooperative would continue to work on this and similar problems. The 
initial challenge derived from the early allied bombing campaigns over North African beaches and 
was designed to predict the destruction of land mines for the sake of the landing troops. Later 
problems would reflect the changing needs of military occupation and theatres over urban civilian 
cities, oceans, or testing grounds on U.S. soil. Throughout, the central ‘problem’ was determining 
the probability of respective bombing strategies as a means of improving (making more efficient) 
future bombing runs and then documenting and archiving military outcomes in terms of probability 
assessments.  
The basic rhythm of this work was first to establish predictions for military outcomes and 
then test those predictions using data generated from the bombing. And then do it again. Because of 
the mathematical prediction mechanisms and infrastructures developed for this testing, military 
strategy came to depend on the mass production of bombing information. The more data generated, 
the more ‘efficient’ the outcomes.  
To make sense of this computing work, I organize the wartime projects into three stages. In 
each stage I aim to draw out the uncertainty architectures and epistemological commitments at 
work. Beyond the base computational work conducted at the Berkeley Statistics laboratory and 
supporting institutions, I consider the larger economic forces and ‘destruction data laboratories’—
areas where bombing waste was translated into useful material data and used in military strategy.  
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STEP ONE of the computational work was to reduce large bodies of disorganized 
information to a singular problem upholding a singular military objective. In the first two years of 
WWII, the computation group reformulated the question of the probability of exploding land mines 
as a more specific line of inquiry, namely, to determine the “ideal tight-string crater flight formation 
needed to clear an efficient path along a beach.” The specificities of this analysis resulted from 
efforts to pluck definable problems out of the onslaught of destruction data generated from 
bombing the beaches of North Africa. To this end, the group decided to just focus on two sources 
of inquiry: bombardier time charts and aerial spatial images of bombing densities. These two material 
sources provided base ‘space’ and ‘time’ measures, so that variance between the intended and actual 
bomb drop times and locations could be calculated, giving sufficient information from which to 
generate probability tables.   
STEP TWO of the computational work was delimiting bombing sites (both physically and 
mathematically) as controllable laboratory spaces. As military theatres and combatant air space were 
considered too unpredictable, initiatives to delimit statistical control states involved physical 
“controlled experiments” on U.S. soil. U.S. proving grounds were predominantly created from 
expropriation of National Park and indigenous land. These were large ground areas where bomb 
drops could be “controlled” and the mathematical delimitations of “error” established. The 
probability tables generated in the first stage were tested against controlled runs to establish a 
standard measure of prediction and bombing ‘error,’ in order that the larger bombing campaigns on 
the world stage could be stabilized according to an expected error rate.  
A particular series of experiments at Eglin Field in Florida exemplify the procedure. These 
experiments were believed to generate proof that bombing error was predictable at a standard 
dispersion error of 400 feet. This value was hotly contested, showing a lack of consensus throughout 
the military and mathematics community as to what it meant to accept this error as a reliable 
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measure. Beyond the dispute, I point to a significant epistemological slippage between ‘statistical 
error’ and ‘bombing error,’ phrases that were often used interchangeably, underscoring the real-
world antecedents and consequences behind the mathematical abstractions. 
In STEP THREE of the computational work, new meanings of (un)certainty were coproduced 
with military computing technologies, including bombsight calculators, part of a larger visual 
epistemology that I call “bombsight optics.” Bombsight optics constitute the technomathematical processes by 
which bomb site areas are translated into statistical and calculable areas and objects of study. The Optical Method, 
which concludes this chapter, and the bombsight calculators used in the production of probability 
tables, belong to a longer lineage of mathematical and physical technologies used to compute and 
rationalize military strategy.  
Beyond Beth Scott, Evelyn Fix, and Jerzy Neyman, other people commissioned to work on 
the bombing problem included UC Berkeley computer Emma Lehmer, her husband, electrical 
engineer Derrick Henry Lehmer, and his colleague Robert Weitbrecht. Mathematician George Pólya, 
nearby at Stanford, contributed to the theoretic dimensions of the problem. Outside of the regional 
cohort, Polish-Jewish mathematician Jacob Bronowski aided with providing data and analysis from 
the British vantage, given the conditional entanglement of the U.S. and U.K. bombing data.  
In his notes on the DOLOC problems, Bronowski captured the general tone of the group’s 
wartime planning work, “The purpose of the analysis, post mortem, of raids is simple: to obtain 
information which shall assist in the planning of future raids.”35AMP’s director, Warren Weaver 
translated DOLOC’s beach landing problem into a probability problem, catalyzing the project’s 
start. He wrote, “What is the desirable size and type of formation using what spacing and aiming  
                                               
35 Jerzy Neyman and Joseph Bronowski, “A New Vulnerability Equation in the Analysis of Incendiary Raids.” 
Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley, emphasis added.   
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points, and how many such formations are required to assure that the expected fraction of 
undetonated mines be P?”36 Here P meant the greatest probability of failing to detonate a land mine. 
In this sense, the objective of the group was to use preexisting uncertainty tools to try and control 
the error of an experiment in such as way that provided sufficient conditions for a real-world 
scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial data coming in from wartime bombing sites such as North Africa was 
unorganized, to say the least. At these bombing sites, military personnel and travelling statisticians 
collected aerial photographs, soil measurements, tactical information, measurements of enemy 
resources destroyed, and idealized representations of bombing densities. Out of this cacophony of 
information, the computation group homed in on two data sources that would allow them to 
                                               
36M. Eudey et. al., “Cooperative Study on Probability of Exploding Land Mines by Bombing,” April 1, 1944, 
Jerzey Neyman Papers, BANC MSS 84/30 c, Carton 5. The Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley (henceforth: Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley). 
Figure 25: “Coordinates of the Clock and Instrument 
Signals on the Tape.” Neyman Papers, Carton 5, 
Berkeley. 
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compute probability tables and confidence intervals: bombing aiming error and bombing dispersion 
error. All of the analysis hinged on identifying time values. The group derived values for temporal 
aiming error, denoted as 𝜎𝛼, from bombardier reports. These reports were charts that used 
intervalometers, clocks, and bombsight calculators to measure the time when a bomb was dropped 
against the time the bomb should have been dropped.  
Uncertainty was calculated along every possible dimension where a time value could be 
quantified. For example, uncertainty values were generated to assess the timing coincidence between 
intervalometer counts and clock counts. Values for spatial dispersion error, denoted as 𝜎𝑑, were also 
collected from aerial images of bombing densities used to compare the actual bomb landings against 
the intended target area. Spatial images of bombing densities and charts of bomb release times were 
the primary sources used to assess accuracy in the probability analysis. By reducing data points to 
temporal intervals and spatial distance measurements, certainty calculations could be made for every 
dimension of the bombing process, from bomb drop times, to machine quality, to prediction and 
success or failure assessments. All these were efforts to control statistical error in such a way that 
would generate confidence in future military tactics. A standard dispersion error value of 400 feet, 
generated in a controlled experiment over U.S. soil, became an indicator of this possibility.   
 
Standardizing Error: The Eglin Field Experiments 
Part of the larger patchwork of proving grounds expanding during WWII was Eglin Field, a 
significant site for the advancement of mathematical planning and operations research. Situated 
along the Gulf coast of Florida and occupying 400,000 acres of land hundreds of miles from the 
nearest city, Eglin Field was an ideal test site for aerial bombing above land and water. The land 
originally belonged to the Muscogee (Creek) and Choctaw Tribes before they were forcibly removed 
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in the 1830s. In a 1908 commemorative effort, President Theodore Roosevelt established the 
Choctawhatchee National Forest as part of his conservation planning programs. But in October of 
1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a directive for the U.S. Forestry to cede 400,000 acres 
of Choctawhatchee National Forest to the U.S. War Department. The Army Air Forces Proving 
Ground at Eglin Field was activated April of 1942.  
Testing conducted on proving grounds were well documented and calculated events. These 
grounds were created with the express purpose of securing control and predictability over military 
strategy and outcomes. Throughout the war, the AF proving ground became a significant test site 
for AMG mathematicians, operations researchers, and military personnel eager to explore new 
technoscientific combat strategies. 37 Eglin Field became an experimental station that merged military 
and mathematical rationality in aerial combat decision-making. 
Neyman made his first trip to Eglin Field on December 3, 1942 to meet with commanding 
officer General Grandison Gardner about the application of probability to problems of aerial 
warfare. At first the General was “rather skeptical” about the mathematics. Neyman recorded 
bitterly that it was “almost without exception [that military persons were] prepared to believe every 
word printed in their Training Manual.”38 Neyman argued that the data was in need of a bounded 
computational mechanism because it was “mostly fragmentary and difficult to record.”39 The central 
purpose of Neyman’s Florida trip was to design and execute an experiment “to test the validity of 
NRDC tables of probabilities of multiple hits in train bombing attacks of multiple targets.”40 That is, 
                                               
37 William Thomas, Rational Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940-1960 (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2016).  
38 Diary of J. Neyman, December 3-19, 1942, Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley.   
39 Ibid.  
40 Eglin Field Proof Department, “Final Report on Test Experiment with Bomb Sight Trainer to Illustrate 
Tables of Probabilities of Multiple Hits on Multiple Targets in Train Bombing,” October 29, 1943. Neyman 
Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley.  
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the bombing scenarios underpinning the statisticians’ probability tables were to be recreated over 
U.S. soil (according to factors of altitude, flight formation, and bomb spacing). The results would 
then be used to determine the accuracy of the tables in correctly estimating bombing error. Gardner 
gave the verbal directive for the test on December 12th, 1942 with Air Corps captain W.D. Snyder, 
Jr. as the officer in charge of the project.41   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The preliminary phase of the experiment was designed to establish a normal expectancy for 
dispersion error. In this phase, trainers dropped 50 bombs at 10,000 feet altitude at 250 miles per 
hour making five runs on each target.42 This “optimal” formation had been established both 
mathematically in the preexisting probability analysis and qualitatively under the advisement of 
military personnel. The main phase of the experiment introduced various kinds of bombs, different 
spacing between the bomb drops, and different speeds and altitudes of the trainers. For example, the 
first run involved three hundred-pound M31 bombs dropped from 6,000 feet at 180 mph.43 These 
                                               
41 W.D. Synder to Command Center, December 23, 1942. Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley.  
42 Eglin Field Proof Department, “Final Report on Test Experiment.” 
43 Ibid. 
Figure 26: “Bombsight View of The Leader in Aiming at: 
Battleships/Destroyers.” Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley. 
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experiments, supplemented by another round in 1943, tested the variation of aiming error at various 
altitudes. In their post-hoc assessment of the data collected at the proving grounds, the computation 
group concluded that the variation of aiming was actually better than anticipated, at 400 σa.  
In their 1944 “Probability of Exploding Land Mines by Bombing” final report, the 
computation cooperative promoted the standard error value by charting a comparison of all of the 
known variations of aiming error currently circulating Air Force oversight. This chart included 
“typical values” and values computed in various AAF reports, an operations analysis report, and 
from the Eglin Field experiments of 1942 and 1943. Of course, the Eglin Field experiments, by 
virtue of being controlled experiments, were conducted under ideal conditions such as clear visibility 
and without enemy combatants.  
Proving ground journal entries make clear that the experimental testing of these probability 
tables and the daily bombing runs quickly achieved rote normalcy. On January 21, 1944 Col. Walsh, 
Major Dillworth, and Captains Leonard and Bleakney of the U.S. military drove to Vera Beach 
Florida where they were picked up around 10:45 a.m. in a B-17 bomber and taken to an airfield in 
Brooksville, Florida. Here a group of 18 B-17s were engaged in carrying out pattern trials for the 
forthcoming tests on the beach at Ft. Pierce. Captains Leonard and Bleakney rode in a separate 
reconnaissance B-17 and Walsh and Major Dillworth rode in planes of the formation. The 
intervalometer was set at 50 feet and the bombs were lowered for deployment. Their conclusions 
were rote and unremarkable. According to military journals from that day, “The pattern blanketed 
the target perfectly” but was too broad and diffuse for the beach attack. They said the trial was 
“convincing” in that it showed that the “javelin formation was definitely suited for the purpose.”  
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Bombsight Optics: Nomograms and Bombsight Calculators  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Probability charts used in scenarios like the one at Vera Beach were coproduced by military 
and mathematics personnel. They were undergirded by a technomathematical rationality, which I 
refer to as ‘bombsight optics.’ I define bombsight optics as the visualization of bombing waste and destruction as 
predictable, controllable, and calculable sites of statistical study. Bombsight optics first and foremost identify 
“solvable problems,” within destruction data and idealize these problems with visual representations. 
For example, the DOLOC problem of assessing how many flight formations were needed to 
probably clear a beach landing strip of land mines, wherefore the beach is represented as a rectangle 
around a set of perfect circles.  
Bombsight optics also denote a convergence between military and mathematics personnel, 
they are the mathematical and visual technologies that stabilize mathematical and data-driven 
militarism.  For example, nomograms (that date back to the 18th century French Military) were of 
frequent use in the bomb idealization process, between military and mathematical personnel. They 
are visual apparatus that depict a bombing scenario as a geometric relationship between number of 
Figure 27: “Functional Diagram of Dial Board and Visual 
Adjustment Board of the Computer of Probabilities.” Neyman 
Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley. 
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bombs dropped, radius of the bomb, and width of the beach, etc. Nomograms represented bombing 
scenarios as simple mathematical relationships between a small set of factors. These mathematical 
diagrams provided context for military personnel and statistical workers to engage each other on 
discrete points of military strategy such as the space intervals between planes in a given bombing 
run. Using data such as reconnaissance photographs and tactical information about flight formation, 
military personnel and mathematicians would then discuss the optimal formation for a given 
bombing density as well as determine and agree on measures such as the standard error in flight 
formation spacing.  
Nomograms were therefore technical representations that served as meeting points for 
military and mathematical expertise. Throughout the war, the computation group also became 
increasingly preoccupied with reinventing bombsight calculators as a mechanized probability tool for 
minimizing bombing error and achieving accuracy that would eventually replace human 
computational labor.  
Since the First World War, accuracy in bombing missions involved an elaborate 
communication exercise between the pilot and bombardier. The burden of precision fell on the 
pilots, requiring them to maintain straight and level flight at the precise altitude predetermined for 
the mission. A combination of intervalometers, clocks, and slide-ruler calculators were used in these 
efforts. Already by the 1930s, engineers Elmer Sperry and Carl Norden of the U.S. Navy were 
developing electronic bombsight calculators to relieve the pilot of the burden of this coordination.44 
These devices received direct input from the planes’ instruments to calculate the effects of gravity, 
air drag and wind speed on the trajectory of a bomb. These competing bombsight machines were 
widely circulated by the start of WWII.45 
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Both the Sperry and Norden bombsight calculators were used in the Eglin Field experiment 
as statistical comparisons were made of the two machines. The importance of machine accuracy did 
not go unnoticed by the statisticians. This was in part due to the military’s preoccupation with bomb 
spacing machines. The machines were seen as crucially important to winning the war, and ongoing 
comparisons were made to the predictive capabilities of enemy bombsights, especially the German 
bombsight calculator.46 On November 4, 1943 the NDRC held a conference in Washington D.C. 
specifically on the Bomb Spacing calculator of which members of the AMG were in attendance. It 
was believed that the calculator could be redesigned “so as not to require any separate operation for 
placing the center of the bomb train on the center of the target.”47 Designs of automated bombsight 
calculators hinged on uncertainty calculations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inspired by the spatial relationships between numbers and calculated values on the slide 
rules, in conjunction with the electric machine capabilities of the Norton and Sperry bombsight 
calculators, the mathematicians designed various computing and machine possibilities. The central 
                                               
46 F. Postlethwaite, “Notes on Enemy Bombsights” September, 1942. Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley. 
47 Diary of J. Neyman, December 3-19, 1942. Neyman Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley.  
Figure 28: The Norden Bombsight 1943. Neyman 
Papers, Carton 5, Berkeley. 
  178 
idea was for the calculating devices to aid with (un)certainty work, and then feed that data into 
calibrating the bombsight. A memo reporting on the “Bombardier’s Calculator,” stated that:  
This device (whether chart, slide-rule, calculating instrument, or whatever) was asked to do 
three things: 
1. To determine the change in the altitude setting on the bombsight so as to aim the 
center of a train on a target rather the first bomb. 
2. To determine the probability of at least one hit on a target with a train of n bombs, 
attacking at a certain angle. 
3. To determine the optimum spacing of the train.  
The first of these three is a relatively simple matter once the length of train is known. 
But it seems that we would do the Air Corps a dis-service if we did not investigate 
points 2. and 3. before attacking 1.; for otherwise we would have a mechanism for 
furnishing bad and misleading answers.48  
 
The base processes of probabilistic estimation and calculation went unquestioned as visions of new 
machine possibilities to take over this labor of calculation circulated. In winter of 1943, Neyman 
conceptualized an instrument that married the bombsight calculator to the Berkeley Statistics Lab’s 
probability table work from the past year. The machine he proposed would be able to instantly yield 
probabilities of multiple hits in train bombing of arbitrary targets. This device was intended to 
supplement “the more cumbersome numerical efforts of manually computing probabilities.”49 The 
“Neyman method” was proposed as a means of feeding data established in the initial design of a 
bombing run or ‘experiment’ back into the next set of bombing runs, without having to recalibrate 
the sight of the machine on the target:   
The following technique is proposed: When the number of bombs, the desired spacing 
between bombs, and the estimated ground speed are set into the intervalometer, these 
data then determine the length of the train in time, and this time is rather accurately 
produced on the basis of those data. It is possible then from the setting for the number 
of bombs and from the shaft rotation which determines the time interval from bomb 
to bomb in the intervalometer to extract directly a numerical time interval giving the 
time duration of the semi-train. Compensation for dropping in train, therefore, or 
                                               
48 DIV. 7 NDRC, Memo Concerning Project #223, Bombardier’s Calculator, December 23, 1942, Neyman 
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offset of the aiming point by the half train may be directly accomplished by adding the 
half train duration thus obtained to the time of flight setting in the bombsight. This 
operation does not interfere with the synchronous operation of the sight and insures 
that the center of the train, regardless of the length, is aimed at the target.50  
 
Neyman remained conflicted about the automation of computational labor, as he expressed 
concern over reconciling the machine with the sheer complexity of the data. In a letter to 
mathematicians John Williams and Warren Weaver, he cautioned, “you will see that the instrument 
could not be considered an alternative to the computations.”51 Nevertheless, the visual and machine 
culture within the bombing work, and the cultural directive to reduce the labor of computation, led 
to a number of probability-machine designs.    
 
Confidence Intervals as Sufficient Knowledge  
The analysis for the computation group’s final 1944 bombing report was conducted using idealized 
images of bombing densities collected at Eglin Field. Drawn from an aerial perspective, the bombing 
densities were represented as a condensed group of circles, over which rectangles were drawn to 
symbolize the “effective path” or the area of high probability that most of the mines had been 
detonated. This rectangular area was drawn according to “a radius of efficiency” calculable by 
analyzing the standard errors of past bomb dispersions on beach mines.  
 This imagery, of an idealized beach of some width B, over which a rectangular “effective 
path” was drawn, became the standard representation of calculating probabilities for beach bombing 
scenarios. The objective was to show the probability for “at least one” effective path given an 
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“optimal” set of factors—plane formations, spacing of bombs, etc. The probability of a unique 
effective path was drawn equal to the difference of the effective path and the width of the beach 
divided by the standard error of the bombs dropped, 𝐸 = 𝑊𝑒/𝐵𝜎𝑎 . The group then calculated values for 
the probability of a unique effective path “actually crossing the beach” equal to 𝛼. So the confidence 
factor, α, translated to actual path measurements.52  
Confidence intervals were computed using the equation:  
 
𝐸𝛼0𝐹′ − 11 > 𝐸′ > 𝐸𝛼	0𝐹′1. 
 
They were calculated in order to produce a table that “at least 𝐹′[1 − 30] formations will be required 
for the probability of having one (or more) “effective paths” leading from one end of the beach to 
another to reach (or exceed) the level 𝛼[. 90, .95, .975].”53 For example, to achieve the probability of 
an actual effective path across the beach with a confidence factor of 90, it was necessary to use at 
least 22 flight formations.54 The general idea was to draw intervals to indicate sufficient flight 
formation conditions for an effective crossing path. That is when attacking formations were “just 
sufficient for the probability of at least one ‘effective path’ crossing the beach to attain the chosen 
level 𝛼.”  
As established in the Polish case, confidence hinged on measuring “error” in statistical 
experimentation. The numerical confidence values produced in Pytkowski’s small-farm analysis 
designated “error” as the risk of confusion he had about the population value he drew from his 
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method of estimation. Pytkowski’s confidence intervals, although unique to the 1927/1928 farming 
data, pertained to his own process of inductive reasoning. His inquiry was largely a philosophical 
one. In the bombing case, error had an unstable meaning. Error was a statistical term but also 
referred to the recorded dispersion distances on the ground as well as the recorded gaps between the 
desired and actual bomb drop times. Epistemic distinctions between ‘statistical error’ and ‘bombing 
error’ blurred in discourse surrounding the experiments.  
Confidence Intervals in the bombing case were not just a method of assessing the validity of 
inductive logic used in experimental design (as in the meaning of the Polish word ufności), they were 
also a method of controlling bombing error, with confidence (the American military’s term of art 
being sufficiency). In its military expression, confidence was a method of predicting conditions that 
were “just sufficient” for achieving a singular objective. According to the confidence interval table, 
with the sufficient conditions of 29 flight formations, there was a 95% probability that at least one 
effective path was cleared across the beach.  
 
Designing Certainty Machines   
In August of 1944, Berkeley engineer Derrick H. Lehmer developed an “Optical Method” 
for planning bombing missions inspired by the ongoing research of the statistics group. This was a 
film projector system that could display the target area on the wall of an airplane. The next year in 
May of 1945, Lehmer circulated a revised version of his “photo-electric instrument for planning 
bombing missions” to mathematicians and military personnel.55 As something produced by an 
electrical engineer, Lehmer’s proposal had more to do with the instrumentation than with 
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mathematics. The physics of light and film were discussed in detail, whereas the statistical 
components were based in gross assumptions of “normal population sets” and “randomizations,” 
ignoring even the most obvious complexities of the bombing data. The Optical Method was based 
on a “sample bomb fall drawn from a normal population set.”56 Lehmer insisted that this single 
apparatus would eventually provide a statistically accurate visual display of any target: “[The] optical 
device [is] intended to replace the numerical treatment of the bombing problem. The device may be 
used with targets having any size and shape and with any direction of attack.”57 He imagined the film 
projection system to project targets of any size and shape and from any direction of attack. It 
supposedly allowed “anyone with some experience in electronics to construct and operate the 
apparatus with a small expenditure of time and effort.” Lehmer imagined an endless belt of film 
rolling through of a finite set of several hundred frames, that would contain images of different 
bomb patterns that had been drawn or abstracted by the computing group during the war. Potential 
displacements would be calculated as standard aiming errors using P.C. Mahalanobis’ error charts 
from his 1933 “Tables of Random Samples from a Normal Distribution.”  
Despite the promises of seeing with certainty, significant doubt lingered about the accuracy 
of these machines, given their reliance on the statistical assumptions produced in the probability 
analysis, specifically the standard error of 400 feet. This doubt is evidenced in comments from 
military personnel and operations researchers who advocated strong caution about this direction of 
research. Military personnel protested, “this calculator idealizes the bomb fall pattern.” And 
“patterns do not conform to a model of this type […] a bomb fall is termed a pattern by courtesy 
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only.”58 Lehmer nonchalantly admitted that, “The informal way in which the notion of a bomb 
pattern is introduced into the above apparatus renders in unlikely that actual results, such as the 
number of hits on the target or the number of sections hit at least once, could be predicted 
accurately.” Still, the wartime planning work spawned a number of similar patents on “target seeking 
missiles” that assumed the probability work. Discourses of statistically accurate aiming devices 
would continue to dominate aerial bombing throughout the Cold War.59  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Un)certainty 
The dramatic rise of a geopolitics 10,000 feet above ground reconfigured uncertainty 
engagement. The resulting certainty-making politics were inextricably tied to the growing militarist 
culture. The WWII aerial bombing economy constituted the fastest growing economy in late 
modern history, and the commissioned computing work was inextricably linked to its economic 
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Figure 29: "View of Apparatus as Set Up." Neyman Papers, 
Carton 5, Berkeley. 
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production. Prior to 1940, the promise and possibility of a probabilistic order already existed, 
although ‘(un)certainty work’ was not conceived as a well-ordered machine. To the contrary, in the 
1930s the ‘probability problem’ inspired philosophical, mathematical, and economic work as well as 
the larger cultural imagination. Probability computing was in place by the start of WWII because of 
its large-scale and rigorous engagement throughout the interwar years, but it was understood as 
explanandum rather than explanans.  
(Un)certainty work in the WWII bombing economy shifted from a structured engagement 
with unknowability and the limits of human reason to an engagement with binary decision-making, 
sufficient conditions, and prognostication. This denotes a radical shift in the political-economic 
conditions and cultural commitments fueling the applications of statistical modeling techniques. At 
the heart of this shift, I identify an emboldened willingness to paper over ‘uncertainty’ in the name 
of efficient calculation. This involved collapsing statistical error with ontological error and reducing 
an overabundance of unorganized information to overdetermined mathematical problems. As the 
war progressed, measures of statistical estimation error were increasingly confused with bombing 
error, as the literal distance between the bomb drop point and the target. Here the epistemological 
distinction between measuring uncertainty in human reasoning and measuring uncertainty in real 
world impacts was blurred. 
While statistical methods—especially the null hypothesis model and other tests of statistical 
significance60—have come to represent an approach to binary decision-making or means of 
ascertaining certainty, this does not elude the fact that they still function as managers of uncertainty 
at the levels of both discourse and practice. The promise of certainty, designated by military 
mathematicians as ‘sufficient knowability,’ relied on computational methods specifically designed to 
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delimited uncertainty, doubt, and error in their work. “Error” and “uncertainty” continued to have 
slippery mathematical, epistemological, and technological meanings. These intricacies were largely 
papered over by descriptions of ‘rational decision-making’ as the modus operandi for wartime 
planning work. A 1943 edition of Popular Science boasted that the bombsight simply “solves 
problems.”61  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military mathematicians achieved new practices of certainty-making in WWII. They 
transformed an onslaught of statistical ‘destruction data’ into ‘probability tables’ and other 
knowledge-making apparatus for binary decision-making in military strategy. Data managers 
separated out ‘time’ measurements and ‘space’ measurements as the basis for their analysis. 
Calculating machines—including intervalometers, clocks, slide rules, nomograms, and bombsight 
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Figure 30:  "How the Bombsight Solves Problems." Popular 
Science 12 (1943) Cover Art by N. Katula. 
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calculators—were used to stabilize this data collection and organization process. The growing desire 
for certainty over the future, specifically for managing one of the fastest growing and most 
destructive economies in modern history, overwrote the admission of an uncertain world organized 
by an uncertain archive.62  
These discourses are not insignificant. The way in which WWII programs were documented 
and archived, and later remembered and popularized by technocrats, mathematicians, algorithmic 
thinkers, and decision-makers, drove public belief that the WWII aerial bombing economy was an 
emblem of high-modernist rationality and efficient management. This belief has shaped the 
formation of the Cold War decision and computing sciences. In fact, the domains of operations 
research, managerial science, and the information and computer science that came to prominence in 
the 1960s are predicated on this memory and narrative of the war.  
In confronting the myriad of ways that data was generated, ordered, and managed, we begin 
to see how uncertainty logics justified not just the waging of war but also domestic policy towards 
land allocation and use for mathematical-military planning, as well as the labor required to operate 
these domestic and colonial laboratories. Uncertainty logics also helped reconfigure the nature of 
war. Bombing strategies created damage and casualties at unprecedented scales, killing tens of 
thousands of civilians in Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo alone. Through the powerful visual-
mathematical culture of bombsight optics, data collected from these events was economized into the 
production of advanced statistical machinery, helping to set a precedent for the continued 
deployment of these wartime strategies after WWII.  
Akin to the race to weaponize atomic energy, the achievement of highly predictive and 
efficient mathematical bombing techniques was a promise to control the postwar world. The realities 
                                               
62 On data and the archive, see: Orit Halpern, Beautiful Data: A History of Vision and Reason Since 1945 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).  
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of these bombing programs—state sponsored mass killings, military expansionism, and the large-
scale destruction of land and natural resources—have been largely hidden by our preoccupation and 
celebration of mathematical predictability. Here we see the power of numbers not only in 
transforming culture but in dictating the focus of what has been officially documented about the 
U.S. involvement in WWII. The banal quantification of human death, resource consumption, and 
the destruction of land and infrastructure—and the wantonness at having predicted these as certain 
outcomes—distracts from moral inquiry and implication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4, contains material as it will appear in Dryer, Theodora. “From Soil to Bombs: A 
History of Uncertainty Computing” (In Review HSNS). The dissertation author was the sole author of 
this material. 
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Chapter 5: Climate 
  
Computing Cloud Seeds:  
A Story of Anthropogenic Climate Change, 1940-1970  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Cloud Seeding    
Out of the smoke and clouds of WWII research and development, a new regime of weather 
managers arose with a promising objective: to control agriculture and the environment from the sky.1 
As human “rainmakers” they promised to alter the “lives of clouds.” Such lofty goals were rooted in 
the interwar physical and mathematical sciences. Since the early 1930s, physicists and meteorologists 
                                               
1 There is a fairly robust and growing corpus on weather modification programs in the Cold War United 
States. Most recently, Kristen Harper, Make it Rain: State Control of the Atmosphere in Twentieth-Century America, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017); Daniel Freund, American Sunshine: Diseases of Darkness and the 
Quest for Natural Light (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Jack Williams, The AMS Weather Book 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009). Important scholarship on numerical weather 
modification: Kristine Harper, Weather by the Numbers: The genesis of modern meteorology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2008) and Phaedra Daipha, Masters of Uncertainty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).  
Figure 31: Ellsworth Huntington, “The Desert Laboratory,” Harper’s Magazine CXXII, No. 
DCCXXXI (April 1911): 658. 
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had theorized new methods of altering the precipitation capacity of clouds. In 1933, Swedish 
meteorologist Tor Bergeron published a hypothetical mechanism for gaining precipitation from 
supercooled clouds that attracted global interest.2 After WWII, this interest intensified when 
laboratory physicists discovered that silver-iodide smoke could potentially implant ice crystals in 
supercooled clouds.3  The advanced technology of new and improved military machines, such as 
ground generators and airplanes, further strengthened researchers’ confidence that they could 
effectively deliver the smoke. Beyond the scientific community, this possibility of mapping the sky 
for “seedable” rainmaking clouds emerged as a feasible solution to a variety of agricultural and 
environmental problems, and provoked the imagination of farmers, agricultural laborers, 
environmentalists, scientists, mathematicians, military personnel, and the everyday American 
consumer. Many shared the dream of managing agriculture and natural resources from above.  
Cloud seeding was “an improvement on nature” that directly confronted the vulnerabilities 
of agricultural uncertainty.4 An unpredicted early season of rain, for example, would yield an early 
crop of produce, rendering it vulnerable to bugs, critters, and hailstorm and sun damage. Rainmakers 
marketed their work as a viable investment for stabilizing rain season predictability. As early as 1945, 
newspapers were reporting that, “cloud seeding [had] been going on high above [American] farms 
for the past four years.”5 In 1941, agricultural specialists in Michigan had begun installation of silver-
iodide ground generators to seed clouds, a process that could “add 10 to 15 minutes to a cloud’s life 
                                               
2 Tor Bergeron, “On the physics of clouds and precipitation,” Verbal Proceedings, International Geological and 
Geophysical Union, Fifth General Assembly, 2 (1933): 156-157.  
3 See: V.J. Schaefer, “The production if ice crystals in a cloud of supercooled water droplets,” Science 104 
(1946): 420-457; Bernard Vonnegut, “The nucleation of ice formation by silver iodide,” Journal of Applied 
Physics 18 (1947): 570-593; Irving Langmuir, “The Growth of Particles in Smokes and Clouds and the 
Production of Snow from Supercooled Clouds,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 92, no. 3 (July 
1948): 167-185. 
4 “Cloud Seeding ‘Improves’ Nature,” The Morning Herald, Tuesday, October 23, 1945. 
5 “Cloud Seeding ‘Improves’ Nature,” The Morning Herald, Tuesday, October 23, 1945. 
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and make it rain longer than it would ordinarily.”6 This initiative was catalyzed by the previous five 
years of “drought” or below average rainfall over Michigan’s farmland.  
Rainmakers harnessed these sorts of anxieties from the farming community in the 
advancement of their programs; they promised to control the rain so that farmers could control their 
crops. Newspaper articles on cloud seeding initiatives were predominantly published in rural papers, 
nestled within advertisements for tractors and other industrial farming machinery. These public 
education outlets underscore the fact that cloud seeding was an agricultural-atmospheric initiative. 
Seen more directly, rainmakers harnessed monetary investment from local agricultural interests. For 
example, rainmakers charged Michigan farming townships $1,000 per the 1945 rainmaking season.  
Throughout the 1950s, the rainmaking enterprise grew into an elaborate transnational and 
heterogeneous data economy where the currency—precipitation—was promised to those in need of 
rain, such as farmers, unions, and agricultural laborers. While corporate, for-profit rainmakers largely 
drove the solicitation of new silver-iodide experiments for agricultural administrators, uncertainty 
managers and data scientists operated as a connective web between these interests. I center my 
analysis of cloud seeding on UC Berkeley’s statistics group. Specifically, I uncover the cultural and 
technological dimensions of their RAIN programs that commenced in 1953 and ended a decade 
later.7 RAIN was not an acronym, but official correspondence used this military-esk title.  
Map-making is at the heart of weather experimentation. Between 1953-1973 the Berkeley 
Statistics Groups designed a number of area maps for their statistical analysis of the drought 
program, RAIN. I stress here that in this Cold War moment that technical and conceptual practices 
of statistical mapping and weather mapping were stitched together. And it is precisely this 
                                               
6 “Cloud Seeding ‘Improves’ Nature,” 1945, ibid.  
7  For example, The State of California commissioned a series of randomized mathematical experiments and 
data computational work to predict changes in precipitation levels over Santa Barbara County after cloud 
seeding. 
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convergence that gave rise to algorithmic modes of governance over climatic and weather sciences. 
By unraveling the epistemological and technological components of mid-century drought programs, 
I engage the larger data laboratories and economies functioning to stabilize weather modification 
programs and the development of prediction models designed specifically to assess cloud-seeding 
outcomes. My story begins in 1930 with a significant water-data initiative catalyzed by a period of 
extreme drought. I then uncover the importance of sixteen European and Australian cloud-seeding 
experiments, as well as numerous local for-profit experiments throughout the Southwestern United 
States, Northern Mexico, and Hopi and Navajo land.  
Cloud-seeding is an aerial-agricultural initiative. It is a large-scale techno-mathematical program designed to 
control ground resources through physical intervention and occupation of the skies.  
  As with the agricultural and bombing economies discussed in the first half of this 
dissertation, I analyze the cloud-seeding economy as a heterogeneous program of uncertainty 
management. By the early 1950s, vaguely defined ‘uncertainty’ was widely acknowledged as a 
component of weather modification and was harnessed by rainmakers to further their programs. 
The promise was to overcome agricultural uncertainty through controlling the lives of clouds. 
Uncertainty dogged the solution as well as the problem, as there was “no hard data […] to gauge the 
seeding’s effectiveness.”8. Not only was uncertainty reduced to an informational problem (a problem 
of incomplete data), it was believed that the effectiveness of cloud-seeding programs in general 
would be determined by data scientists—not farmers—who would eventually use data, “to assess 
the effectiveness of […] cloud seeding.”9 Data scientists were revered as an objective voice in 
weather modification. However, as shown in this dissertation, uncertainty models were architectures 
                                               
8 “Cloud Seeding ‘Improves’ Nature,” 1945, ibid. 
9 “Cloud Seeding ‘Improves’ Nature,” 1945, ibid. 
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that translated unknowability into probabilistic language rather than objective representations of 
physical phenomena.    
Phaedra Daipha’s study of postwar weather forecasters is particularly resonant here. She 
argues that, “No one can master deep uncertainty—but [forecasters] certainly are masters at 
mastering uncertainty.”10 Her comprehensive genealogy of forecasting in the National Weather 
Service and its larger “weather prediction enterprise” situates forecasting as an elaborate decision-
making practice, which leads to “the official weather story” for the public.11 Ultimately, Daipha 
argues that uncertainty inherent to the forecaster’s decision-making practice is black-boxed by the 
yes-or-no events presented to the public, as in rain or shine, overlooking the fact that these are 
presented as probabilities—30% chance of rain. In contrast to this, in cloud-seeding initiatives, 
‘uncertainty’ was visible to the public, specifically because rainmakers harnessed anxieties pertaining 
to the uncertainty of weather events as justification for their interventions.  Despite the centrality of 
uncertainty to the whole enterprise, what rainmakers themselves meant by it remains murky. There 
is a significant epistemic leap, for example, between managing the uncertainty of predicting the 
behavior of an individual cloud and managing uncertainty technologies designed to alter cloud 
behavior. In this sense, rainmakers, like Daipha’s forecasters, were also masters of mastering 
uncertainty.  
Lorraine Daston reminds us that even before this twentieth-century plight of predicting ‘the 
lives of clouds,’ nineteenth century atlas makers struggled to “describe the indescribable” and 
classify, collect, and represent cloud taxons.12 In her analysis, the inherent “vertiginous variability of 
                                               
10 Phaedra Daipha, Masters of Uncertainty: Weather Forecasts and the Quest for Ground Truth (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015): 3.  
11 Daipha, Masters of Uncertainty, 30.  
12 Lorraine Daston, “Cloud Physiognomy: Describing the Indescribable,” Representations 135 (2016): 45-71.  
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clouds”13 inevitably pushed the “resources of description to a breaking point”14 so a cloud ontology 
was then only achieved through the creative process of “seeing in types and speaking in tongues.”15 
Ultimately, vaguely captured rain observations helped to classify cloud types. For example, an 1896 
Atlas describes the Nimbus cloud “without shape and with ragged edges, from which steady rain or snow 
usually falls.”16 Consideration of the inherent indescribability of cloud behavior underscores the wild 
instability of identifying clouds as the control object in Cold War rain experimentation.  
The hubris undergirding these ambitions makes clear the enthusiasm for wartime technology 
but also the deep anxieties about stabilizing an agricultural economy in the postwar world. It also 
attests to how powerful the assertion of the probabilistic worldview can be in simply overwriting 
unknowability.     
 Throughout this dissertation, Uncertainty is primarily a probability concept, which addresses 
unknowability or in Daston’s nineteenth-century framing, indescribability, by asserting mathematical 
limits to what is being managed. (Un)certainty work constitutes a regime of computation that 
interprets experiments in terms of probability data. It is through engaging the dimensions of 
(un)certainty work in infrastructure, data production and computation labor, technological 
development, and so forth that the historical impacts are most salient. In the 1950s cloud-seeding 
initiatives, this computing work began with the conceptualization and design of visual environmental 
and weather maps. Akin to the WWII bombing images and the sugar beet breeding maps, these 
contoured atmospheric abstractions became the visual medium by which mathematical experiments 
were conducted. I therefore conceive of cloud seeding ‘experiments’ as a layered reordering of 
                                               
13 Daston, Cloud Physiognomy, 47.  
14 Daston, Cloud Physiognomy, 48. 
15 Daston, Cloud Physiognomy, 63. 
16 Daston, Cloud Physiognomy, 63 (my emphasis). 
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information, occurring in chronological phases of physical interventions, data collection, and 
mathematical calculation. These were organized into visual representations (maps) and ordered with 
central computing mechanisms (e.g. confidence intervals). Ultimately, in the Cold War period 
‘clouds’ were translated into probabilistic computing events. 
Over the course of the Cold War, the 1930s conception of supercooled clouds evolved into 
identifiable convection band “targets” that were determined not just by their ability to be “seeded” 
through silver iodide operations but also by their ability to serve as control targets in randomized 
statistical experimentation.17 Like individual clouds, convection bands remain poor statistical 
controls. They are a rare physical phenomenon, occurring within a highly specific terrestrial-
atmospheric environment (mountainous regions) and only under highly specific conditions. From 
the ephemeral nineteenth-century cloud taxon, to the rare supercooled cloud, to today’s convection 
band targets, clouds have served as a slippery subject in weather prediction and modification. Still, 
the 1950s cloud seeding initiatives generated powerful data infrastructures and epistemological 
frameworks that have persisted into twenty-first century weather and climate modeling.  
In this final dissertation chapter, I confront the blurry boundaries of mathematical ‘experiment 
making’ in the context of 1950s and 60s cloud seed experimentation, which involved a melding 
together of mathematical computing analysis and physical and environmental alterations. I take apart 
conclusive mathematical experiments designed in the late 1960s and early 1970s to uncover their 
technological, informational, and environmental underpinnings. The data used in these programs 
was first generated in the 1930s, with a powerful snow and rain data collection project, responsive to 
Depression-Era drought anxieties. I then consider the importance of data generated in physical 
                                               
17 See, for example, in its recent drone iteration: T.P. DeFelice and Duncan Axisa, “Developing the 
Framework for Integrating Autonomous Unmanned Aircraft Systems into Cloud Seeding Activities,” Journal 
of Aeronautics & Aerospace Engineering 5, no. 172 (2016): 1-6. 
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silver-iodide experiments in the 1946-1957 period. Following this prehistory, the heart of this 
chapter addresses lesser known experiments conducted by corporate and private interests 
throughout the 1950s, focusing on experiments over Navajo and Hopi Land. I conclude with the 
series of randomized mathematical experiments during in the 1960s, which synthesized this 
multifaceted data from the previous three decades. This is when the climate of public opinion 
shifted to doubt and distrust for weather modification programs partly due to failed mathematical 
results.  
I recast 1950s cloud-seeding programs and computing analysis as a cultural and economic 
movement rather than a strict disciplinary or state initiative. Reframing cloud seeding as a 
heterogeneous movement rather than a top-down state initiative brings to light the larger 
environmental geographies affecting and affected by its data production and reveals a larger 
computing laboratory. Consistent with earlier studies in this dissertation, I demonstrate that 
rainmaking initiatives were a response to economic and environmental crises. Weather modification, 
like the confidence planning movement was a project of public participation. Cloud-seeding 
initiatives were designed as a response to  demand across the whole industrialized world for 
increased precipitation in places of drought, such as Santa Barbara County18 and Australia’s outback 
farm territories, and for decreased precipitation in places of destructive weather, such as the 
damaging hailstorms pounding the French countryside.19 In response to these potential markets for 
geo-engineering, and emboldened by WWII technologies and infrastructures, elaborate trans-
                                               
18 The Santa Barbara County physical rainmaking experiments were the main experiment overseen by the 
Berkeley Statistic’s Group, but their larger ‘experimental’ analysis involved all the experiments covered in this 
chapter. Their experimental surveys were largely published in the late 1960s 1970s, after the physical 
experiments and data collection initiatives were concluded. See, for example: Jerzy Neyman, Elizabeth Scott, 
and M.A. Wells, “Statistics in Meterology,” Revue de l’Institut International de Statistique 37, no. 2 (1969): 119-148.  
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disciplinary and transnational data economies formed in efforts to make it rain or in some places, to 
make it stop raining. This drive for artificial weather control operated through and with information 
at every level of implementation. Data was also its downfall.  
 
Data Streams and Hydraulic Empire   
The 1950s RAIN and cloud-seeding programs constitute heightened moments of (un)certainty 
work. Cloud-seeding programs involved techno-chemical interventions into weather systems 
through the use of airplanes and electrical ground generators, which delivered silver-iodide smoke. 
However, the entire process -- from deciding which clouds to seed, to the delivery strategy, and, 
especially, the determination of whether or not an experiment was successful—was guided by data-
based assessment. Tracing the history and creation of this data—mostly precipitation data—reveals a 
larger landscape of computing work and production, and a much longer history of reconfiguring the 
landscape for this computing work, streaming from the late-nineteenth century to our current big-
data ocean. The information used in Cold War cloud-seeding analysis dates back more than a 
hundred years, to experiments that set precedents in data, analysis, and decision-making still 
impacting the region today. These epistemological and technological projects are inseparable from 
the political projects that drive them.20  
                                               
20 My thinking in this chapter draws from literature on indigenous and postcolonial thought and labor at the 
nexus of data and computing, see: Lisa Nakamura, “Indigenous Circuits: Navajo Women and the 
Racialization of Early Electronic Manufacture,” American Quarterly 66, no. 4 (2014): 919-941; Kim Tallbear, 
“Beyond the Life/Not Life Binary: A Feminist-Indigenous Reading of Cryopreservation, Interspecies 
Thinking and the New Materialisms,” in Cryopolitics: Frozen Life in a Melting World, eds. Joanna Radin and 
Emma Kowal (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017); Kim Tallbear, “The Emergence, Politics, and Marketplace of 
Native American DNA,” in The Routledge Handbook of Science, Technology, and Society, eds. Daniel Lee 
Kleinman and Kelly Moore (London: Routledge, 2014): 21-37; Eden Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries: 
Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011; Eden Medina, “Forensic 
Identification in the Aftermath of Human Rights Crimes in Chile: A Decentered Computer History,” 
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I use the term data streams to stress the importance of precipitation or water information in 
weather and climate modeling, and also to capture the longer political histories and environmental 
impacts of this computing information. Data streams from its origin sources just as it is being 
directed somewhere else, and it transforms the landscape along the way.  
Information used in the mathematical assessment of 1950s cloud-seeding experiments did 
not originate from a single source. Data streamed in from late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century geological, hydrogeological, and meteorological surveys, driven by the National Geological 
Survey and the American Meteorological Service. It was also collected by 1920s and 1930s New 
Deal institutes such as the Soil Conservation Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and after 
WWII, from the formation of rain gauge stations, as will be shown in the following sections. It 
streamed in from private entities such as big oil and smaller state enterprises. Finally, data was 
produced from the physical water modification experiments themselves. What is important in 
visualizing flows of water data used in Cold War cloud-seeding analysis is that the production of this 
information involves complex political processes, of varying impacts. These data streams provide 
context for understanding the longer political and social consequences of these programs.  
I argue that cloud-seeding is a mode of aerial power, which aims to transform and control 
the political and physical environments of the earth below. This  
chapter centers on Arizona and the Navajo nation, within a larger cloud-seeding data economy 
throughout the southwest—Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, California with extensions into Mexico 
and Canada. The Berkeley Statistics Group’s RAIN programs were conducted in Santa Barbara, 
California, but their analysis was entangled with the Arizona experiments. In terms of the temporal 
                                               
Technology & Culture 59, no. 4 (2008): S100-S133. In Critical Data Studies: Craig M. Dalton, Linnet Taylor, Jim 
Thatcher, “Critical Data Studies: A dialog on data and space,” Big Data & Society (2016): 1-9.  
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dimension, cloud-seeding analysis ballooned between 1945-1960, but the data streams originated in 
the late-nineteenth century, with a significant inflection point in the 1930s water scarcity crisis.  
Taking the aerial vantage of Arizona, a larger computing landscape becomes visible. To the 
north east is Navajo and Hopi land, that would become and continue to be a major site and 
laboratory for cloud-seeding experiments throughout the Cold War period. The Salt River and 
adjacent Theodore Roosevelt dam were contested bodies of water in the so-called production of 
artificial precipitation. Tucson, in the southern part of the state, is another important hub in military 
planning. It is also situated near a number of experimental laboratories—watershed gulches and rain 
gauge stations—created to collect precipitation information. The Santa Catalina Mountains 
backdropping Tucson were a major silver-iodide delivery site, because of the conditions of mountain 
air.  
At the foot of the Santa Catalina Mountains are two centers of calculation: Walnut Gulch 
Experimental Station and the Desert Laboratory, geophysical laboratories designed for generating 
and collecting precipitation data. Both remain incredibly important sites in ongoing computing 
analysis. In the context of the U.S. entry into Korea, the state capital, Phoenix, came to serve as a 
command center for military-driven cloud-seeding programs throughout the Southwest region. After 
WWII, Phoenix became an aerial hub for commercial and military flight and a gateway between the 
eastern seaboard and the west. In 1946, Kleberg county capitalists set up the Precipitation Control 
Company there in 1946, creating a demand economy for cloud-seeding experiments throughout the 
region. This computing landscape from Navajo and Hopi land down through the Santa Catalinas 
and west through California, constitutes the epicenter of Cold War cloud-seeding analysis.  
I relate this computing landscape to German technology historian Karl Wittfogel’s notion of 
hydraulic empire, especially his conclusion that “those who control the [water] networks, are uniquely 
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prepared to wield supreme power.”21 Wittfogel’s notion of hydraulic empire is particularly fitting to 
mid-century cloud-seeding experiments and to the longer history of settler colonialist expansion in 
the southwestern regions, even as his original, orientalist thesis counterposes his “hydraulic 
civilizations,” with western societies.22 Wittfogel’s hydraulic empire is premised on the idea that 
whoever controls the water, controls the people. Hydraulic civilizations produce social hierarchies 
and power structures that are built on the unequal distribution of water resources. In his studies, 
Wittfogel focuses on Mesopotamia’s complex irrigation systems and the forceful extraction of labor 
to sustain those systems, but his idea of hydraulic empire is an even more fitting description of the 
processes of American colonial expansion over Mexican and Indigenous territory. Settlers harnessed 
the conditions of water scarcity to achieve control over the southwestern regions.   
 In 1985, Envirotech historian Donald Worster’s 1985, Rivers of Empire revealed the American 
West as a hydraulic empire, tracing politics of those who seized control of water, through riverways, 
damns, and streams in the late-nineteenth century. His study centers geologist Wesley Powell, who 
in the 1890s was director of the U.S. Geological Survey. The arrival of the U.S.G.S. marks the start 
of the data flow, beginning with Powell’s 1890s campaign of “the accumulation of facts for the 
people.”  In the late-nineteenth century, the manipulation of water sources occurred more quickly 
than efforts to document and quantify these transformations. Dams were built, land was seen as 
available to exploit, and there were not yet “a lot of maps and data with farmers poring over 
them.”23 Between 1890-1930, the U.S.G.S. became a major driver of rational survey work in what 
they deemed to be “the arid region,” generating geological and hydrogeological mapping of land and 
                                               
21 Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and Growth of the American West (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1985). 
22 See: Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1957).  
23 Worster, Rivers of Empire, 140. 
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water.24 The enterprise produced libraries of material data in the form of maps, charts, and record 
books, which provided the Geological Survey, and other state and federal bodies with information 
about water resources throughout the western territories, used in remapping the land.25 This was 
driven by a search for water in a land of water scarcity.26 
The formation of western hydraulic empire through the U.S. Geological Survey’s seizure of 
the rivers and streams, and formation of dams, reveals the entangled histories of violence against 
indigenous communities with the emergence of data-systems for tracking and mapping water 
scarcity. Once the USGS was in the game, efforts to control water were structured at the level of 
data and analysis. This data production extended beyond water measurement to the people 
themselves. In Powell’s late-nineteenth-century expeditions along the Western rivers, his 
commission documented the existence of indigenous communities as his anthropological subjects, 
including the Utes of Utah; Pai-Utes of Utah, Northern Arizona, Southern Nevada, and 
Southeastern California; the Go-si Utes of Utah and Nevada; the Northwestern Shoshone of Idaho 
and Utah; and the Western Shoshone of Nevada.27 They created graphs and charts, took 
photographs, and intervened into the communities, “for the purpose of consulting with them 
concerning the propriety of their removal to reservations.”28  
                                               
24 John Wesley Powell, On the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States, with a More Detailed Account of the Lands 
of Utah. With Maps. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879). 
25 For a history of Powell’s harnessing of water, see: John Wesley Powell, ed. Wallace Stenger, C.S. Howard 
(2004, originally published in 1848). “Quality of water of the Colorado River in 1926-1928,” (Water Supply 
Paper 636-A, U.S. Geological Survey, 1929).  
26 Bringing critical attention to Powell’s terminology, Diana K. Davis argues that, “the perception of arid 
lands as wastelands is politically motivated and that these landscapes are variable, biodiverse ecosystems, 
whose inhabitants must be empowered.” See: Diana K. Davis, The Arid Lands: History, Power, and Knowledge 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016).  
27 Don D. Fowler, Robert C. Euler, and Catherine S. Fowler, “John Wesley Powell and the Anthropology of 
the Canyon Country,” Geological Survey Professional Paper 670, Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1969.  
28 United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Report of special commissioners J.W. Powell and G.W. Ingalls 
(Washington: Washington Government Printing Office, 1873): 1.   
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  White settlers occupied land along the water, on the streams and rivers of Utah and 
Colorado. Powell’s USGS. commission reported on the displacement of people from water sources: 
The commission found that the feelings of the white people inhabiting the territory 
under consideration were wrought to the high state of resentment, which frequently 
found vent in indignities on the Indians, while the latter were terrified, and many of 
them had fled to the mountains for refuge.29  
 
Beyond their displacement and forced removal, Native peoples in the southwestern region were 
relegated to subjects of analysis, as part of the larger campaign to rationalize water and land 
resources. Powell’s geological survey incorporated the peoples living along the waterways as 
anthropological subjects. This continued into the twentieth century under the ballooning trends of 
quantitative mapping and survey work. The term ‘southwestern’ itself came into common usage in 
the 1920s and 1930s as part of anthropological studies of indigenous peoples. Prior to this point in 
time, ‘southwestern’ referred to land in the larger Mississippi valley. The newer designation of 
‘southwestern’ became tied to arid climate, drought conditions, and indigenous inhabitants.30  
The designation of the southwest as a racialized arid landscape shaped the sciences of 
climatology and meteorology. In 1930, a prominent Harvard climatologist Robert DeCourcy Ward 
published a somewhat literary piece, How Far Can Man Control His Climate? In it, he surveyed the 
current and sometimes outlandish methods used to guard against fog, frost, and flooding around the 
world. Ward’s broader conclusion was that it was impossible to, “produce rain or change the order 
of nature,” but that “the future will bring further advances in the way of controlling local climates is 
certain.”31 He haughtily addressed the very recent trend of, “numerous so-called “rain-makers” who 
                                               
29 United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, Report of special commissioners J.W. Powell and G.W. Ingalls, 1.   
30 See, for example: Donald D. Brand, “The Status of Anthropology in the Western United States,” New 
Mexico Anthropologist 2, no.1 (1937): 4-16; E.B. Renaud, “Undeformed Prehistoric Skulls from the Southwest,” 
Science New Series, 64, no. 1661 (1926): 430-432; Frank H.H. Roberts, Jr., “Archaeology in the Southwest,” 
American Antiquity 3, no. 1 (1937): 3-33.  
31 Robert DeC. Ward, “How Far Can Man Control His Climate?,” The Scientific Monthly, 30, no. 1 (1930); 18. 
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have plied their trade and often made large profits by contracting with farmers.”32 In the early 
twentieth century, there were “professional rain-makers,” operating in the western United States 
who would promise farmers rain in exchange for money. These were based on “secret methods” 
that involved “mixing chemicals in large tanks.”33   
Stressing his disbelief in rainmaking, Ward wrote, “these “rain-makers are, of course, pure 
fakirs.”34 The word “fakir,” referring to a Muslim religious ascetic, is used here by Ward as a racial 
slur, an explicit reference to his racism and anti-immigration and eugenics policy work, for which he 
was well-known and which directly informed his climatology. For Ward, ‘climate’ included the entire 
ecosystem in a given geographical area and the human races that he deemed were conditioned to 
survive there. His theory of climate related to his theory of racial differences in his eugenic 
philosophy.35 In his own travels, he wrote about the ‘acclimatization’ of white people in foreign 
environments and his research into ‘climate’ earned him prestige and standing in the Association of 
American Geographers, the American Meteorological Society, and more. Taking Wittfogel’s 
hydraulic civilization analytic forward, we see how processes of water control are racialized and 
further how these modes of resource control are built into systems of quantification and scientific 
order.  
Water scarcity is a constant climatic feature of the western landscape, with periods of 
extreme drought as recurrent event. The threat and reality of water scarcity was harnessed 
throughout the 1890 and 1920 period in the formation of geological and hydrogeological mapping. 
There were continued large-scale efforts to establish and control water resources and information in 
                                               
32 Ward, “How Far Can Man Control His Climate?,” 18. 
33 See: C.F. Brooks, “Rain-Makers,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 1, no. 5 (1920): 48.  
34 Ward, “How Far Can Man Control His Climate?,” 13-14. 
35 Robert DeC. Ward, “Climate and Man,” Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 39, no. 12 (1907): 735-
738.  
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the arid western landscape. Hydraulic empire here is not just a matter of resource control, but the 
control of information about water scarcity. From the mid 1920s through the New Deal era, the 
southwestern region was hit with a period of extreme drought. The 1930s were then designated by 
federal and state oversight as a crisis. This crisis catalyzed a movement for data-driven water 
management, which would balloon again in the interwar period—a major inflection-point in my 
designation of (un)certainty work. The drought crisis also catalyzed a large-scale livestock reduction 
program on Navajo, Hopi, and Zuni land, that was justified with quantitative metrics of water 
analysis.  
There are two dimensions to the southwestern New Deal that are needed background for 
understanding the later 1950s, cloud-seeding programs. First is the formation of a computing 
landscape through the widespread creation of rain-gauge networks and experimental stations. 
Second are the 1930s livestock reduction programs that represent a significant, traumatic moment 
revealing how agency over water allocation is appropriated from local decision-makers through 
processes of computation. New Deal logics about the water economy in the indigenous southwest 
were incommensurable with the lived environment. Mid-century cloud-seeding campaigns in this 
region need to be contextualized within this longer history of data-driven water control over 
indigenous and colonized land. It is precisely in times of crisis that the contradictions in decision-
making systems are the most apparent. 
 
Hydroscapes: Rain Gauges and Water Stations    
At the center of 1930s precipitation data production in the Southwestern and western territories, 
were the mapping and measurement technologies—rain gauges. Rain gauges are seemingly 
unremarkable, or simple technologies, but at the nexus of the climate and weather science and the 
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history of computing, rain gauges were vitally important. A major contributor to this movement, the 
Western Snow Conferences, stated in their commencement 1933 proceedings, “The need for 
knowledge of the yearly varying quantity of water in the snow-pack which furnishes varying volumes 
of stream flow to lakes and reservoirs for irrigation and power development is paramount to semi-
arid agriculture in the Western States.”36 If water is life tó éí iiná, to those who inhabit the southwest 
water is also data within a hydraulic empire. Water data is valued as precious information about the 
conditions of drought and aridity that directly informs decisions in agriculture, livestock 
management, resource distribution, and human life in a region. In the interwar period, changes in 
rainfall were studied through the strategic distribution of rain gauges over areas of land. The study of 
rain gauge areas emerged because rainfall is not uniform in a given storm, necessitating the averaging 
of discrete values. In the 1930s, rain-gauge data-mapping projects increased in the southwestern and 
western United States. The physical distribution of rain-gauges was a techno-environmental project, 
which overlaid landscapes with grids-and-clusters of these little measuring devices. The grid 
designated these spaces as research stations and laboratories, a process of turning the earth itself into 
a series of computing landscapes.  
In 1930, a detailed study of desert rainfall, conducted at the Tucson, Arizona’s “Desert 
Laboratory” of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, claimed to be only the second study of 
“rainfall difference on a small area,” using rain gauge technologies.37 The 860-acre Desert Laboratory 
on Tumamoc Hill was originally established in 1903.38 In 1911, Harper’s Magazine writer Ellsworth 
Huntington described the purpose of the station, recounting in dramatic detail the spectacle and 
wonder of the Laboratory. Its guiding epistemological project was cast as a mode of colonial 
                                               
36 https://westernsnowconference.org/biblio?s=year&o=asc 
37 Robert R. Humphrey, “A Detailed Study of Desert Rainfall,” Ecology 14, no. 1(1933): 31.  
38 For a primary history of the laboratory, see: Judith C. Wilder, “The Years of a Desert Laboratory,” The 
Journal of Arizona History 8, no. 3 (1967): 179-199.  
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expansion into an uninhabitable, alien landscape, where life somehow miraculously thrived in the 
cracked earth. But underneath this natural-history expedition, the desert laboratory was a federal 
satellite—understood as a necessary research center in national economy and population control. 
This was driven by a Malthusian anxiety, expressed in a problem: “as population increases, and the 
need of land for cultivation becomes greater, […] “How can a country so dry be made to yield 
food?”39  
This Desert Laboratory, backdropped by the Santa Catalina mountains, was designed for 
long-term data collection, reflecting the eternal nature and timelessness of the desert landscape. As 
the Harper’s Magazine author noted, “The problems [were] not selected with a view to immediate 
“practical” results, although their solution may ultimately be of incalculable importance in the affairs 
of every-day life.”40 Precipitation and hydrogeological research was likewise designed to aggregate 
information over long periods of time. A single rain season, much less a single rainfall, are only 
drops in a bucket of the information needed to make sense of, and control water in the southwest.  
In 1930, Carnegie installed 24 rain gauges throughout the Desert Laboratory, distributed in 
an idealized grid. Sixteen were placed in four rows of four gauges each at intervals of 100 m., 
creating a big square. Eight additional gauges were placed in a straight line at 100 m. intervals from 
the east corner of the square. The gauges were galvanized iron funnels topped by a vertical collar 5 
inches high, inserted through a cork in the top of quart mason jar. Through the creation of this 
experimental laboratory, rainfall data collection in the desert Laboratory commenced. This was a 
data-collection project admitting the uncertainties of environmental conditions, weather and rainfall, 
as well as the uncertainties of quantification, placing all hope on the precarious placement of mason 
                                               
39 Ellsworth Huntington, “The Desert Laboratory,” Harper’s Magazine CXXII, No. DCCXXXI (April 1911): 
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40 Huntington, “The Desert Laboratory,” 655.  
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jars in a 4 x 4 square. With each storm, rain would fall, and the jars would fill. Analysts would 
calibrate the water levels and translate these into numbers, averages, and rainfall records, displayed 
as perfect column by row matrices of precipitation information. This rain gauge station generated a 
widely-circulated corpus of data, even though it represented only 24 points in the sand, and no more 
than 400 meters of the vast southwestern landscape.  
Reports from the Desert Laboratory capture the drive to quantify water scarcity, “Here the 
rainfall, because of its relative scarcity and uncertain distribution, is undoubtedly the most important 
climatic factor to be considered.”41 By the 1940s, the southwestern regions surrounding the Sonoran 
Desert were patchworked with rain gauge stations like the ones in Tuscon’s desert laboratory. 
Meteorology was rooted to agriculture through the study of hydrology, what one statistician referred 
to as “hydro-metrology,” where hydrology is a study of forecasting ground water, swelling, 
precipitation, rivers, streams, and run-off through statistical methods.42 Water data was the most 
valuable scientific currency in the twentieth-century southwest. In the same moment as rain gauge 
networks were first being installed throughout the southwestern region, this information was already 
being translated into decisions about water scarcity.  
 
Drought as Crisis  
A significant inflection point of tensions in water scarcity decision-making was the 1930s 
livestock reduction programs, a devastating New Deal response to the interwar drought crisis.43 The 
federally mandated livestock reduction programs, first implemented in 1933 through the Bureau of 
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Indian Affairs (BIA), were a response to the designated drought crisis throughout the American 
West.44 But they were more urgently a response to a designated crisis of overgrazing, as livestock 
grazing beyond the capacity of the land had devastating impacts on the carrying capacity of the 
environment. Livestock programs were tied directly to hydrogeological politics, as livestock feed 
needed water to grow.   
As sites for political inquiry, sheep, goats, and horses are the living entities at the heart of 
agriculture in the American West. They have been central to histories on livestock reduction 
programs throughout the twentieth century. Historian Marsha Weisiger’s scholarship on livestock 
reduction centers sheep and goats, telling the history of Navajo (Diné) women during livestock 
reduction, the people who were most directly impacted and traumatized by these programs, and who 
led the resistance against the programs at the local, state, and federal levels. Weiseger’s work 
addresses the drastically incommensurable views of livestock animals between the New Deal 
administrative gaze and the Navajo economy. The Navajo home economy was matriarchal and 
centered on goats and sheep to feed and sustain homes, families, and communities. This sharply 
contrasts with the New Deal programs, which were geared to design and order the U.S. economy 
according to patriarchal family units as the quantified nodes of rational production. The official 
justifications for state intervention and appropriation and slaughter of Diné animals were framed as 
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balancing the units of productive analysis for these male-centric households, which were entirely 
incommensurable with the actual matriarchal structure of Navajo home economy. 
New Deal logics were designed around water scarcity. Sheep, according to the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and the Soil Conservation Service, were quantified as units of water analysis. One 
sheep unit was equivalent to one year’s worth of water needed to grow the feed for that sheep.45 
Taking sheep as units of rational production was consistent with the New Deal’s quantitative 
restructuring of family consumption and production towards reaffirming a white patriarchal farm 
society. These expanding systems of model-based planning were further fueled by the 1920s towards 
econometrics and industrial-agricultural management systems. These were rooted in the 
formalization of measurable farm-family units—with the male head of household as primary 
producer, and the wife and children as additional consumers.46  
The ongoing violent slaughter of Navajo and Hopi goats and sheep, at the hands of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Soil Conservation service, was justified as a means of balancing the 
worksheet. While drought conditions in the 1930s American West were very real, and exacerbated 
by conditions of overgrazing in the region, ‘excess’ in livestock ownership was determined by the 
metrics of New Deal rational planning, not by the experience of Navajo and Hopi farmers and 
home managers. And these policies were loudly contested throughout. The 1920s and 30s episodes 
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of drought crisis in the American West, and the generation of information and misinformation in 
response, makes clear that the racialized creation of informal and de facto policies about the 
environment and land allocation, and decisions in their implementation, were reaffirmed at the level 
of data and analysis.  
Following WWII, another drought crisis hit the southwestern region. This crisis gave rise to 
weather modification programs, designed to generate precipitation in the region. A regime of 
“rainmakers” harnessed drought anxieties in the formation of new water policy and quantitative 
control. Their programs carried New Deal precedents in water control and data production that 
forward, now emboldened by WWII technologies and economic systems. Most significantly, 
weather modification was an aerial initiative, aiming to control the southwestern landscape, from the 
sky. Hydraulic empire rose to new heights from 10,000 feet.   
 
Rainmakers  
In 1947, a regional paper reported, “Hopi snake dancers were described today as incensed over the 
white man’s invasion of their realm as rainmakers.”47 The paper was reporting on a recent complaint 
by Hopi people about recent silver-iodide experiments conducted over the Roosevelt Damn on the 
Salt River, northeast of Phoenix. The paper quoted a Hopi commentator as saying, “If white men 
want water, let them do their own dancing and make their own clouds.”48 This newspaper report 
captures some of the contradictions in the term ‘rainmaker.’ Rainmaking is a term used in the article 
to refer to the rain dancing ceremonies of the Hopi and Zuñi people. Rain dance ceremonies are an 
indigenous concept and custom that in the twentieth century, had been requisitioned as the scientific 
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control over nature.49 The term “rain-making” was appropriated throughout the twentieth century, 
by white administrators, scientists, capitalists, and meteorologists, who promised to make artificial 
rain through aerial interventions. In the early 1950s cloud seeding campaigns, traditional Hopi 
dances were racialized as “primitive” and efforts to control rain through literally bombing clouds 
were upheld as “modern.”  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I use ‘rainmakers’ for the people and institutions that directly contributed to 
designing artificial rain and the formation of the cloud seeding data-economy. The term is a very 
prominent actor’s category, primarily used by those with a for-profit interest to convince the public 
that they could generate artificial rain. I extend the term to the entire network of interests working 
on the cloud-seeding experimental programs, in order to underscore the fact that none of these 
programs were politically neutral. My use of the actor’s category, rainmaker, should be read in the 
context of its conflicts and contradictions, which persist throughout the cloud-seeding enterprise. 
My direct focus is on two specific groups of rainmakers that have been largely overlooked in the 
historiography on Cold War weather modification programs: statistical and algorithmic thinkers and 
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413-432.  
Figure 32: “Rain Making Firm Takes Mexico Jobs,” The 
Arizona Republic, Sunday, May 29, 1949. 
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private for-profit capitalists, who explicitly identified themselves as ‘rainmakers.’ Beyond the 
technical and political work of the Berkeley Statistics Group, I study the expanding programs of the 
Arizona Precipitation Control Company (PCC).  
 Throughout the 1950s, the Precipitation Control Company, headquartered in the semi-arid 
Kleberg County, Arizona, executed cloud-seeding experiments over Arizona, California, Navajo and 
Hopi land, and Coahuila, Mexico. There were two dimensions to producing these programs: 
acquiring technological resources and creating a public need. By the start of the Korean War, the 
Kleberg County rainmakers were successful in accruing technological and monetary resources left 
over by WWII. For example, they acquired WWII machinery and commissioned military workers in 
the U.S. and Mexico to redesign aerial bombers as cloud-seeding machines. They also came into 
possession of ground generators used for cloud and smoke-screen research during WWII. As 
pictured in the newspaper clip, “Cloud Busting Mapped for the Coahuila Area,” the PCC worked 
with Mexican Air Force personnel and agricultural administrators to extend these programs to the 
Coahuila region. Following this meeting, Mexican agricultural financier Federico Sanchez stated, 
“We feel that our people can be benefited by this new rainmaking method.”50 In a spirit of 
entrepreneurship, the PCC repurposed second-hand military technology for generating a profit 
economy in agriculture.    
 The second dimension to the PCC’s rainmaking initiative was to generate a demand 
economy and need for cloud-seeding programs. This was part of a larger trend of military, 
government, and private interests working in local and regional contexts to harness resources from 
those most in need of rain. Money was harnessed from agricultural administrators and farming 
groups from Northern Mexico, the Navajo Nation Council, and farming townships throughout the 
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southwestern United States to the Saskatchewan and Manitoba regions of Canada. Common 
throughout the growing forced-demand economy was that experiments were conducted over 
indigenous land and funded by local farmers. Rainmakers harnessed resources from a wide and 
diverse set of agricultural interests to fund their cloud seeding programs. It was an atmospheric 
initiative that promised artificial rain to a needy public, through transforming public land and sky 
into an experimental laboratory.  
Entities like the Kleberg County rainmakers directly contributed to the production of 
physical cloud-seed experiments, as well as the generation of cloud-seeding data and a growing 
computing landscape. This is to say that those who sought expand cloud-seeding enterprise for-
profit converged with analysts commissioned as “objective observers,” contributing to a growing 
computing network on the transnational stage geared to stabilize a mode of (un)certainty work over 
weather control. By the early 1960s, a widespread public backlash against the programs would situate 
the Precipitation Control Company in Phoenix, Arizona, and the Berkeley Statistics Group in 
Northern, California as oppositional forces on the question of accuracy.   
The Berkeley Statistics Group entered into cloud-seeding from a different vantage. In the 
1920s and 1930s, mathematical-statistical analysis rapidly integrated into meteorological and 
hydrogeological data collection processes in the United States. By the early 1950s, State survey 
bodies were eager to officiate contracts for their mathematics departments, as they wanted to 
maintain relevance in government and policy decision-making, in the postwar world. Cloud seeding 
provoked the interest of a number of burgeoning data-science and computing outfits centered in 
universities or private and government centers. It was an opportunity to assert state and public 
relevancy in the postwar economy. These computing outfits were interested in consolidating and 
standardizing the way weather data was processed and analyzed via new mathematical methods.  
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In March of 1952, a contract was made between the State Water Resources Board the 
University of California Regents titled: "Statistical investigation of precipitation with particular 
reference to rain making operations." The “contractor” in this case was the Berkeley Statistics 
Group at the University of California, Berkeley. In its first year, Jerzy Neyman and Elizabeth Scott 
began their data collection process, which was a painstaking process. Their eventual network of data 
contributors included meteorological institutes, oil companies, military consultants, public works 
administrators mostly in water management, and other university groups working on weather 
modification. The contributors held varying rationales for having collected data in the first place and 
varying interests in their willingness to share or exchange information. For example, competing 
research groups at other universities, even as close as Stanford University, were resistant to share 
their data.  
The statistics group obtained information about potential sources through informal talks 
with relevant parties, through letter writing, at conferences, or hassling central agencies interested in 
weather information, especially the National Weather Bureau. In other words, much of the initial 
data accumulation was hearsay about the locations of existing information and the identities of 
people who might have collected, managed, and preserved that information. In July of 1952, for 
example, Neyman wrote C.D. Ball, the General Superintendent of the Standard Oil Company of 
California, to request a copy of their sporadic California records on ‘rainage’ in the southwestern San 
Joaquin Valley and adjacent areas as well as several years of records obtained at Estero Bay. This 
piecemeal gathering of existing information constituted the mathematicians’ early 1950s rainmaking 
database.  
These patchwork efforts to centralize a precipitation database delinked information from the 
earthly conditions in which it was created. A measure of precipitation is a statistical estimation or 
averaging of water levels in a designed region of water analysis that is limited by technologies and 
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data practices. It is a measure of unknowability, and an effort to grasp control over fleeting weather 
conditions. These unreliable measurements represent nodes of designed certainty in unstable 
systems of water collection and analysis. Conditions ranging from variability in weather systems, to a 
lack of homogeneity in rainfall, inconsistent placement of rain-gauge technologies, and shaky 
systems of data collection and analysis all contribute to this instability.  
However, this same data holds very real political value in resource decision-making on the 
ground level. This information is used to make decisions about life on earth. These computing 
landscapes, and the computing systems designed to manage them, are not neutral. As with earlier 
case studies in this dissertation, the commissioned RAIN project and analysis created by the 
Berkeley Statistics Group were part of a larger international program to design certainty in the 
context of social and economic crisis echoing the new deal era—the recurrent drought crisis.  
 
Navajo (Diné) Skies and Arizona Rain in the Context of Korea 
 Efforts to quantify the skies between 1945 and 1955, directly link domestic water control in 
the United States to the Pacific proxy wars. The first wave of cloud-seeding programs occurred at 
the start of the U.S. war in Korea. As the United States military mobilized for entry into Korea, rain 
makers in the U.S. Southwest mobilized new infrastructures for aerial-driven cloud-seed 
experimentation, data collection, and quantitative analysis over domestic territory. Efforts to design 
systems and infrastructures for aerial bombing abroad reflected the internal militarization of the 
southwestern skies. Domestic programs purported to “control the weather” for public good, even as 
they abided a strict military lexicon. From the vantage of military research and development, the 
Korean War provided a needed opportunity for recovering weapons research and analysis programs. 
It was an opportunity to redeem their embarrassingly inefficient management of the aerial bombing 
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economy during WWII by improving their programs. It was believed that with more efficient 
weapons testing and mathematical oversight came the possibility of more profitable enterprise.  
After 1945, Vannevar Bush’s Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) had 
officially stated a directive of ‘peacetime’ research. But while the Pentagon nominally moved into 
peacetime spending, funding for Operations Research projects, mathematical ballistics analysis, and 
algorithmic directed management of military resources ballooned. The Manhattan Project funding 
that had purportedly dried up in the transition to peacetime research was reallocated to the 
advancement of algorithmic systems and resource management.  
Between 1950 and 1953, Pentagon and military spending increased for the continued testing 
of probability-led experiments, to sustain the growing labor of calculation. This was manifest in new 
computing education programs, bureaucratic reorganization, and the formation of new systems for 
circulating destruction data. The Pacific theatres and North Korean soil were transformed into large-
scale laboratories, where tonnages of bombs were dropped generating a swell of destruction data. 
This information was fed back into algorithmic data-management research in the United States. 
There, the Pentagon allocated funding for internal computing projects, like Project S.C.O.O.P., for 
the development of the simplex algorithm to manage military resource allocation. At the same time, 
university mathematics departments received new military contracts similar to their wartime 
programs. Ideological threats of communism in Korea thinly veiled an enthusiastic expansion of 
military programs and computational testing. 
This growing economy of bomb-data production and weapons analysis boosted 
development of digital computing “war machines” in U.S. institutions. Electronic memory-stored 
computers in use during the war in Korea included the Harvard Mark 1, or the IBM Automatic 
Sequence Controlled Calculator. The overarching dream was to construct an artificially managed 
military database to oversee military activity throughout the postwar world. The hope was that these 
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machines would help wrangle the daily onslaught of ballistics information that they were tasked with 
organizing, and thereby render the daily activities of military field agents efficient, rote, and sensible. 
These calculators were imagined to stabilize and manage the ascendant modes of data-driven aerial 
governance on the world stage in occupied and wartime contexts, an ambition for aerial control that 
had not yet been achieved.  
Weather modification programs in North America were an extension of the Cold War proxy 
wars. The ambition to control the skies through quantitative governance was shared between 
rainmakers in the southwest and military personnel in the occupied Pacific. Rainmakers and 
bombardiers shared the ambition to quantify the skies through the epistemological and experimental 
world of probability. This (un)certainty work was stabilized by technologies and infrastructures 
needed to sustain it. In this context, Phoenix, Arizona was the Pentagon of water modification 
programs and resource control in the Southwest. The city did not necessarily hold monopoly over 
the expanding water resource institutes; these were spread throughout Colorado, California, and 
New Mexico. But Phoenix was the geographical center of Southwestern cloud-seeding programs, 
and the home of the Kleberg County rainmakers. It also served as a nominal command center in 
resource experimentation and decision-making throughout the Southwest territories, decentering 
and marginalizing Navajo and Hopi councils in resource decision-making and the management of 
water.    
Many interests converged to shape the semi-arid Southwestern landscape into a data-driven 
desert laboratory and computing landscape. This story cannot be reduced to military oversight, as 
private enterprises such as the Kleberg County rainmakers harnessed funding from a patchwork of 
state and local interests. In fact, by decentering military and federal oversight in this history, other 
actors emerge on the stage, shedding light on the complexity of contested water resources in the 
region. At the same time, these programs were saturated with military funding, technology, and logic 
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systems, even as rainmakers promised water as a public good. This was a mass mobilization effort, 
that upon closer look, reveals significant complexities, and a grasp for control over decision-making 
about ground water data.  
On July 15, 1950, mechanical engineer Dr. Vincent J. Schaefer arrived in Phoenix, Arizona 
for a meeting with regional water administrators, to map out a new watershed experimental station 
in the valley. Schaefer was by then widely-known for the silver-iodide method and experimental 
physics. But on this visit, he was serving in his capacity of research associate for General Electric 
laboratories. His employment with General Electric stretched back to WWII, where he had gained 
considerable experience with smoke and particle experimentation, over large landscapes. Employed 
by General Electric Co., and funded by the United States Army, Schaefer and partner physicist 
Irving Langmuir conducted smoke screen and artificial cloud experiments over hundreds of miles of 
land and sky.51 Their work aimed to theorize cloud and smoke phenomena in outdoor contexts, as 
they worked to stabilize military control of land visibility from the aerial vantage.  
Smoke and cloud experimentation required technological machinery that consumed material 
resources in large quantities. Smoke screens were primarily produced with ground generators. These 
machines consumed tonnages of oil and water, as oil was converted into controllable smoke 
material. The large amount of funding feeding WWII smoke screen programs, which utilized 
cutting-edge military technology, set a precedent in the technological infrastructures behind artificial 
rain experiments.  
On this hot July day in Phoenix, Arizona, just a few weeks after the U.S. start of the Korean 
War, Schaefer was visiting to oversee plans for a proposed experimental Watershed area, which 
                                               
51 For an account of their wartime research conducted under a National Defense Research Committee 
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would be used to collect data on rainfall, ground swelling, and other precipitation measures. The 
proposed watershed would be an area of dug-out earth on the edge of Arizona’s Santa Catalina 
mountains.  
Over the course of the Cold War, and still today, Walnut Gulch experimental station, like the 
Desert Laboratory, was a ‘controlled’ experimental environment for generating and collecting rainfall 
and ground swell precipitation information. Experimental stations, like Walnut Gulch, were 
geophysical centers of calculation in hydrogeological and meteorological analysis. These 
experimental spaces served as important nodes for producing weather and climate data and 
ultimately, for shaping decision-making systems and policy over the region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The July 1950 meeting offers a perfect portrait of the represented interests in hydro-resource 
oversight in the region. Pictured here are the four administrators and scientists who held 
unrestrained authority in developing hydrogeological projects and weather experimentation. Vincent 
Schaefer sits center, sketching out a map of the Arizona Valley, the proposed experimental 
watershed area. Posed around him are R.J. McMullin, manager of Salt River Valley Water Users 
Association, R.D. Searles, Water Users’ president, and S.A. Ward, manager of the Salt River Power 
Figure 33: “Rain Making Pioneer Hints Weather Control,” 
Arizona Republic, July 16, 1950. 
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District. Searles of the River Valley Water Users had already spent over $120,000 on cloud-seeding 
since 1947. This gives a clear picture of the powers of resource management and control in the 
southwestern region, which aimed to reaffirm their position through the weather modification 
programs. It further depicts the fact that aerial cloud-seeding experiments were designed to reaffirm 
extant and newly-minted water control centers on the ground.   
While the demand economy for cloud-seeding programs would emerge from various local 
and regional contracts and individual programs, the military set a precedent in unregulated aerial 
experimentation. Schaefer’s trip to Tucson came right after his involvement with ‘Project Cirrus,’ a 
military cloud-seeding experiment currently active in New Mexico.52 Other programs included 
‘Project Stormfury’ and ‘Project Firesky.’ At this point the process and results of the experiments 
carried forward a wartime display of secrecy: “What happened in the two weeks experiment is 
known only to residents of New Mexico and Dr. Schaefer and his associates.” This military backing 
gave tremendous authority to scientists like Shaefer who served as liaison between the military and 
local administrators. The Arizona Republic, wrote, “The first man to make the heavens weep— 
[Vincent J. Shaefer]—believes tremendous strides have been made toward human control of 
weather.”53 This hubris was counter-weighted by the work still needed to be done to bring these 
programs to fruition, from experimentation, to data collection and analysis, to establishing systems 
and protocols for decision-making after the rain. Human control of the weather, even as practiced 
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by anointed demigods such as Vincent Shaefer, was still very much beyond the horizon of 
possibility.  
Not in attendance at this July 1950 meeting were representatives from the Navajo and Hopi 
communities, even though their communities were and are the most vulnerable to water scarcity. 
The expansion of infrastructures for cloud-seed weather modification programs occurred 
simultaneously with the appropriation of Navajo and Hopi ground resources through state and 
federal mandates. And these two programs were not distinct, as private rainmakers appropriated 
funds from Navajo and Hopi decision-makers directly into their cloud-seeding experiments.  
Military-led cloud-seeding programs in the southwest opened the skies to private enterprise.   
Just the week prior to arriving in Tuscon, Schaefer had convened in Phoenix with Charles Barnes, 
president of the Precipitation Control Company (PCC), which was reported to have “contracts with 
various groups in Arizona to put moisture on the ground.”54 As described earlier, Charles Barnes 
founded the PCC in the immediate aftermath of WWII. The company had since worked to acquire 
and repurpose wartime technologies, predominantly ground generators and retired B-52 bombers, 
for the development of cloud-seeding programs. While official military and federal programs created 
huge throughways for aerial-weather modification in the region, it was these semi-private companies 
and firms that were generating interest on the ground.  
The PCC worked to acquire seasonal resource and water funds from local and regional farm 
organizations, at the city, county, and even town levels. A major interest of theirs was in the Navajo 
Resource Council, as this was a means of appropriating federal relief and rehabilitation funds.   
The Precipitation Control Company first solicited funds from the Navajo Resource Council 
in 1945. Charles Barnes had inroads with his primary point-person, Navajo councilmen, Howard 
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Gorman. Over the next few years, Gorman would be an enthusiastic proponent for cloud-seed 
programs, to such a degree that he earned the nickname “rain boy” by his Navajo community. 
Gorman’s interest in cloud-seeding resonated with his larger initiatives over the past two decades in 
expanding Navajo wage-labor force outside of the reservation. Gorman had been centrally involved 
during the New Deal programs, as he served as liaison between the BIA and the Diné and was 
personally traumatized by his witness of livestock slaughters in Ganado.55 From 1938-1942, Gorman 
was vice chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, and he would represent Ganado on the council for 
another three decades. In the period following WWII, he worked as liaison between Navajo workers 
and industrialists interested in their land and labor resources.  
The integration of work-wage labor and the massive extraction of Navajoland resources by 
external interests, set precedent for state and industrialist appropriation of indigenous resources and 
labor in forming the cloud-seeding economy. A major shift in labor conditions occurred during 
WWII, as Navajo men were commissioned for resource-related work outside of the reservation, 
usually pertaining to energy work in steel, coal, and uranium mining.56 This was in the context of a 
much-larger drive to extract natural resources, especially uranium from Navajo territory.57  
In 1949, Gorman first appealed to the Navajo Resource Council to hire a rainmaker. When 
C.B. Barnes of Arizona’s Precipitation Control Company solicited funds for an initial set of 
experiments, he was chasing a storm up from El Paso, Texas. Gorman appealed to the Navajo 
National Council in 1949 to hire a rainmaker. The council initially funded the PCC with $2,500 to 
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begin the cloud seeding programs. The decision was not unanimous, with an almost 50% split 
against. To be cautious, they set aside 5,000 as a relief fund, should the programs not work, to be 
able to carry water to their sheep. Barnes was instructed to steer clear of Hopi land. The Albuquerque 
Journal reported that, “The Navajos are going to trust to the white rain-makers, but the Hopis 
continue their trust in their rain dances.58 Echoing of New Deal policy, the solicitation of funds 
from Navajo council for cloud-seeding experiments became part of a larger state and federal interest 
in directly appropriating resources for resource management programs.   
On April 19th, 1950, the federal government mandated an Act “To promote the 
rehabilitation of the Navajo and Hopi Tribes of Indians and a better utilization of the resources of 
the Navajo and Hopi Indian Reservations, and for other purposes.”59 The ‘rehabilitation’ bill had 
been in the making for some time, and it was hotly contested. The bill had become a stand-in for 
debating the Indian commissioner John Collier’s destructive policies of the last 15 years. Collier 
opposed the bill and so this gave many a good reason to support it. As things progressed, dissent 
increased. In 1949, newspapers reported on oppositional voices in the Navajo and Hopi tribal 
councils. In negotiating the proposed congressional rehabilitation fund, upwards of $100,000,000, 
there were conflicting visions of how those monetary resources would be used. Some local Indian 
Welfare groups favored putting the bill in front of Truman, primarily because they opposed Indian 
commissioner Collier. The 1950 rehabilitation bill was a new iteration of an old dynamic describing 
federal oversight of indigenous territory, reinscribing existing tensions between state administrative 
entities, and Native decision-makers, over the management of water resources in the region. The 
legacy of the livestock programs echoed in these new rehabilitation efforts.  
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After being denied by the Navajo council for a second round of cloud-seeding experiments, 
the PCC directly appropriated rehabilitation funds from state oversight, arguing that this was 
towards the advancement of weather modification programs. This set a precedent in appropriating 
contested funds for allocation of water resources in the region for weather-modification research. 
The PCC was not the only semi-private cloud-seeding enterprise operating in the region. Another 
private enterprise was the Water Resources Development Corporation of Denver, Colorado 
(WRDC), run by Dr. Irving P. Krick. The WRDC was a enterprise identical in kind to the PCC. In 
the early 1950s period, the WRDC worked to collect funds, county by county throughout the greater 
western regions, and this work would eventually extend internationally. In New Mexico, the WRDC 
had solicited cloud-seeding funds from ranchers, who by 1951 were already skeptical of Krick’s 
promises.60 And this stretched northwards, in the 1951 season, seven northeastern Wyoming 
counties and one southeastern Montana county contributed to the overall cost of the cloud-seeding 
operations carried on by the WDRC of Denver.61 On March 6th, 1952, in Colorado, 400 county 
farmers voted to allocate $7,000 of their seasonal funds to the WRDC, in the hopes that the ground 
generator and silver-iodide method interventions might alter the precipitation levels of their clouds.62  
Ground level solicitation of interest, acquisition, and appropriation of funds from local 
farmers contributed to a growing demand economy for cloud-seeding programs. Information 
generated from their experiments eventually streamed into a much larger computing enterprise, 
geared to stabilize and make sense of weather modification in the region. The initial surge of these 
cowboy driven experiments, emboldened by the war in Korea, were followed by efforts to quantify 
and assess the outcomes.  
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The political, administrative, and scientific actors on the ground, who represented the Republic of Arizona, 
and who were working to harness control of ground water resources through intervention in the skies, relegated their 
authority to mathematical decision-makers. Cloud-seeding was always a dual-experimental program, 
involving the physical-environmental interventions as well as the production of experimental data 
and analysis. Physical experiments conducted in the Arizona skies were deemed early-stage events, in 
what was anticipated to be a 5-10 year wait for data accumulation towards a comprehensive data 
analysis. At that same July 1950 meeting, Schaefer and Irving Langmuir remarked that, “We are now 
through with the field work. For the next year we expect to be working on the evaluation of all the 
rainmaking work that had been going on all over the world. From this evaluation may arise new 
problems, or there may come the answers to a good many things (sic).”63 Already by 1950, 
rainmakers relegated the authority of weather-modification to data analysts. They believed that 
answers to the success and reliability of the programs, and the potential for human control of the 
weather, would come through computing expertise.  
Cloud-seeding programs were asserted by military, state, and private interests as a needed 
solution to agricultural uncertainties. This was the primary justification for the programs. But the 
adoption of cloud-seeding programs as agricultural ‘solution’ was not uniformly accepted, and a 
closer look reveals the complexities in aerial-agricultural planning, as they relate to data analysis and 
resource decision-making on the ground. Returning weather and climate control back to earth 
uncovers political discontents in decision-making that are not visible from 10,000 feet. The politics 
of the airways are not distinct from the politics of the ground, and especially with cloud-seed 
programs geared to control precipitation levels and water resources, it is important to ask, for what 
and, for whom? This is a question of whether techno-mathematical interventions into the weather 
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were designed towards economic and environmental equality, or to reaffirm extant and emergent 
water politics on the ground.  
 
Rain-Gauge Uncertainty Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following WWII, a significant shift occurred in statistical planning, decision-making systems, 
and predictive analysis over weather control. This shift involved the formation of precipitation data-
collection systems, as treated in the data streams section, and a new mode of making-sense of data 
through regression analysis and (un)certainty work. Regression analysis, probability tables, 
hypothesis testing, and confidence intervals comprised the analytic-apparatus of Cold War weather-
modification assessment. In the 1950s, new mathematical frameworks for analyzing statistical 
significance and outcomes were implemented to assess the viability of cloud-seeding experiments 
around the globe. Motivated by the Cold War planning virtues of optimality and efficiency, an 
international network of cloud-seed analysts, went to work to determine a singular and standard 
Figure 34: Robert R. Humphrey, “A Detailed Study of 
Desert Rainfall,” Ecology 14, no. 1(1933): 31. 
  226 
method of analysis. Their (un)certainty work translated preexisting precipitation data and 
information collected from military and private-enterprise cloud-seeding programs into valued 
material that would be used in forming larger infrastructures for quantitative and algorithmic 
decision-making.  
From World War II through the 1970s, rain-gauge generated precipitation data and mapping 
analysis was the base information body in weather modification assessment. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, this data streamed through an evolution of decision-making practices, from the 
initial modes of collection and regression analysis, to confidence maps, to algorithmic decision-trees, 
and Monte Carlo programs, that would be of more common usage by the 1970s. Late Cold War 
advancements in radar and satellite technology would come to supplement and displace rain-gauge 
technology as the predominant source of information. However, the streams of precipitation 
information, generated within these earlier twentieth-century computing landscapes, relied on rain-
gauge technologies as the primary data source. Rain gauge technology informs these mathematical-
epistemological frameworks and is also the root of analytic uncertainty. Water captured in the 
Sonoran Desert was abstracted from its local conditions, but not entirely, as uncertainty was first 
calculated in the base design and placement of the mason jars. 
In 1950, the University of California, Berkeley and the State Department of Public Works, 
Division of Water Resources, commissioned the Berkeley Statistics Group for their RAIN 
programs. The programs aimed to design a rain making experiment for the region, involving both 
the design of silver-iodide interventions as well as the design of the computational analysis. At this 
point in time, the group used information from the Arizona experiments, and experiments 
conducted internationally, as a blueprint for their own experimental design. This began with a 
happenstance data-collection project, as the quantitative assessment of clouds, by the current 
methods, required a large and complete database: 
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…efforts will be made to organize a continuing statistical follow-up for treatment of 
those future rain making attempts which will be going on independently of the 
controlled experiment. It is hoped that within a few years it will be possible to collect 
and to analyze enough data to lead to the final authoritative conclusion regarding the 
important problem of artificial rain making.64  
 
Their experimental design hinged on the collection of “basic rain data.”65 Some basic data was 
available from already existing New Deal entities, such as the Western Snow Conferences, who had 
already collected large-bodies of hydrogeological information in their water scarcity programs.   
A majority of the basic rain data came from the ground stations. The analysts worked to 
pool information generated in a number of “rain-gauge stations,” for their central precipitation 
database. By the early 1950s, the U.S. Weather Bureau of Washington D.C. was operating a number 
of stations, and so the Bureau held oversight on the data. The Berkeley Statistics Group traced 
streams of information to this source, and in 1952, Jerzy Neyman wrote the chief of the Weather 
Bureau, “Data from these stations are urgently required [we are] seeking satisfactory statistical 
methods for the valuation of attempts at the artificial production and/or control of artificial rainfall 
by private operators.”66 In addition to national enterprises, the group focused on a collective of 
regional stations in South Central California, including the La Panza Ranch, Cholame Hatch Ranch, 
Taft, Huasna, Cuyama R.S. and Cuyaman rain-gauge stations.67  
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Federal oversight did not hold a monopoly on rain gauge stations. Private money and capital 
were another major source of precipitation information. One such entity was the Standard Oil 
Company of California, who was rumored to have kept a fairly complete weather record at their San 
Francisco Bay refinery for the past 100 years. Permission to obtain the rain gauge records of 
Standard Oil depended entirely on building personal relationships, as this was a private company. In 
customary confidence-planning form, Neyman requested information from them that would address 
as many dimensions of uncertainty as possible—time frames, location, the frequency of 
measurement, and the availability of the information.  
Ideally, the Berkeley Statistics Group desired to obtain as detailed information as possible. 
Precipitation data was a frequentist statistical project that relied on the aggregation of many data 
points. In some cases, they requested daily and even hour-by-hour rainfall information, hoping that 
at some sites, human technicians had calibrated their rain gauges on an hourly basis. For the material 
exchange, the group requested this information to be transcribed, “on manuscript forms, on 
Figure 35:  RAIN—Water Resources Corres. 
1952-6/52. Neyman Papers, Carton 7, Berkeley. 
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microfilm, or on punchcards.”68 They wanted the data to move as quickly as possible from rain 
gauge to computing machines. While a lot of their initial work was still conducted by hand 
calculation, they anticipated the labor of calculation to grow. Over the next decade, their cloud-seed 
probability tables would be aided by digital computing machines, such as the IBM 701.69 Through 
the design of their analysis, they imagined a larger computing landscape, with a more dense and 
wider distribution of rain-gauge technologies. The more rain-gauge data generated, the higher their 
confidence levels in the information.  
(Un)certainty work then began at the level of the rain gauge, as probability tables were 
created to assess the confidence that individual rain gauges were accurately reporting rainfall 
measures. “The nature and timing of physical measurements likely to improve the precision of the 
experiment and, at the same time provide important information on the mechanism of rainfall 
[…].”70 It then extended to the scale of the entire network of rain gauges, or hydroscapes, to assess 
confidence levels about how well the geophysical placement of these rain gauges captured accurate 
rainfall measures. They calculated precipitation data averages, in inches, at each rain gauge node, and 
then calculated averages for areas of nodes in the region or “target areas.” They then compared 
regressions of these target areas, before and after seeding, and against the controlled or “not seeded” 
areas. A probability of significance was calculated for each target area and each silver-iodide 
experiment. The probability of significance value represented whether or not the silver-iodide 
experiments had an effect on the precipitation capacity of the clouds. Their regional analysis in 
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California fed into a much larger computing program occurring throughout the southwestern region 
and internationally.  
 
Quantitative Skies  
The California cloud-seed experiments were independently commission by regional entities such as 
the California State Water Board and the University of California. Regional entities held an interest 
in the outcomes of the experiments, as they would be liable for any health risks associated with the 
experiments. Beyond the local farm union resources funneled into the experiments, they were also 
being funded by state money allocated to water management and resource, as with the Arizona 
administrators who were, already by 1950, channeling hundreds-of-thousands of dollars of public 
money into artificial rain. The California analysis was also operating as part of a much larger 
enterprise involving a growing network of artificial rain analysts, who exchanged data, methods, and 
other information in order to assess the viability of cloud-seeding methods. Throughout the 1950s, 
this cadre of computers was commissioned by national and regional entities to be “objective 
observers” in the growing cloud-seed economy. They were likewise stationed at regional institutes 
throughout the United States and beyond.  
 One such regionally-managed entity was the National Weather Improvement Association, 
Inc. (NWIA), By the early 1950s, the NWIA positioned itself as a central oversight in weather 
modification programs.71 NWIA was headquartered in Denver, Colorado. The institute was also a 
meeting point in facilitating mathematical and computation cloud-seed analysis. In July of 1952, a 
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Denver meeting on the “Weather Modification Operations Analysis Project” brought together 
representative interests from American Institute of Aerological Research, the Weather Bureau, 
California Electric Power Company, university physicists, engineers, and climatologists, Denver 
Water Board, Colorado State Weather Control Board, Water Resources Development Corporation, 
and others. The representatives at this meeting show the patchwork of local and state interests 
coming together on these programs, “… in the hope that a comprehensive manual of techniques 
could be devised over a period of time, and that the Association might, as a neutral organization, 
assist every evaluator in obtaining current, accurate information and data concerning the subject of 
weather modification.”72 This was a search for a standard method of analysis for assessing the 
effectiveness of cloud-seeding operations.  
 In the early 1950s, analysts commissioned by local and state bodies throughout the United 
States, Canada, and the world, began to organize a larger uncertainty computing collective, towards 
achieving quantitative command and control over the skies. This program involved people from 
many different institutional bodies. “Universities and scientists cannot avoid being drawn into the 
investigation of matters of high public interest. When the public wants answers, it will have them, 
one way or another.”73 The Berkeley Statistics Group was commissioned in the early 1950s by the 
California Water Board and UC Berkeley’s board of regents. Local and state bodies held legal and 
monetary interest in the success of cloud-seeding and weather modification programs. Since many of 
these local interests had reallocated designated water resources towards the experiments, they were 
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possibly liable for any detrimental or failed outcomes, and they desired a profitable outcome on their 
investments.  
The larger analysis project involved an international circulation of data, methods, and 
analysis that would continue through the 1960s and 1970s. This included exchanging local analysis 
of seasonal records and comparisons with analysis of individual storms and “the dissemination of 
materials on current thinking,” such as the use of confidence intervals in assessment as opposed to 
other methods of analysis. While the previously-described probability analysis, conducted at the scale 
of the rain gauge and rain gauge maps, very much resembled the interwar uncertainty programs, the 
larger movement for a quantified sky followed from trends in operations research and algorithmic 
systems analysis currently being used to manage military resources in the context of the Cold War.  
Cloud-seeding work was not distinct from the military context. The project sought a general 
method of analysis over the many facets of the programs from data collection to the orchestration of 
the physical experiments themselves. The culture of seeking out general and optimal solutions was 
part of research into efficient logistics that had ballooned during WWII and that was currently in 
operation. This was a search for optimal methods of calculation yielding yes/no outcomes. The 
cloud-seeding analysis was geared to mimic such an effort by describing cloud-seed agents as 
rational actors, for example: “The operator is concerned with finding the optimum number of 
generators per unit of ground, in order to minimize his operating costs.”74 The larger analysis project 
was driven by minimum-maximum profit logics that they deemed would trickle down to the farmers 
themselves. The farmer then became an agent within the systems analysis, as captured in this 
analyst’s description: “The farmer is concerned with the timing of the storms, and maximizing 
precipitation from specific storms at specific times, may be best served by the same type of 
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analysis.”75 Here the local farmer was transfigured into an operations researcher and rainmaker, who 
could maximize storm precipitation and increase the profit margins of their field.  
 
Calculating “Neutrality”: Towards the Cloud Computing Method   
Despite the grand design of a system of strategic operators, uncertainty saturated the entire 
program from data management to analysis. In terms of uncertainty management, cloud-seeding 
programs constituted a leaky system. When one part of the experiment was held still, and confidence 
intervals were calculated, uncertainty would leak out of another side. This was a program of 
(un)certainty work, and it was the job of the analysts to tame this relentlessly ephemeral subject. For 
the analysts, the undergirding uncertainty problem was a general lack of knowledge of the processes 
of precipitation, viewed as incomplete. “To fill [knowledge] gaps, it is necessary to use statistical 
methods of analysis, by which estimates can be obtained of the likelihood that given phenomena 
would have occurred naturally.”76 Probabilistic thinking reigned over the entire epistemological 
project—it was believed that unknowability about natural processes of water and weather could only 
be managed with statistical methods of calculation. So, both the problem and the guiding 
assumption were that incomplete knowledge was inherently probabilistic.  
(Un)certainty work breeds more (un)certainty work. Uncertainty tools became the object of 
project analysis, an epistemic process embodied in confidence interval calculations. Confidence 
intervals were used to quantify the levels of tractable uncertainty within a designed cloud-seeding 
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experiment, while bounding the intractable uncertainty. The general problem of a lack-of-knowledge 
was thereby relegated to the, “limitations of statistical methods,” currently guiding experimental 
analysis. 77 The statisticians expressed the resignation to these limitations: “At best statistical method 
can only estimate the effect, and not the operation, of unknown factors.” “It is mechanical, and the 
finest electronic computer faces the limitations of the material with which it is presented.”78 This 
acknowledges the fact that the philosophical issues with the program could not be overcome with 
more advanced technology; they had to be solved at the level of analytic architecture. The 
assumption of incomplete knowledge was transfigured into a problem of experimental design, and 
the design of the experiment and the methods used became the entire epistemological project.  
This reinforces again Phaedra Daipha’s statement that, “No one can master deep 
uncertainty—but they certainly are masters at mastering uncertainty.”79 
Confidence intervals wrangled experimental uncertainty by quantifying its limits within an 
imperfect dataset—a visual-mathematical compromise between objectivity and subjectivity. Even in 
1967, fifteen years after the initial wave of silver-iodide experiments, Neyman wrote: “While 
“objective” methods of weather forecasting are frequently mentioned in the literature, we became 
convinced that forecasting is still an art and involves subjective elements.”80 Since Ronald Fisher’s 
1935 treatise on the Design of Experiments, the mathematical-statistics movement—what I have 
identified as a growing epistemological commitment to the probabilistic worldview and 
corresponding regimes of calculation—put forth a synthetic interpretation of the world—a design—
to grasp after a failing European world order that had begun to fall apart in the aftermath of WWI. 
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Consistent with this history, the Cold War cloud-seeding analysis project reaffirmed extant policies 
of state water control in indigenous land. This was a design of certainty or ‘neutrality’ over the 
unlivable conditions of the southwestern United States.   
This was also a matter of grasping for control over the institutions, technologies, and 
environments surrounding the experiments. Akin to the USDA. agriculturalists, cloud-seeding 
analysts visualized a statistical control state over natural and experimental processes. As addressed in 
Chapter 2, Control was a matter of defining areas of analysis and producing randomized experiments, 
where each experiment could be tested against a randomized ‘control’ experiment. Control is a 
process of experimentation that assumes a complete historical database and an idealized 
orchestration of experiments, where each experiment is coupled with another randomized 
experiment—the control experiment. The ideal experiment coupled precipitation measurements 
from one ‘seeded’ cloud experiment wanted with precipitation measurements from one ‘non-seeded’ 
cloud experiment.  
Cloud-seeding analysts described their work as decontaminating the “contamination of 
control areas.”81 They described the challenge thus: “The principle difficulty is that in using historical 
records as a control over a large area, all but one or two instances are quickly eliminated as not 
significant, and the accumulation of [analogous] circumstances for investigation is a lengthy 
process.”82 This subscription to control design and efforts towards “decontamination,” became 
manifest on the ground.  
A major source of uncertainty, as already addressed, was a lack of control over the 
measurement technologies. Rain gauges were the central nodes of analysis and primary culprits of 
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uncertainty. As with the WWII destruction data campaigns, it was believed that the more data 
generated, the clearer the limits of uncertainty, and that this would paper over uncertainties in 
smaller sample groups, such as data collected from a single rain gauge. There were two dimensions 
to expanding the experimental work to achieve a larger quantity of data. First, analysts asked for 
more rain gauges to be installed, in order to generate more information. Second, analysts advocated 
for randomized control experiments. For every cloud seeded by the silver-iodide method, they 
wanted precipitation information from clouds that were not seeded, to serve as statistical control 
and generate more viable data towards a better-defined uncertainty analysis. Analysts called for an 
increase in the number of physical silver-iodide experiments conducted, and an increase in the 
number of rain gauges installed, towards achieving an ideal randomized experiment.  
Randomization was a core component of the analytic vision. In 1956, the Statistical 
Laboratory organized a conference on cloud-seeding with attendees from the North American 
Weather Consultations, Inc. and the Department of Water Resources. A major topic of the 
conference was persuading the Board of Supervisors of Santa Barbara to finance the seeding 
operations on a randomized basis. Testament to the general atmosphere on this topic, at a dinner 
that followed the conference the guests enthusiastically drank a toast “to the Cloud Seeder who is 
not afraid of Randomization!”83  
The exchange of cloud-seed information and analysis reveals an anxious grasp for 
experimental control (political and mathematical) on the international stage. These data streams 
carve out a much larger landscape, pertaining to quantitative control of water. Quantitative analysis 
reinforced the growing postwar hydraulic empire. Analysis was a big-data project—and the demand 
                                               
83 Letter from Jerzy Neyman to Mr. Charles G. Wolfe, Senior Hydraulic Engineer, October 27th, 1959. 
RAIN—NSF Project Corres. 7/1959-12/59. Jerzy Neyman Papers, BANC MSS 84/30 c, Carton 7, Part 
VIII—RAIN 1951-1957. The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (henceforth: Neyman 
Papers, Carton 7, Berkeley). 
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for data drove the formation of new infrastructure that contributed to an expanding physical 
computing landscape on the ground. The entire analysis project, although designed to be objective 
and impartial, reinforced extant and newly forming infrastructures of water control on the ground. 
Consistent across the geographical contexts covered in the analysis project, cloud-seeding 
experiments were conducted over indigenous land, were funded with appropriated and reallocated 
water resources, and directly informed local farm policy.  
Southwestern weather modification and management institutions conducted extended 
operations from Mexico to Canada. In 1953 and 1954, the Water Resource Development 
Corporation (WRDC) of Denver, Colorado, through a Canadian affiliate, undertook cloud-seeding 
operations in two Canadian regions, in an area in the extreme southwestern sector of Manitoba 
(referred to as area MT-1) and in two adjacent areas in Saskatchewan (referred to as SK-1 and SK-2). 
These operations occurred from May 1 to August 6, 1953, and from May 22 to August 11, 1954.84 
As pictured in this [image] map, of “target” and “control” areas depicted by the analysts. The land 
areas in this map belonged to First Nations and were largely being funded by regional farm 
collectives, who had entered into contracts with the WRDC, as they had done in the southwestern 
United States.  
The Canadian experiments were a major focal point in the movement towards an optimal 
analytic method. Statisticians John W. Tukey, H.C.S. Thom, and the Berkeley Statistics Group wrote 
back and forth, as they tested different confidence interval methods with each experimental set of 
data, to determine the preferred method of analysis. In the process, they abstracted the data from 
the Arizona cloud-seeding programs, as southwestern experiments were central to their analysis. 
                                               
84 Warren L. Godson, “Report on Evaluation of Cloud-Seeding Operations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.” 
Folder 1. Advisory Committee on Weather Control, 1953-1955. John W. Tukey Papers. Ms. Coll. 117, Series 
Correspondences.  
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This included Irving Krick’s unpublished, “Report on meteorological aspects of artificial nucleation 
in the Phoenix area” and “Evaluation of cloud seeding operations in the Phoenix area.” Other 
reports included, “An analysis of the results of the 1951 cloud seeding operations in central 
Arizona,” and “An evaluation of the results of cloud seeding in western New Mexico and 
southeastern Arizona during July and August 1951.”85  Using this broader southwestern database 
and through their new experiments, the analysts aimed to create a formal typology of cloud-seeding 
computing methods and a standardized mode of analysis to oversee artificial rain programs around 
the globe. The objectives of achieving a standard method were to, “ensure that human bias was 
completely excluded and that the maximum possible amount of information was extracted from the 
rainfall data.”86 This work was guided by the virtue and promise of neutrality.   
The drive to design a controlled, randomized experiment and aggregate a substantial data 
base depended on a long history of information gathering. (Un)certainty work accounts for ‘time’ in 
discrete quantities. The longer the history of information, the more valuable it was. The ideal 
experiment had a robust database over long periods of time, generated by randomized experiments. 
In practice, these dimensions were compromised.  
For example, the Berkeley Statistics Group’s Santa Barbara experiments focused on a short 
time span of five years of what they deemed adequately randomized, cloud-seeding experiments and 
information. The Canadian experiments, on the other hand did not have good, randomized silver-
iodide experiments, but did have an established historical precipitation database or “history period” 
from 1923-1954. This history period was used to make sense of their experimental cloud-seeding 
                                               
85 Found reports in bibliography of: H.C.S. Thom, “Statistical Methods in Evaluation Cloud Seeding Effects,” 
Advisory Committee on Weather Control, Washington 25 D.C., September 1955. Folder 1. Advisory 
Committee on Weather Control, 1953-1955. John W. Tukey Papers. Ms. Coll. 117, Series Correspondences. 
86 Advisory Committee on Weather Control, Washington 25 D.C. “Notes on Program.” Folder 1. Advisory 
Committee on Weather Control, 1953-1955. John W. Tukey Papers. Ms. Coll. 117, Series Correspondences. 
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period. So, the hypothesis testing about cloud-seed experiments that occurred in the 1953-1954 
period, accounted for data dating back to the 1920s. The mathematical analysis, therefore, assessed 
recent experiments through regression analysis of a longer period of precipitation data, in order to 
point toward a recommendation for the future. Uncertainty shaped the design of the physical and 
mathematical experiments.  
In both the Santa Barbara and Manitoba experiments, the mathematical evaluation resulted 
in negative outcomes for the hypothesis that silver-iodide cloud-seeding increased rainfall.  
The evaluation of the nine seeded months indicated that the most likely effect of the 
seeding was a decrease in rainfall of 14.1 percent. The odds were 19 to 1 that the effect 
of cloud-seeding lay between decreases of 0.2 and 24.6 percent. Moreover, the odds 
were 39 to 1 against the hypothesis that seeding increases rainfall. It was possible to 
demonstrate in a general way from the results that there had been no significant 
differences of seeding effect between different areas, months, or years. 87 
 
The method of evaluation hinged on assessing the “confidence range” for the seeding effect, here it 
is rather glibly stated that “the odds were 39 to 1 against the hypothesis that seeding increases 
rainfall.” Since this was a controlled experiment, there were controlled, non-seeded clouds in the 
analysis, and statistically, there was no appreciable difference between the seeded and non-seeded 
clouds. The analysts were not finding evidence of a controlled increase in precipitation levels. Doubt 
leaked from the mathematical interpretation back into the tractability of the physical experiments. 
Analyst Warren L. Godson, wrote: “It is well known that silver iodide smoke has a profound 
precipitation effect on a supercooled cloud, in the laboratory. Similar experiments in nature, have 
almost invariably produced considerably less conclusive results.”88  
                                               
87 Warren L. Godson, “Report on Evaluation of Cloud-Seeding Operations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.” 
Folder 1. Advisory Committee on Weather Control, 1953-1955. John W. Tukey Papers. Ms. Coll. 117, Series 
Correspondences. 
88 Ibid. 
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The lack of empirical-mathematical results indicating cloud-seeding success, and the flagging 
confidence in the outcome of the experiments generally, did not dissuade from expansion of the 
experiments. This failure was used as evidence for the further production of these programs, as 
reflected in this quote:  
These figures, although providing significant evidence, are not necessarily the final 
answer. An evaluation covering a longer period of operations might increase or 
decrease the value given for the most likely effect of cloud-seeding and would certainly 
increase the degree of confidence in the results.89  
 
The mathematical experiments did not yield positive results, but still the data and analysis were 
formulated. WWII analysis resurged in Cold War weather modification management, as a regime of 
evaluative oversight over a growing aerial-agricultural initiative on the world stage. The analysts’ 
dream was to obtain more information, over larger areas of analysis, and longer periods of time, and 
design an infrastructure for managing uncertainty in artificial weather control programs. The guiding 
epistemological project was towards a big-data program, organized to design and implement an 
optimal computing technique over water management.  
Toward the end of the 1960s, these inconclusive mathematical results amplified the 
disenchantment of an already dissenting public with the topic of artificial weather control. In 
Canada, A 1957 newspaper article explicitly blamed the “gullible public” and “desperate people” for 
wasting millions on cloud-seeding experiments that had so far not worked or had actually decreased 
rainfall.90 A large-scale assessment occurred, the results of which were anticipated on the ground 
level. By the end of the 1950s, many analysts working on cloud-seed assessments determined the 
                                               
89 Ibid. 
90 Leiterman, Doug, “Rainmaking Called Humbug: U.S. Physicist Asserts Gullible Public is Wasting Millions, 
Calgary Herald, September 5th, 1957.   
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programs unreliable, and this fueled the misgivings of a public already doubtful about weather 
modification.  
 
1960s Doubt Politics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By the end of the 1950s, significant uncertainty about the veracity of silver-iodide cloud-
seeding programs impacted the climate of public opinion about the capacity of artificial rain to solve 
the economic drought crisis. The general public disapproval of weather modification in the 1960s, 
has been well documented in the historiography in the context of growing environmentalist and 
anti-state interventionist movements. Doubt about the promises of artificial weather control was 
amplified by official reports on the mathematical results—the fact that analysts had achieved 
consensus that there were no significant findings that cloud-seeding had increased precipitation. 
Long before the mathematical results were publicized, Navajo and Hopi tribal members were 
already unconvinced that the programs would work at all, and if they did work, it would only be for 
Figure 36: Weather Control Newspaper Article, 
undated, Neyman Papers, Carton 7, Berkeley. 
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the benefit of white men. Just as the programs were taking off, in 1950, Navajo protested that, “Rain 
fell only over white men.”91 Navajo Councilman Billy Becenti went on record then to say that even if 
artificial rain was possible, it would only benefit white people. One unidentified [Navajo] council 
member suggested that, since it was difficult to tell which rains are increased by cloud-seeding, the 
rainmakers should drop receipts over the reservation from airplanes when they believe they have 
produced results.  
In 1959, Jerzy Neyman and Elizabeth Scott of the Berkeley Statistics Group withdrew their 
contract with the Santa Barbara cloud-seeding analysis project. They wrote that while they “had 
certain doubts from the start,” they genuinely enjoyed their time on the project.”92 Their primary 
reason for leaving was that “the experiment needs a new design and a new study.”93 Despite leaving 
the official capacity as cloud-seed oversight, their work would not be in vain as they would publish 
their results, analysis, and the greater significance of the programs, over the next fifteen-years. In 
1960, a reviewer on their draft of “Statistical Evaluation of the Santa Barbara Randomized Cloud 
Seeding Experiment,” objected, “This paper is incomplete, inaccurate, contains deliberate 
misstatements of fact and the manner of its presentation is unethical.”94 The defense to this reviewer 
was that yes, “it is true that a number of details are omitted,” and “we limit ourselves to quoting a 
few sample figures.” This, they reminded, was part of the standard method of analysis. They 
concluded, “Without further indications as to the exact location of alleged “inaccuracies” and 
“misstatements” and “unethical presentation” we are not in a position to comment.”  
                                               
91 “Council Backs Rehabilitation,” Tucson Daily Citizen, July 12, 1950. 
92 Letter from Jerzy Neyman to Earl G. Droessler, Program Director Atmospheric Sciences, October 22, 
1959. RAIN—NSF Project Corres. 7/1959-12/59. Neyman Papers, Carton 7, Berkeley. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Letter from Jerzy Neyman to Dean Werner A. Baum, January 27, 1960. RAIN—NSF Project Corres. 
7/1959-12/59. Neyman Papers, Carton 7, Berkeley.  
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 By the early 1960s, under growing uncertainty, both the Kleberg County rainmakers and 
their mathematicians were publicly ridiculed. The Berkley Statistics Group, highlighting Jerzy 
Neyman, were identified in a Bay Area newspaper as “fraudsters.”95 In efforts to differentiate 
himself from the rainmakers, in 1961, Neyman flew to Phoenix to give a talk at the University of 
Arizona, to warn the public about the real rain-gauge fraudsters. The flowing day, the Kleberg 
County newspaper reported: “Seed-For-Pay Boys Can’t Prove It.” The article reported on Neyman’s 
University of Arizona speech from the night before casting him as a docile, “slight, mild-mannered” 
professor, and sharply contrasting him with the aggressive rainmakers with for-profit motives.  
Neyman warned of “persons with profit motives” who he said, “made one uneasy” as they 
could tamper with experimental results in their promise of making rain. Specifically, he invoked 
consideration of rain gauge vulnerability, measuring devices stationed “in unprotected places where 
they could have been tampered with.” Rain gauges were the primary means by which rainfall was 
measured and thus generated crucial data on the cloud seeding experiments. Tampering with rain 
gauges would compromise the validity of experimental results. Thus, Neyman implied that the 
general flagging confidence in weather modification programs was due to extra-experimental actors 
willing to cheat the experiments rather than any inherent uncertainty in the experimental design 
itself.  
At the height of this public uncertainty and rage about weather control programs, in 1962, 
Rachel Carson published her widely circulated book, Silent Spring. In it, she broke down the barriers 
between “controlled” experiment and the larger environment, as well as the barriers between blood 
and water. She argued that if you poison one, you poison the other. The concluding sentence of 
Silent Spring, states:  
                                               
95 Misc. RAIN—NSF Project Corres. 7/1959-12/59. Neyman Papers, Carton 7, Berkeley. 
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The “control of nature” is a phrase conceived in arrogance born of the [early] age of 
biology and philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience 
of man. […] It is our alarming misfortunate that so [unevolved] a science has armed 
itself with the most modern and terrible weapons, and in turning them against the 
[earth], it has also turned them against [us].96 
 
Carson’s critique of the whole concept of the ‘control of nature’ takes on new meaning in the 
context of the computational work. Throughout this chapter, I have shown how the computing 
concept control— a designed, randomized mathematical experiment—was at work in the control of 
nature.  
Impetus to generate water scarcity data in the southwestern regions emerged out of colonial 
expansion and the formation of a hydraulic empire. The identification and control of natural water 
systems through maps, charts, and naming, and the formation of networks of damns, were designed 
to consolidate settler power into systems of water management. Data streamed from nineteenth 
century initiatives into the formation of data centers and experimental stations responsive to the 
1920s and 1930s drought crises. Precipitation data emerged as a currency for resource control, a 
means by which the land could be mapped, and fed into decision-making systems. Livestock 
reduction hinged on calculations of Navajo and Hopi animals as water units. After WWII, ambitions 
to control the skies transfigured this currency into an (un)certainty work, overlaying the southwest 
with a map of rational allocation, creating a larger computing landscape predicated on seeing 
probabilistically. This set precedent for the resources and conditions for digital decision-making 
systems to take over water allocation in the southwest, as will be discussed in my final chapter. 
Artificial rain is a central experiment in the evolution of artificial intelligence. 
                                               
96 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962): 319.  
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Cloud-seeding offers a critically important site of intervention into larger conversations 
about computing networks and decision-making systems used to track and make sense of weather 
and climate events. In fact, even in cases where there was a tractable increase of precipitation in 
seeded-clouds, the effects of this precipitation for the farming communities remained negligible, 
especially when weighted against the deleterious impacts of the cloud-seeding programs for those 
same communities. Study of cloud-seeding initiatives makes clear that these programs, as promises 
of development from 10,000 feet above ground, are still rooted in the soil. Agricultural remains 
highly vulnerable to climate change and erratic weather and cloud-seeding continues to function as 
an aerial-agricultural initiative, where those in control of aerial technological systems aim to control 
resources on the ground.  
 I argue more broadly that water is the most valuable source of information in the long 
twentieth-century history of computing. Water scarcity and uncontrollability is also a primary source 
of modern anxiety. While this dissertation culminates in an explicit study of water data, it has been 
present throughout. The data societies I have traced throughout this dissertation, beginning with 
interwar agriculture, were primarily concerned with calculating water scarcity. Harvesting and farm 
information exists on a spectrum between water scarcity and flooding over. The agricultural stations 
addressed in this dissertation were also centers for the collection of precipitation data. In efforts to 
rationalize agricultural practices and production, they documented rainfalls, soil precipitation, and 
weather and climatic events—generating libraries of information. This water information was used 
to demarcate harvest seasons, and even calculate the sweetness of a sugar beet. Anxieties pertaining 
to the unruly and unpredictable nature of water, seen primarily as a hindrance in the formation of 
western capitalist societies, inspired new methods of calculation and control.97 Mathematical 
                                               
97 Water calculation emerged from efforts to control the U.S. slave economy in crop calculations and the 
Atlantic slave trade. See: Caitlin Rosenthal, Accounting for Slavery: Masters and Management (Cambridge: Harvard 
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statistics was a regime of calculation that created databases and designed new methods of regression-
analysis, to control water for capital production in agriculture.  
The southwestern United States is a critically important geographical area in the history of 
control and (un)certainty work. It was and is the epicenter in the history of artificial weather control 
and critically important to broader histories of climate science and the history of computing. Water 
scarcity in the region has shaped its brutal human history and informed its regimes of calculation. 
Water data has been sourced as a highly valuable indicator of the possibility of resources in the 
region. It is the central currency of southwestern decision-making systems. Water is data. 
Precipitation data, like water itself, has a history and a future—it streams from its origin source as it 
is being directed somewhere else, and it impacts the landscape along the way. Water is data, just as it 
is a primary source of life and food. Water is life.98   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
University Press, 2018); Johnathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).  
98 Water is Life is an ongoing indigenous resistance movement for land and water sovereignty. See, for 
example: Mary Annette, Pember, “Inside the Long, Hard Fight to Stop the Bayou Bridge Oil Pipline, 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
 
Automating Uncertainty 
Digital Cloud Seeds and Confidence Algorithms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Digital Cloud Seeds: From Doubt Crisis to New Method  
In the first two decades of the Cold War, cloud-seeding programs reconfigured the vast and 
heterogenous southwestern landscape across Arizona, California, Navajo and Hopi Nations, and 
spanning into Northern Mexico and Southern Canada. In this time period, over 10% of the U.S. 
landscape became a target area for weather modification experiments. Artificial rain was sought after 
globally, too, as the weather control enterprise that began in central Europe expanded over apartheid 
South Africa, Australia, and South East Asia. The southwestern computing landscape was a layered 
reordering of the geophysical world through installations of rain gauges, excavations of the earth to 
Figure 37: Eduardo Paolozzi, “Conditional Probability Machine,” 1970. Secrets of 
Life—The Human machine and How it Works: Perception through Impression. 
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create experimental watersheds, and conducting ground generator and aerial explosions of chemical 
smoke. The southwestern skies became experimental corporate and military proving grounds as 
water as agricultural became managed from above. This geophysical remapping blurred with 
mathematical descriptions of the area map, as hydroscapes were veiled over coordinate rain gauge 
systems and clouds were transfigured into probability assessments. Uncertainty logics permeated the 
mathematical and geophysical landscape, enabled by the control thinking dictating the experimental 
design (seeded and not-seeded experiments), and the confidence logics driving the precipitation data 
economy.  
The early 1960s climate of public doubt and uncertainty about weather modification 
impacted aerial-agricultural development more broadly. Public awareness of the physical and 
mathematical failure of the programs, as well as the deleterious impacts on the environment, 
blossomed from a larger context of conservationism and environmental activism of the early 1960s. 
The Navajo Nation fought during this time to obtain sovereignty over the major bodies of water, 
the Salt River, San Juan River and Colorado River Basin. The early 1960s Salt River Project, a 
legislation designed to commandeer the damn water for a new coal mine, became a central site of 
contest. Construction for Navajo Lake and Navajo Dam were completed in 1962. And in 1963, the 
Navajo Transitional Energy Company (NTEC) was founded in the midst of the 1960s coal boom. 
Silent Spring circulated in the context of increased public awareness of carcinogens, chemical waste, 
and scientific misinformation. Drought continued to define the U.S. landscape; California recorded 
its worst year in 1961. Finally, the U.S. farm economy was going through radical transformation: 
between 1950 and 1970, the number of farms was cut in half, due to the rise of corporate agriculture 
and, for many farmers, of bad weather. The public backlash against weather modification programs 
was a multiplex of dissent. 
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While public uncertainty reined-in technocratic enthusiasm about the cloud-seeding 
programs, the projects nonetheless persisted.  The programs had already created information 
systems and mathematical oversight on questions of resource allocation and weather and climate 
prognostication. For analysts, the public doubt did not correspond wholly to a political or ecological 
crisis, but a technological crisis, denoting a failure to harness certainty in their experimental designs. 
Echoing the confidence crisis of the early twentieth century, analysts asserted a crisis of technique 
and method over the uncertainties of weather data. This 1960s moment of public doubt was thereby 
followed by an impulse to improve artificial weather control through computational analysis, rather 
than abandon the artificial weather control programs in total. This 1957 NSF quote on Cold War 
weather modification captures this dialectic between crisis and technological redesign at work:  
UNCERTAINTY characterizes most thinking about the changes in natural systems that 
are subject to modification. […] The principal lesson to be drawn from this experience 
is that where uncertainty is large, as it continues to be with weather and climate 
modification, the basic social implications will tend to remain unexplored unless 
explicit and sustained effort is made to stir up and support the essential research. 
Otherwise, the human problems are ignored until they burst into prominence on the heels of an 
improvement in technique.  
 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, artificial rain persisted as a promise and solution for 
flagging agriculture and ever-scarcer water resources and became a major site for the development 
of new mathematical methods and digital computing techniques. The 1950s programs had generated 
a substantial area of inquiry at the nexus of weather and climate science and probabilistic 
architectures, and this was carried forward by the momentum already generated by the frameworks 
and infrastructures designed to quantify the skies in the cloud-seed analysis project. New models 
designed to visually display probabilities and confidence logics became a conduit for translating 
these methods into digital code. The dissent against automation seen in the conservationist 
movements was met with a growing captivation with automated systems by others. In 1960, Paul 
Kircher’s popular book The Crisis We Face: Automation and the Cold War, argued that the crisis of 
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automation was a crisis of insufficient automation, which he melded into the contemporaneous 
crises of military power and conditions of the Cold War. He wrote, “Our only hope is to multiply 
the output of the man by giving him automatic weapons and machines—and to achieve this 
multiplication so greatly, so rapidly, and efficiently as to hopelessly outdistance the enormous 
populations now organizing against us.”1    
By the early 1970s, decision-trees were conceptualized and used to map uncertainty in 
weather and hurricane prediction and farm planning.2 These were diagrams, drawn as simple tree-
like figures- that broke decisions into consecutive steps of probabilistic outcomes. Other geometric 
frameworks, such as Thiessen polygons, were used to represent hydroscapes as mathematical planes 
and regions, further abstracting the data from its earthy origins and staging it for algorithmic 
analysis. Studies on automation and weather control ballooned in the 1970s, and even more so in the 
1980s. Resource management and data collection on the ground had been translated into an 
uncertainty program drawn from the aerial vantage, and this set the stage for indigenous and local 
farm water management to be relegated to digital systems of decision-making.  
The analog dimensions of the computing landscape, rain gauge analysis and ground 
generator maintenance, were fed into digital production. Already in the 1950s, the Berkeley Statistics 
Group outsourced precipitation data to the IBM 701. While in development, this machine was 
known as “the defense calculator,” but after its launch in 1953 it assumed the title of “IBM 701 
Electronic Data Processing Machine.”3 At this time, IBM computers were stationed at university 
                                               
1 Paul Kircher, The Crisis We Face: Automation and the Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).  
2 For examples of technical literature at the nexus of probabilistic decision-science and weather analysis in this 
period, see: D. Yaron and U. Horowitz, “Short and Long-Run Farm Planning Under Uncertainty; Integration 
of Linear Programming and Decision Tree Analysis,” Agricultural Economics 20, no. 2 (1972): 17-30; Albert H. 
Brown, “Automation of Visual Weather Observations,” Report of the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory, 
April 1, 1980.   
3 For technical primary sources on the machine design, see: Werner Buchholz, “The System Design of the 
IBM Type 701 Computer,” Proceedings of the I.R.E. 41, no. 10 (1953): 1262-1275; Clarence Frizzell, 
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computing centers that were being established around the United States, and operational programs 
were launched through “customers” who commissioned computational work for various projects. 
Significantly, the earliest customers of the IBM family were the U.S. Weather Bureau, for the 
purpose of the mid-1950s Joint Numerical Weather prediction project. The first 36-hour forecast 
was conducted in April of 1955, using the IBM 701.4 Cloud-seeding data was processed as part of a 
larger convergence between climate mapping and the development of digital technology. These 
programs hinged on a gradual development of uncertainty logics into code, programming languages, 
and certified algorithms. Mirroring the evolution of mathematical statistics, digital computing 
programs were first designed for basic statistical routines before methods such as confidence 
intervals were programmed. Early projects began with translating basic statistical techniques, such as 
the analysis of variance, covariance, and linear regressions, into code.5  
 The international cloud-seeding analysis that was conducted in the 1950s and 1960s went 
through a second stage of analysis as part of a larger turn towards digital computing and the 
application of new methods of analysis. The same data that was used in the first round of 
mathematical experiments was reused in the second wave of experiments, but in the second wave of 
mathematical experiments, new methods of analysis were employed and new computing 
technologies, especially punch card programming, were used to expand computational oversight. 
The use of digital computers involved another layer of work for the mathematicians and personnel 
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who transcribed the data onto punch cards and utilized programming languages for translating 
techniques into computer instructions.6 The physical Arizona experiments that began during the 
U.S. war in Korea created an atmospheric-terrestrial testing ground over a semi-arid southwestern 
landscape that had already been sustaining precipitation data collection and computational work for 
decades. While the conditions of data production, and the bodies of data remained the same, new 
modes of analysis were designed with these resources.  
A computer-generated schematic map of Arizona, pictured below, depicts the nodes of rain 
gauges that continued to be used in the second-wave analysis. The topography of the geological 
surface, the political landscape and boundaries between Navajo and Hopi land, the waterways, and 
distinction between farm land and metropolitan areas all vanished into a white backdrop, dotted 
with uniform points representing rain gauge coordinates and distances. In this particular experiment, 
a new “moving grid” technique is used, with the aid of a digital computer, to assess the gauges as 
groups and networks of gauges, further abstracting the analog technologies from the uncertainties of 
their ground placement.  
                                               
6 There is a substantial body of primary and secondary scholarship on punch cards and programming, see: 
Wallace J. Eckert, Punched Card Methods in Scientific Computation (Lancaster, PA: Lancaster Press, Inc., 1940); 
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Throughout the 1970s, a number of “re-evaluations” of the failed cloud-seed analysis 
occurred, not necessarily to change the outcomes or results, but to improve the techniques and 
methods used in the analysis.7 In 1970, for example, the Berkeley statistics group, including Jerzy 
Neyman, Herbert Osborn, Elizabeth Scott, and Marcella Wells, conducted a new confidence analysis 
of the experiments, after achieving what they deemed to be an improved set of data. The initial data 
set from 1957-1960 of two silver-iodide programs or aerial delivery of smoke over the Santa Catalina 
mountains was documented through rain gauge charts. These were analyzed by the statistics group 
“using the facilities of the USDA-ARS Southwest Watershed Research Center in Tuscon.”8 The 
                                               
7 For re-evaluations generated by the Berkeley Statistics group’s network, in particular, see: Jerzy Neyman and 
Herbert Osborn, “Evidence of widespread effect of cloud seeding at two Arizona experiments,” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 68 (1971): 649-652; L.J. Battan, “Silver iodide seeding and rainfall from 
convective clouds,” Journal of Applied Meteorology 5 (1966): 669-683;  J.L. Lovasich, Jerzy Neyman, Elizabeth 
Scott, Marcella Wells, “Further studies of the Whitetop cloud-seeding experiment,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science 68 (1971): 147-151.  
8 Jerzy Neyman et. al., “Re-Evaluation of the Arizona Cloud-Seeding Experiment,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 69 (1972): 1349.  
Figure 38: Neyman et. al, “Re-Evaluation of the 
Arizona Cloud-Seeding Experiment,” 1349. 
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combined “deck of IBM cards, baring hourly precipitation amounts for all the available gauges for 
all of the 212 experimental days,” was delivered to meteorologist L.J. Battan.9 This data was 
combined with new observations from Battan, who integrated radar data and photographs of clouds 
taken over the mountain range, as new points of visual-mathematical analysis. The results of this 
analysis concluded the apparent effect of seeding was a 73% loss of rain, but the analysis was not 
toward proving the efficacy of the experiments, but the efficacy of the statistical analysis—this was 
still a question of whether the results were randomized. Neyman noted, for example, that the 
experiments were not randomized and therefore not in a state of control.  
 Even though, since the late 1950s, there has been consistent consensus that cloud-seeding 
did not predictably generate precipitation in target clouds, these programs have continued to be a 
central site for advancing automating decision-science and digital computing programs. These 
mathematical re-evaluations of the early cold war experiments were not just a matter of reassessing 
whether or not the programs worked but were projects of creating further experiments with the 
data. These included studies of “aerial spread,’ “after-affects,” and so forth. Artificial rain-making 
campaigns contained an ocean of uncertainty, which had generated substantial mathematical, 
technological, and economic infrastructures to compute it, and therefore studies of its technologies, 
methods, and models were of use and interest to ongoing (un)certainty work into the domains of 
digital computing.  
By the late 1970s, precipitation models indicating the effects of cloud-seeding were 
programmed for digital computing. Neyman noted the transformation, “the widely accessible digital 
computers make it relatively easy to use the Monte Carlo simulation techniques to study the 
                                               
9 Neyman et. al, “Re-Evaluation of the Arizona Cloud-Seeding Experiment,” 1349.  
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statistical tests.”10 He went on to describe the use of confidence logics to assess the Monte Carol 
method itself:  
In addition to satisfying the maintenance of the chosen level of significance—𝛼 = 0.10 
or 0.05 or 0.01, etc.—it is important to investigate the so-called “power” of the test. 
This would answer questions of the following kind: With the given level of significance 
𝛼 and the given number of experimental units, say 𝑛 = 100 or 𝑛 = 200, what is the 
chance, 𝛽, of detecting a real seeded-not-seeded difference in precipitation if it 
represents a 20% (or some such) decrease (or increase) in the rain due to seeding? If 
the calculated 𝛽 = 0.1 or 0.2 and the 20% effect is all that is anticipated […] then the 
contemplated experiment can hardly be considered promising and changes in its 
design would be in order. 11   
 
In the 1960s through 1970s period, the more visible human computing work in the Cold 
War artificial rain analysis project was incrementally relegated to computerized management systems. 
Thiessen geometric mapping diagrams, and decision-trees became some of the analytic mediums 
through which confidence logics were translated into digital programming languages and relegated to 
algorithmic oversight. This was part of a larger reconfiguration of uncertainty, and confidence 
intervals, under automation, within the growing machine philosophy of “logics of automata” and the 
professional design and certification of algorithms. It is important to map out iterations of 
confidence intervals through these two computing movements—algorithms and automata—as they 
contributed to the integration of CI logics into machine consciousness and algorithmic oversight.  
 
“The Logics of Automata”: Conditional Probability Machines  
After 1950, new designs for computational processing in digital computing impacted the 
epistemic form and material production of (un)certainty work. As seen in the last section, while 
                                               
10 Jerzy Neyman, “A Statistician’s View of Weather Modification Technology,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 74, no. 11 (1977): 4719.  
11 Neyman, “A Statisticians View, 4718.  
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computing landscapes used to support these systems did not disappear, confidence logics were also 
reconfigured as a new mode of reasoning, pertaining to digital philosophies and coding practices. 
The theory of automata that popularized in the early 1950s, and designs of certified confidence 
algorithms, which were circulating the 1960s, contributed to the new wave of (un)certainty work. This 
is exhibited in the re-evaluation of cloud-seeding, which incorporated digital machinery and centered 
algorithms in the assessments. Significantly, confidence logics were not replaced by the new modes of computing 
and machine development, but rather, they were built into the material and logical designs of digital models, machines, 
and methods. Confidence intervals are built into the material fabric of artificial intelligence, they are a 
tuning apparatus in assessing the power and validity of other optimal algorithms such as linear 
programming (the simplex algorithm) and Monte Carlo methods, and they are algorithmic in their 
own right as they were reprogrammed and circulated as certified algorithms. Digital computing 
brings new iterations of (un)certainty work that have black-boxed the philosophies of logic at work 
under its protocols, procedures, and programs.  
In 1954, Arthur Burks and Hao Wang of the University of Michigan, put forth a typology of 
the logical systems and techniques used in the structure and behavior of “automata.”12 Burks had 
                                               
12 For histories of “automata,” see: Robert Kline, “Cybernetics, Automata Studies, and the Darmouth 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 33, no. 4 (2011): 5-16. 
“Automation” has been a central problematic and logical enigma in digital computing. For histories of 
automation in computing generally, see: Thomas Haigh, “Remembering the Office of the Future: The Origins 
of Word Processing and Office Automation,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 28, no. 4 (2006): 6-31. 
For histories of automation at the nexus of mathematical logic and machine intelligence, see: Donald 
Mackenzie, “Automation of proof: a historical and sociological exploration,” IEEE Annals of the History of 
Computing 17, no. 3 (1995): 7 -29; Stephanie Aleen Dick, “After Math: (Re)configuring Minds, Proof, and 
Computing in the Postwar United States. (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 2015): Dick writes, 94: “The 
prospect of automation generated disagreement about the character of human mathematical faculties like 
intuition, reasoning, and understanding whether computers could be made to possess or participate in them.” 
Her conclusion is that “processes of automation seldom, if ever replace human thought. Instead automation 
attempts rather displace and transform human thinking at the same time as they enable the construction of 
new objects of thought—these develop always in tandem.”  
For automation and risk, see: Rebecca Slayton, “Measuring Risk: Computer Security Metrics, 
Automation, and Learning,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 37, no. 2 (2015): 32-45. Automation is 
fundamentally a political process, for a recent study see: Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech 
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long been interested in the design of logics within electronic computing machines, as he worked 
with Hermann Goldstine and John von Neumann on the ENIAC machine at the Moore School—
the center of calculation for ballistics analysis during WWII.13 Chinese philosopher, logician, and 
mathematician Hao Wang, from a less empirical vantage, was interested in automata as a study of 
logic and philosophy. Burks and Wang give a general definition of automata in their following 
description:  
To begin with we will consider any object or system (e.g. a physical body, a machine, 
an animal, or a solar system) that changes its state in time; it may or may not change 
its size it time, and it may or may not interact with its environment. When we describe 
the state of the object at any arbitrary time, we have in general to take account of: the 
time under consideration, the past history of the object, the laws governing the inner 
action of the object or system, the state of the environment (which itself is a system 
of objects), and the laws governing the interaction of the objects and its environment. 
If we choose to, we may refer to all such objects and systems as automata.  
 
Automata studies became a way of explaining machines, mathematics, and machine 
processes, which privileged the machine in explaining systems and networks. The machine was 
intelligent, and processes were likened to the human nervous system, brain stimulation, and animal 
qualities. Logic was a physical system that constituted the machine: “Logical propositions can be 
represented as electrical networks or (idealized nervous systems) [and] networks are formed by 
connecting basic components.”14 Despite the analogy with animal instincts throughout the 
movement, the computing concepts of optimality and efficiency reigned supreme, as these processes 
were organized in terms of input-output logics. Furthermore, as Von Neumann described, 
                                               
tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018). For a primary source on automation 
and formal methods: Automation of Reasoning 1: Classical Papers on Computational Logics 1957-1966, J. Siekmann, 
G. Wrightson, eds. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1983). 
13 See: Arthur W. Burks, Herman Goldstine, and John von Neumann, Preliminary discussion of the logical design of 
an electronic computing instrument (Princeton: Institute for Advanced Study 
14 John von Neumann, Lectures on “Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis of Reliable Organisms from 
Unreliable Components,” delivered at the California Institute of Technology, January 4-15, 1952.  
http://www.dna.caltech.edu/courses/cs191/paperscs191/VonNeumann56.pdf. 
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“externally an automaton is a “black box” with a finite number of inputs and a finite number of 
outputs.”15 In this conception, the input and output processes, relied on determining which inputs, 
when stimulated, caused responses in the outputs— “responses” as in terms of animal behavior. 
This larger epistemological framing of machines as living bodies, brains, and neural networks was 
common to a family of machine intelligence work at this time including Turing machines, control 
systems, cybernetics, general systems theory, and servo-systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Automata studies therefore did not view machines as tools or calculators, but as “thinking” 
entities. Therefore, machines did not simply compute probabilities, but they could be probabilistic in 
nature. In fact, Burke divided automata into two camps: deterministic and probabilistic. As described, 
automata have a fixed number of elements and states in their system, and probabilistic automata, 
have “an always changing, but finite, number of states.”16 Von Neumann in particular advanced the 
notion that the problem with probabilistic automata was that their constituent parts were unreliable, 
as it hadn’t yet been proved, “that these systems [would] do what is claimed for them—namely 
                                               
15 See: John von Neumann, “Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis of Reliable Organism from Unreliable 
Components,” in C.E. Shannon, Automata Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1956): 43.  
16 John von Neumann, Lectures on “Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis of Reliable Organisms from 
Unreliable Components,” delivered at the California Institute of Technology, January 4-15, 1952.   
Figure 39:  John von Neumann, “Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis 
of Reliable Organism from Unreliable Components,” in C.E. Shannon, 
Automata Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1956): 43. 
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control error.”17 Error in automata was theorized to occur from mistakes by the central “organs” of 
the machine and also, error would arise when operating bundles (lines going in and out of the 
organs) that were not in the same state of stimulation. This was a matter of anticipating levels of 
error in the network responses by asserting a value for error—or the probability of malfunction.  
Error theory in probabilistic automata was a matter of assessing the stability or the reliability 
of a network, in terms of input and output of bundles, into and out of the main organs. Since the 
main organs were “black boxes” the error had to be assessed in terms of the bundles and, common 
to confidence logics, estimated and established ahead of time. For example, Von Neumann wrote:  
Having established this fiduciary level [∆	= .07], there exists also an upper bound for 
the allowable values of ∈ [error]. This is ∈	= 	 .0107. In other words, if ∈	≥ .0107, 
the risk of effective malfunction of the network will be above a fixed, positive lower 
bound, no matter how large a bundle size 𝒩 is used.  
 
I.e. stimulation of at least 93% of the lines of a bundle represents a positive message; 
stimulation of at most 7% of the lines of a bundle represents a negative message; the 
interval between 7% and 93% is a zone of uncertainty, indicating an effective malfunction of the 
network. 18   
 
For von Neumann, uncertainty was a precondition of the machine that, as an intelligent entity, did 
not reveal its thinking processes, akin to the vast unknowabilities of the human brain. The early 
1950s conceptions of automata as neurological machine, that informed the major fields of systems 
of analysis, cybernetics, and so forth situated uncertainty not as a production of the machine, but as 
the machine itself. Conditional probability machines were probabilistic entities. Confidence intervals, 
fiduciary limits, and related data architectures were employed to describe error in the animal-like 
machine impulses and responses of the network. Network malfunction was bounded by the zone of 
uncertainty, as defined by the intervals.    
                                               
17 Ibid, 37.  
18 Ibid, 44.  
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Confidence Logics as Algorithm  
As CI logics were defined as part of the living system of animal-machines, they were also 
being programmed into new machine languages, stripping them of their philosophical intricacies. 
After 1954 the electronic computing language FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslation), was designed 
to handle numerical computation. FORTRAN spawned a number of related programming languages 
such as FORMAC (FORmula MAniupulation Compiler) and the ALGOL programming language 
that was specifically designed to aid the translation of mathematical techniques into algorithmic 
procedures. These programming languages were used in experimenting with mathematics and 
machine processing. The American Computing Machinery (ACM) became the central oversight on 
research and development pertaining to certifying algorithms. The development of algorithms by 
designers at computing disparate departments, was funded for a variety of interests and purposes 
under the auspices of entities like the US Atomic Energy Commission, the Bureau of Census & 
Statistics, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Boeing Scientific Research Laboratories, and so on.   
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, programmers, computer scientists, and others who 
worked on developing algorithms would find legitimacy for their designs through the ACM. The 
ACM created a platform, “the Algorithms Department,” and established protocol for the format and 
circulation of algorithmic designs. The standard code of conduct advanced by the Algorithms 
Department, was outlined as a step of procedures: “A contribution to the Algorithms Department 
should be in the form of an algorithm, a certification, or a remark [and] carefully follow the style of 
this department.” The form of an algorithm was that it must written in the ALGOL 60 
programming language or in ASA Standard FORTRAN or Basic FORTRAN. It should be 
presented as a commented procedure, accompanied by a complete driver program in its language 
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that will not be published. For ALGOL 60 language in particular, the policy stated that “input and 
output should be achieved by procedure statements,” out of eleven procedure statements, which 
asserted a language and logic of efficiency over the mathematical processes:  
insymbol  inreal  outarray  ininterger 
outsymbol outreal  outboolean outinteger 
                                   length  inarray  outstring 
 
Certified algorithms were a digital mathematical procedure that reconfigured logical interpretation 
and mathematical methods into input-output statements, or the technical computing concept of 
efficiency and optimality.  
Reflective of a computing culture that upheld simplicity and procedure over complexity, much 
of the computational process involved in reconfiguring mathematical processes—such as confidence 
interval calculations—into code was not widely circulated. The math and machine interaction were 
therefore not the central inquiry in circulation. For example, it was not communicated how exactly 
the punch cards were used in computing the algorithmic tests. Another missing element was the 
significance of data, where it came from, how it was sorted and organized, and how it was valued. 
All data was communicated as an epistemologically flat, algorithmic processing data. Explanations of 
engineering and hardware machine processes, that constitute the physical electronic computers, were 
also not circulated. The computational labor in data collection, machine engineering, and 
computational work was therefore missing from discussions about algorithmic language and 
certification. (Un)certainty work was flatted in the formal presentation of algorithmic procedure.  
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While the ACM worked to standardize algorithmic procedure and communications, the 
wider public speculated about the morality of algorithmic versus human decision-making. Popular 
understanding of algorithms mirrored the captivation with elegance and simplicity reaffirmed by 
protocol, but also reflected doubt about their crude, rote, and bureaucratic nature. There was both a 
crisis and awe surrounding the new authority over human mind. In one report: “Soon, with total 
mindlessness, [the civil service], may be working by the algorithm—a choice specimen […] 
instructing hapless bureaucrats on the decisions they have to make […] like some science fiction 
monster, the algorithms are coming, burying desks in decision-making trees.”19 A woman’s magazine 
in support of offloading decision-making responsibility to algorithms explained, “One of the 
problems of being human rather than a computer when faced with a decision is that emotion almost 
invariably enters into the picture.”20 Many people were interested in the simplicity and the reduction 
of human labor associated with algorithmic thought, stating things like, “Algorithms replace wordy 
definitions in new methods,” and “algorithms make complicated decisions simple.”21 
                                               
19 “The Treasury gets algorithm and initiative gets the bird,” The Guardian, Saturday, July 01, 1967.  
20 “Decisions…decisions…decisions…,” The Woman’s Guardian, Monday, May 25th, 1970. 
21 “Algorithms Replace Wordy Definitions in New Methods,” The Waco News-Tribune, Wednesday, February 
9th, 1966.  
Figure 40:  "Algorithm 516: An Algorithm for Obtaining Confidence 
Intervals," ACM, 1977. 
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Indeed, practitioners viewed their algorithmic designs as reducing the procedural and 
computational labor needed in mathematical processes, like probability estimations. Early 1960s 
probability algorithms were designed to translate more basic mathematical statistical procedures in 
probability and statistics into programming code. This included mapping normal bell curves, 
randomizing information, conducting f-tests and t-tests, and drawing confidence intervals.22 For 
example, “Algorithm 322 was coded into FORTRAN and run on a CDC 3200, and its accuracy for 
moderate probability levels was tested using 5-figure critical values of the F-distribution at the .95 
and .99 levels […] and 6-figure probability values taken from the t-distribution.”23 This particular t-
test algorithm was designed on a Control Data Corporation computer (CDC), a family of about 100 
main frame computers that were released in the late 1960s.24  
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, a family of confidence interval algorithms were designed per 
the procedures of the ACM in the FORTRAN computing language. What is evident in the 1960s 
and 70s confidence algorithms is that they were designed to take over the epistemic and the data 
processing dimensions of (un)certainty work. These logic algorithms were literally designed to 
replace the logicians, philosophers, and mathematicians of the early twentieth century. Algorithms 
were designed to do the work of data sorting and organization, of calculation and computing, testing 
and estimating, bounding and limiting, predicting and decision-making. In real-world applications, 
however, algorithms proved to not reduce computational labor nor the complexity of the analysis. 
Uncertainty reigned supreme.  
                                               
22 M.D. MacLaren, “Algorithm 272: procedure for the normal distribution functions,” Communications of the 
ACM 8, no. 12 (1965): 789-791. John Morris, “Algorithm 346: F-test probabilities,” Communications of the 
ACM 12, no. 3 (1969): 184-185; John Morris, “Algorithm 321: t-test probabilities,” Communications of the ACM 
11, no. 2 (1968): 115-116.   
23 David A. Levine, “Algorithm 344: Student’s t-distribution,” Communications of the ACM 12, no. 1 (1969): 39. 
24 Levine, “Algorithm 344,” 39.  
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In wider applications, confidence intervals were also built into the program designs of 
algorithm-led experiments, as a tuning apparatus used in confirming the validity or power of the 
models. As already discussed with the Monte Carlo method in the cloud-seeding re-evaluations, 
confidence intervals and probability tests were used to assess the power and virtue of the method 
itself. This proliferated throughout the 1960s and 70s in resource allocation work. During this time, 
digital optimization models, especially in linear programming, were deployed in applications such as 
overseeing resource analysis pertaining to water in the U.S. southwest and Navajo territory. A typical 
dissertation in this field of research would be on studying how allocation of water resources affected 
development in an arid environment. In this case, “linear programming techniques [would be] used 
to determine optimum farm output and resource use patterns for different farm models representing 
different farm size groups.”25 While the experiments were designed to establish optimal outcomes 
through the use of specified technique—such as Monte Carlo methods or linear programming 
techniques—(un)certainty work was indispensable to the experiment. confidence logics were used 
first in the collection of farm data, as this still depended on estimation. And they were used in 
assessing the probability that the methods used were accurate in their predictions of optimum 
outcomes.  
Experimental designers referred to their work as being “under uncertainty,” hence the need 
for confidence logics. The initial pentagon designer of the simplex algorithm, George Dantzig, wrote 
a paper titled, “Linear Programming Under Uncertainty.” Digital methods, models, and machines 
                                               
25 Douglas Jones, “Economic aspects of agricultural use of Colorado River water in Yuma County, Arizona,” 
PhD. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1968. See also: James H. Milligan and Calvin G. Clyde, “Optimizing 
Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water,” Reports 199 (1970); Donald William Boyd, “Simulation 
via time-partitioned linear programming: A ground and surface water allocation model for the Gallatin Valley 
of Montana,” WSC ’74 Proceedings of the 7th conference on Winter simulation—Volume 1 (1964): 161-170.  
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were subject to uncertainty in their applications even though the experimental design promised 
yes/no outcomes.26  
 
With 95% Certainty  
 In the introduction to this dissertation, I asserted that algorithmic computing is a 
multinational and multidisciplinary reordering of the informational world, according to axiomatic-
mathematical designs and bounded by computing technology. This definition captures the expansive 
empire of algorithmic society, a society that upholds the algorithm as manager, decision-maker, and 
central oversight in geopolitics, global trade and economic development, military expansionism and 
surveillance, public health, resource allocation and appropriation, and so forth. This definition also 
captures the process of algorithmic computing, the reordering of the informational world, which did not 
occur in a linear trajectory, but through waves of designed crisis and confidence computing—
projects that were manifest as a new statistics, a new method, a new mathematical machine. 
Algorithms, artificial intelligence, computational statistics, decision trees, and the larger family of 
twentieth-century data architectures that make appearances in this dissertation, were designed to 
solve social and environmental problems—crises that were defined in terms of the preexisting 
mathematical infrastructures and techniques that had failed to achieve certainty and control before 
them. These problems were described as a flagging confidence in statistical information, a lack of 
control in manufacturing and breeding processes, as error rates in target accuracy, and persistent 
uncertainty in controlling the climate.  
                                               
26 See: George B. Dantzig, “Linear Programming under Uncertainty,” Management Science 1 (1955): 197-206; 
Abraham Charnes and W.W. Cooper, “Chance-Constrained Programming,” Management Science 6 (1959): 73-
80: Elliott E. Dudnik, “Optimization of planning and architectural decisions under conditions of uncertain 
demand,” DAC ’72 Proceedings of the 9th Design Automation Workshop (1972): 213-219.   
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The human problems and stories in these projects were used as evidence for the need of 
new techniques, they were harnessed for resources, and hidden under a veneer of controlled 
calculation. The anxiety driving these twentieth-century computing initiatives was, at its root, a grasp 
for continued control over the world’s information—algorithmic computing is a preoccupation 
with/by the past that manifests as a conditioned worry about the future. This view of the rise of 
algorithmic computing subverts the notion of a progressive narrative of twentieth-century 
computing—from analog to digital technology and from heuristic to bounded rationality—and 
incites caution about this tendency in our ongoing search for certainty through artificial intelligence. 
The mathematical and political contradictions and complexities existent in earlier iterations persist in 
their new expressions.  
Throughout this dissertation, I have expanded the notion of mathematical experiment to 
include the larger cultural, political, and environmental contexts of uncertainty-work. Designing 
Certainty is organized around four experiments—small-farm confidence computing in interwar 
Poland, the assertion of control logics in New Deal policy, uncertainty management in U.S. 
militarism, and (un)certainty work in cloud-seeding projects. The design of experiments, advanced 
by the Anglophone school of mathematical statistics, was a planning philosophy that reconfigured 
statistical experiments, usually conducted with frequency measures and regressions, into experiments 
organized around confidence, control, and probability logics. Their experiments pertained to small-
scale projects—the testing of virulent particles in a sample, testing a finite set of precipitation data, 
and so on. These experiments were designed to quantify confidence, control, and certainty in the 
experimental results. 
(Un)certainty work constitutes the larger translation of data, evidence, and analysis generated 
from a statistical experiment into probabilistic frameworks. In my genealogy of (un)certainty work 
throughout this dissertation, I show how computational work and analysis were ordered into tables 
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and graphs containing probability measures, and into visual displays and geometric diagrams 
representing probabilistic frameworks. The computational routines of estimating and calculating 
probabilistic outcomes, merged with adding machines, bombsight calculators, optical-display 
devices, digital electronic memory-stored computers, programming code, and automata. Designing 
Certainty’s epistemological story, of uncertainty, ties into stories of technology, labor, and the 
environment that I develop through identifying the larger computing landscapes that support 
(un)certainty work. Data is not only produced in the laboratories where it is computed, it is 
generated through human and environmental intervention, often through processes of radical 
transformation and mass destruction as with industrial agriculture, firestorm bombing, and 
anthropogenic climate change. Historical data streams from its sources and origins into decision-
making procedures, and it impacts the landscape along the way. 
 The dialectic between crisis and computational development outlined in this dissertation 
fueled a growing commitment to probabilistic thinking that by the late 1970s had become 
hegemonic in digital computing and mathematical oversight. Unlike the probability debates of the 
mid-1930s, this epistemological framing now reigns in scientific and social decision-making, without 
major contest. I argue that this transformation is one of the most significant and understudied 
information stories in twentieth-century history of computing. While probability has been at work in 
state and social planning since the Enlightenment, its empire held limited power. It had not yet 
permeated the various realms and dimensions of social thought explored in this dissertation. Current 
uncertainty projects such as: “Probabilistic Weather Forecasting Analysis for Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle Path Planning,” show the layering of (un)certainty work and computing concepts introduced 
in the first half of this dissertation, imbued with philosophies of digital machine interaction from the 
domains of algorithms and automata just discussed. Designing Certainty begins and ends with 
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(un)certainty work in quantitative farm management, only today’s iteration is an outcome of the 
years of war and colonialism that procured it.  
1970s quantitative designs for achieving certain outcomes that were built into digital 
computing programs promised certainty without its achievement. Procedurally, algorithms operate 
as yes/no decision-makers, and automata are conceptualized as intelligent machine networks, but in 
their applications, they remain subject to the uncertainty built into the technologies and landscapes 
that sustain them. Uncertainty persists in designs of certainty. Hearkening back to Jacques Lacan’s 
definition of anxiety as the perverse pleasure of an object’s pursuit—an object that can never be 
obtained—and contextualizing this within this jagged history from fin de siècle through the 1970s, 
there resides the fleeting persistence of this indeterminate mental and political architecture, with 95% 
certainty.  
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